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than a
year ago, a small group of law students founded a new
organization at the University of Tennessee College of Law
that would devote itself to publishing a journal that
explores the issues at the intersection of law and public
policy. With this Inaugural Issue, those students, whose
names are listed at the front of this publication, have
established that journal, the TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW
TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY - More

& POLICY.

Like other law journals, the TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW
& POLICY will publish leading articles on timely subjects
by lawyers, judges, journalists, and scholars. Notes and
comments on important legal cases and public policies,
based upon careful research, will also be published.
Perhaps unlike traditional law journals, however, the
JOURNAL will look beyond traditional legal scholarship and
publish significant essays, commentaries and addresses by
leading news and policy makers.
A student editorial board will be responsible for managing
the JOURNAL's affairs. The editing and preparation of
materials for publication will be done by student editors
who are selected on the basis of scholarship and general,
ability. The Comments and Notes will be written by
student editors. Two members of the Law Faculty, Penny
J. White, Associate Professor of Law, and Otis H.
Stephens, Alumni Distinguished Service Professor of
Political Science and Resident Scholar of Constitutional
Law, will serve in an advisory capacity.
Professors White and Stephens already deserve
extraordinary praise for their patience and enthusiasm.
Future editorial boards and student editors will be guided,
as we have been, by their wise counsel.
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The JOURNAL could not have been established without the
support of Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., the College of Law
Dean and Elvin E. Overton Distinguished Professor of
Law. His generosity and continued commitment to the
TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY will ensure its
continued success. Also deserving of our thanks is George
W. Kuney, Associate Professor of Law and Director of the
Clayton Center for Entrepreneurial Law, whose guidance in
the early stages was, and continues to be, invaluable.
With each Issue, the TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW &

POLICY endeavors to enhance the public's understanding of
questions of law and public policy. We hope this Inaugural
Issue is only the first step.

LEONARD EVANS,

Editor-in-Chief
RICHARD GREENE,

Managing Editor
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Constitutional Sex Discrimination*
Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Lisa Baldez, & Tasina
Nitzschke Nihiser*

Abstract
Nearly thirty years have elapsed since the U.S. Supreme
Court decided Craigv. Boren, a landmark case in the
Court's constitutional sex discrimination jurisprudence. In
Craig, the justices pronounced that they would apply
neither the lowest level of scrutiny-rational basis-nor the
highest level-strict scrutiny-to evaluate claims of sex
* Please

send all correspondence to Lee Epstein. Email:
epstein@artsci.wustl.edu; Post: Department of Political Science,
Washington University, CB 1063, 1 Brookings Drive, St. Louis, MO
63130.
**Lee Epstein is the Edward Mallinckrodt Distinguished University
Professor of Political Science and Professor of Law at Washington
University; Andrew D. Martin is Assistant Professor of Political
Science at Washington University; Lisa Baldez is Associate Professor
of Government at Dartmouth College; Tasina Nitzschke Nihiser is a
Ph.D. student at Washington University. We are grateful to the
National Science Foundation, the Center for New Institutional Social
Science, the Washington University School of Law, and the
Weidenbaum Center on the Economy, Government, and Public Policy,
for supporting our research. We also owe thanks to participants in
Washington University's Workshop on Empirical Research in the Law
("WERL"), Susan Appleton, Jeffrey A. Segal, and Nancy Staudt for
offering many useful suggestions; and to Scott Friedman, David
Lewarchik, Shelby Johnston, and Peter Ryan for outstanding research
assistance. We used R, SPSS, and Stata to conduct the analyses
presented in this paper. The project's web site
(http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/sexdiscrimination.html) houses a full
replication archive, including a database containing all the cases and
variables we used in this study, as well as the documentation necessary
to reproduce our results.
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discrimination. Rather, the Court invoked a standard "in
between" the two, now known as intermediate or
heightened scrutiny. Under this approach, the Court asks
whether a law challenged on equal protection grounds is
substantially related to the achievement of an important
objective.
Certainly the CraigCourt's intermediate approach has
its supporters; indeed, influential legal scholars are now
advocating that courts adopt it to evaluate laws
discriminating against gays and lesbians. But to many
analysts, Craig(and its progeny) was and remains highly
problematic. Among their claims is that the standard it
instantiated is so "loose" and "amorphous" that it produces
unpredictable results.
In this article, we seek to bring some empirical teeth to
this debate by exploring patterns in sex discrimination
litigation in the U.S. Supreme Court and in state courts of
last resort. Our chief finding is that the critics of
heightened scrutiny probably have the better case. At the
very least, the Craigstandard-while generating outcomes
more favorable to parties alleging sex discrimination than
did the traditional rational basis test-does, in fact, lead to
far less predictable results than either rational basis or strict
scrutiny. For reasons that may have little to do with the
standard itself, courts are just as likely to uphold sex-based
classifications as they are to eradicate them.
This finding has important implications for the future of
sex discrimination litigation, as well as for the
advancement of legal rights for gays and lesbians. As to
the former, our results underscore the importance of
elevating the standard used to adjudicate sex discrimination
claims-a goal, as we demonstrate, that could be achieved
in several distinct ways. As to gays and lesbians, our
findings identify the possible costs and benefits associated
with a litigation strategy designed to place their claims of
discrimination in the intermediate scrutiny basket.
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I. Introduction
Nearly thirty years have elapsed since the U.S.
Supreme Court decided Craigv. Boren,' a landmark in its
constitutional sex discrimination jurisprudence. 2 In Craig,
' 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
2Id. We follow Mary Anne Case, ConstitutionalSex Discrimination:
The Law as a QuestforPerfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1447,
1447 (2000) and "use the term 'sex discrimination' to refer to
discrimination between males and females." The vast majority of
Supreme Court inquiries into denials of equal protection on grounds of
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the justices pronounced that they would apply neither the
lowest level of scrutiny-rational basis-nor the highest
level- strict scrutiny--to evaluate claims of sex
discrimination. 3 Rather, they would invoke a standard "in
between" the two, now known as intermediate or
heightened scrutiny. Under this approach, the Court asks
whether a law challenged on equal protection grounds is
substantially related to the achievement of an important

sex-our chief concern in this Article-have focused on this type of
discrimination, that is, "on deprivations caused by rules that, on their
face, distinguish between males and females." Id.
3 Since we provide more details about these levels of scrutiny in Part
II, suffice it to note here that prior to Craig,the Court.invoked a twotier approach to equal protection claims. Under this model, the Justices
upheld legislation so long as it was rationally related to a
legitimate governmental purpose, unless that legislation
impinged upon a "fundamental right" or classified on the
basis of a "suspect trait" like race or ethnicity. Where a
law employed a "suspect classification" or restricted the
exercise of a "fundamental right," the Court applied "strict
scrutiny," requiring that the government establish that the
legislation was necessary to a compelling governmental
objective and that no less restrictive alternative was
available.
Peter S. Smith, The Demise of Three-Tier Review. Has the United
States Supreme CourtAdopted a "SlidingScale" Approach Toward
Equal ProtectionJurisprudence?, 23 J. CONTEMP. L. 475, 477 (1997).
See also LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
FOR A CHANGING AMERICA: RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, AND JUSTICE (2004);
DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2003); SUSAN G.

MEZEY, ELUSIVE EQUALITY (2003); Norman T. Deutsch, Nguyen v.
INS and the Application of IntermediateScrutiny to Gender
Classifications,30 PEPP. L. REv. 185 (2003); Michael C. Dorf, The
Paths to LegalEquality, 90 CAL L. REv. 791 (2002); Gerald Gunther,
Foreword:In Search ofEvolving Doctrineon a ChangingCourt: A
Modelfor a Newer EqualProtection 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1971); Risa
E. Kaufman, State ERAs in the New Era: Securing Poor Women's
Equality by EliminatingReproductive-BasedDiscrimination,24 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 191 (2001).

14
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4

objective.
Since Craig,the Court has tinkered with this "inbetween" standard. Most notably, in United States v.
Virginia (the "VMJ case") 5 it seemed to "ratchet up"
Craig,6 stating that it would require an "exceedingly
persuasive justification" to sustain a sex-based
classification. 7 Tinkering, as it turns out, is the operative
word. Despite the speculation of some commentators, 8 and
4 Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
5 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
6 Martha C. Daughtrey, Women

and the Constitution, 75 N.Y.U. L.

REv. 1, 21 (2000) (suggesting that in VMI, "Justice Ginsburg ratcheted
up the already 'heightened scrutiny' another notch or two."); see also
Dorf, supra note 3 (claiming that "United States v. Virginia arguably
ratcheted up the level ofjudicial scrutiny applicable to sex
classifications from intermediate to nearly strict."); infra notes 8 and 9.
7 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531 ("Parties who seek
to
defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an
'exceedingly persuasive justification' for that action. Today's skeptical
scrutiny of official action denying rights or opportunities based on sex
responds to volumes of history."). Some trace this language back to
Mississippi Univ.for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,724 (1982) and
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. TB., 511 U.S. 127,136 (1994). See, e.g.,
Smith, supra note 3 at n. 17 (asserting that "in recent gender
discrimination challenges, the Court has applied a super-heightened
scrutiny to equal protection challenges. The language for this
redefinition of intermediate review derives from Hogan (requiring that
gender-based governmental action demonstrate an 'exceedingly
persuasive justification.')."); see also David K. Bowsher, Cracking the
Code ofUnited States v. Virginia, 48 DUKE L.J. 305,320 (1998); Jason
M. Skaggs, Justifying Gender-BasedAffirmative Action under United
States v. Virginia's "Exceedingly PersuasiveJustification" Standard,
86 CAL L. REv. 1169,1170 (1998); Laura Weinrib, ProtectingSex:
Sexual Disincentives and Sex-Based Discriminationin Nguyen v. INS,
12 COLUM. J. GENDER& L. 222,228 (2003).
8 As Heather L. Stobaugh notes:
Over the years, commentators have argued that Justice
Ginsburg's use of "skeptical scrutiny" and her heavy
reliance on the "exceedingly persuasive justification"
language in the majority opinion of Virginia introduced a

15
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even Court members, 9 United States v. Virginia has hardly
generated a sea-change in the Court's approach to sex
discrimination. In fact, in its most recent forays into the
area the majority of the Court backed off Virginia,10
stricter test into cases involving gender-based
classifications as opposed to the traditional level of
intermediate scrutiny established in Craig v. Boren.
Heather L. Stobaugh, The Aftermath of-United States v. Virginia, 55
SMU L. REv. 1755, 1755 (2002). For commentary illustrating
Stobaugh's claim, see, e.g., Steven A. Delchin, United States v.
Virginia and OurEvolving "Constitution": Playing Peek-a-boo with
the Standardof Scrutinyfor Sex-Based Classifications,47 CASE W.
RES. L. REv 1121, 1134 (1997) (arguing that "VM! may be the
instrument for establishing strict scrutiny"); Cass Sunstein, Foreword:
Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARv. L. REv. 6, 73 (1996).
9 For example, in his dissent in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at
574, Justice Scalia accused the majority of"a de facto abandonment of
... intermediate scrutiny." See also Daughtrey, supra note 6, at 22,
who writes that "in an address to the University of Virginia School of
Law shortly after the VMIdecision was announced, [Justice Ginsburg
said,] 'There is no practical difference between what has evolved and
the ERA."'
10 Since VMI, the Court has decided two cases mounting constitutional
challenges to sex-based classifications, Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420
(1998) and Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001). In both, it upheld the
classification and invoked the specter of Craig,rather than VM, in the
process. As to Miller,the majority wrote, "[e]ven if, as petitioner and
her amici argue, the heightened scrutiny that normally governs gender
discrimination claims applied in this context, we are persuaded that the
requirement imposed by § 1409(a)(4) on children of unmarried male,
but not female, citizens is substantially related to important
governmental objectives." Miller, 523 U.S. at 434 n. 11 (citation
omitted). Many scholars argue that this language "cannot be squared
with... Court doctrine prohibiting sex-based classifications that are
not supported by 'exceedingly persuasive justifications'." Cornelia T.
L. Pillard and T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary
Power, 1998 SuP. CT. REv. 1 (1998). See also Kristin Collins, When
Fathers'Rightsare Mothers'Duties, 109 YALE L. J. 1669 (2002);
Emily J. Gelhaus, The New Lower Standardfor Equal Protection
Claims ConcerningGender, 71 U. CN. L. REv 305. As to Nguyen, the
Court's majority claimed that "[fror a gender-based classification to

16
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retreating to the familiar territory of Craig." "The message
of United States v. Virginia," turned out to be "no different
from Craig: gender classifications are subject to

withstand equal protection scrutiny, it must be established 'at least that
the [challenged] classification serves important governmental
objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives."' Nguyen,
533 U.S. at 60. Because the Court once again relied on the standard
articulated in Craig rather than the standard of VMI and Nguyen, many
scholars argue that this represented "a marked shift away from the
Court's gender-based equal protection analysis set forth in Virginia."
Stobaugh, supra note 8, at 1756. See also Dorf, supra note 3, at n. 93
(suggesting that while "United States v. Virginia arguably ratcheted up
the level ofjudicial scrutiny ... Nguyen ... ratcheted it back down.").
Stobaugh speculates that this "retreat" from Virginia occurred because
five Justices united to pull in the reins on the use of the
"exceedingly persuasive justification," which they believe
imposes a higher level of scrutiny on gender-based
classifications under Justice Ginsburg's Virginia opinion.
In other words, five Justices saw this area of the Court's
jurisprudence moving in a direction they did not
support-toward treating gender as a suspect class-and
they used Nguyen to prevent that result.
Stobaugh, supra note 8 at 1757.
11 See Weinrib, supra note 7, at 227 (stating that "in light of the
landmark anti-discriminatory outcome of United States v. Virginia...
the apparent retreat in Nguyen came to many as an unpleasant
surprise."); Stobaugh, supra note 8, at 1756 (noting that "[d]espite such
scholarly speculation about Virginia'spositive impact on future
gender-based equal protection claims, it now appears not enough
weight was given to those Justices who had expressed a strong dislike
for the 'exceedingly persuasive justification' language and had
disapproved of Justice Ginsburg's heavy reliance on it."); Bowsher,
supra note 7, at 318 ("The Court has repeatedly applied the standard
expressed in Craig without any further changes to the message."). Also
worth noting are Bowsher's findings, at 306-07, that "[o]f the six
federal Courts of Appeals that have considered whether United States v.
Virginia heightened the standard of scrutiny, five have concluded that it
did not."

17
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intermediate scrutiny."12
Certainly Craig'sintermediate approach has its
supporters; 3 influential legal scholars are now advocating
that courts adopt it to evaluate laws discriminating against
gays and lesbians. 14 But to many analysts, Craig (and its
12 Bowsher, supranote 7, at 320. But see Edward M. Gaffney, Curious
Chiasma, 4 U. PENN.J. CONST. L. 394,396-97 (2002) (claiming that "if
the formal language of the standard used to evaluate claims of gender
discrimination is not strict scrutiny, it is something very close to that
sort of exacting review. It rarely meets a classification that it likes ....
From Hoyt v. Floridato United States v. Virginia, the movement in the
protection of gender equality has been from low to high, from toothless
irrationality to de facto strict scrutiny.").
13See, e.g., Bowsher, supra note 7, at 317-18 (arguing that "despite the
objections of three members of the CraigCourt, intermediate scrutiny
has since proven to be very workable."); Collin O'Connor Udell,
SignalingA New Direction in Gender ClassificationScrutiny, 29
CoNN. L. REv. 521, 548 (1996) (claiming that "from a feminist
perspective, the intermediate scrutiny standard was certainly preferable
to the 'mere rationality' formulation," but also asserting that "we can
do better [than Craig].");Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 724 n.9 (1982) ("when a classification expressly discriminates on
the basis of gender, the analysis and level of scrutiny... does not vary
simply because the objective appears acceptable to individual Members
of the Court.").
14 Some commentators urge the application of heightened scrutiny to
laws that discriminate between homosexuals and heterosexuals, that is,
these analysts "seek to gamer intermediate scrutiny for gays as gays."
Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The LiteraryArgumentfor
HeightenedScrutinyfor Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753. See, e.g., Ann
Shalleck, RevisitingEquality: Feminist Thought About Intermediate
Scrutiny, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & LAW 31 (1997) ("As in the struggle for
women's equality, heightened constitutional scrutiny matters both
symbolically and practically in the movement for gay and lesbian
rights."); Yoshino, at 1756 ("In the near future, the United States
Supreme Court is likely to consider the argument that gays should
receive heightened scrutiny... The main purpose of this Article is to
strengthen [that] argument.") Another group of commentators suggest
that discrimination against gays and lesbians is, in fact, discrimination
on the basis of sex. Hence, courts should apply the same level of
scrutiny to classifications based on sexual orientation as they do for

18
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progeny) was and remains highly problematic. Among
their claims is that the standard it instantiated is so
"loose"15 and "amorphous" 16 that it produces unpredictable
results17-So much so that it was "only a partial victory in
women's rights advocates' campaign for equality." 18
In this article we seek to bring some empirical teeth
to this debate by exploring patterns in sex discrimination
litigation in the U.S. Supreme Court and in state courts of
last resort.' 9 Our chief finding is that the critics of
laws that discriminate on the basis of sex. See Andrew Koppelman,
Why DiscriminationAgainst Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex
Discrimination,69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994); Sylvia A. Law,
Homosexuality and the Social Meaning ofGender, 1988 Wis. L. REV.
187. See also Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN.
L. REv. 45, 81 (1996) (stating that an "equality-based argument against
antigay policies is that such policies constitute gender discrimination
....When one is barred from entering into a marriage with a same-sex
partner who satisfies all other legal criteria of marriage eligibility, then
one has been denied a marriage license solely because of sex. This
triggers intermediate scrutiny."); Andrea L. Clausen, Marriageof
Same-Sex Couples in Iowa, 6 J. GENDER, RACE, & JUST. 451, 461
(2002) ("[I]f the Iowa Supreme Court were to recognize denial of
same-sex marriage as a sex-based claim, but did not want to classify
sex as a suspect class, the court could use intermediate scrutiny.");
SUZANNE PHARR, HOMOPHOBIA: AWEAPON OF SExISM (1988).

See

also infra Part IV. For commentary advocating the use of intermediate
scrutiny in other areas, see Rosemary M. Kennedy, The Treatment of
Women Prisonersafter the VMIDecision, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & LAW
65 (1997) and Tamra M. Boyd, Keeping the Constitution's Promise:An
Argumentfor GreaterJudicialScrutiny of FederalAlienage
Classifications, 54 STAN. L. REv. 319 (2001).
15 Justice David Souter, quoted in Skaggs, supra note 7, at 1190.
16 Joan A. Lukey and Jeffrey A. Smagula, Do We Still Need a Federal
EqualRights Amendment?, 44 BoSTON BAR J. 10, 26 (2000).
See also, John Galotto, Strict Scrutinyfor Gender,via Croson, 93
COLUM. L. REv. 508, 545 (1993) (writing that the "standard is chafing
at the Court and [unconvincing] to most scholars.").
18 Shalleck, supra note 14, at 33.
19 In Part III, we explain why we focus on state courts of last resort
rather than on the lower federal bench. Suffice it to note here that

19
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heightened scrutiny probably have the better case. At the
very least, the Craig standard-while generating outcomes
more favorable to parties alleging sex discrimination than
did the traditional rational basis test-does, in fact, lead to
far less predictable results than either rational basis or strict
scrutiny. Courts are, for reasons that may have little to do
with the standard itself, just as likely to uphold sex-based
classifications as they are to eradicate them.
This finding has important implications for the
future of sex discrimination litigation, as well as for the
advancement of legal rights for gays and lesbians. As to
the former, our results underscore the importance of
elevating the standard used to adjudicate sex discrimination
claims-a goal, as we demonstrate, that could be achieved
in several distinct ways. As to gays and lesbians, our
findings identify the possible costs and benefits associated
with a litigation strategy designed to place their claims of
discrimination in the intermediate scrutiny basket. 20
We arrive at these implications in three steps. We
begin in Part II with a description of the three-tier approach
federal courts use to analyze claims of discrimination under
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause,
along with a long-standing critique of that approach-that
it leads, especially in the mid-level tier, to indeterminate
results. In Part III, we demonstrate that this critique has
merit. In particular, we show that while the application of
the lowest and highest standards does, in fact, lead to rather
predictable outcomes, the "in-between" standard does not.
This result leads us in Part IV to emphasize the importance
of elevating sex to the highest level of scrutiny and to
question efforts designed to treat discrimination against
gays and lesbians as sex discrimination-at least until
because all three levels of scrutiny have been used in these courts to
adjudicate claims of constitutional sex discrimination, they provide

excellent laboratories for exploring patterns in this area of the law.
20 See supranote 14 and infra Part IV B.

20

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY [VOL. I, 1]

21

courts move away from Craig'sin-between test.
II. Equal Protection and the Supreme Court
To say that the Supreme Court's equal protection
jurisprudence has generated its fair share of commentary
over the past few years is to make a rather uncontroversial
claim. In fact, in the wake of recent decisions in the areas
of sex discrimination, 2 ' affirmative action,22 and gay
rights, 23 scholars have scrutinized virtually every aspect of
the Justices' approach to classifications based on sex, race,
sexual orientation, and the like. 24 We do not intend to
review the range of commentary, which would require a
book or two. Instead we have two objectives. First, since
an appreciation of current debates over Craig and its
progeny requires some knowledge of the Court's three-tier
approach to equal protection, we provide a brief overview
of it in Part II A. Not much more is necessary since it has
been so well described elsewhere.25 Second, since we
explicitly seek to put the debate on firmer empirical
ground, we identify in Part II B the chief claims of both
proponents and opponents of the Court's jurisprudence,
first with regard to the determinancy of the results yielded
by the current three-tier approach, and then with particular
emphasis on its application to sex discrimination.

21 See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
22 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger,

539

U.S. 244 (2003).
23 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), reh 'gdenied, 124 S.Ct. 35
(2003).
4 For a recent and particularly insightful analysis, see Robert C. Post,

Foreword:Fashioningthe Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and
Law, 117 HARv. L. REv. 4 (2003).
25 For a sampling of work, see supra note 3.
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A. The Three- TierApproach to Equal Protection
To analyze claims of discrimination under the
26
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause,
judges, at least until Craig, applied one of two standards. 27
Under the traditional rational basis test, as Table 1 shows,
courts presume the validity of whatever classification the
government has made (e.g., allowing only those over the
age of 18 to enter into contracts, or permitting only M.D.s
to perform surgery); it is up to the party challenging the law
to establish that it is irrational. Since this burden is difficult
to meet, the conventional view among scholarly
commentators is that rational basis leads to a predictable
outcome: courts defer to the government, generally
upholding its classification.28

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is
restricted to the states; the governing constitutional provision for claims
of discrimination against the federal government is the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. For purposes of our discussion on sex
discrimination, the two clauses are interchangeable.
27 We adopt and adapt some of the discussion in this Part
from Lee
Epstein et al., Do We Still Need an ERA? at
http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/ERA.html.
28 See, e.g., EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 3; MEZEY, supra note 3;
Barbara A. Brown et al., The EqualRights Amendment: A
ConstitutionalBasisfor EqualRightsfor Women, 80 YALE L. J. 871
(1971); Gunther, supra note 3; Kaufman, supranote 3. As we
foreshadowed in Part I, some contemporary commentators take issue
with this prediction.
For their views, see Part II B.
26
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Table 1. Equal protection tests

Test

Example of
Application

Rational Basis

Age discrimination

The law must be a reasonablemeasure designed to achieve a legitimate government
purpose,

Intermediate scrutiny

Sex discrimination

The law must be substantiallyrelated to
the achievement of an important objective.

Strict scrutiny

Race discrimination

The law must be the least restrictive
means available to achieve a compdling
state interest.

Validity Standard

Until the 1970s, the vast majority of claims of
discrimination proceeded under the rules of the traditional
rational basis test-with one particularly relevant
exception: race. In light of the history surrounding
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has
held that classifications based on race should be subject to a
less surmountable standard, known as "strict scrutiny" (or
"suspect class").30 Under this standard, judges presume
that a government action is suspect or unconstitutional.
Only by showing that the law is the least restrictive means
available to achieve a compelling state interest can the
government overcome that presumption (see Table 1).
Given the difficulty of making this showing, a conventional
EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 3, at 645. See also supra note 3 and
infra note 89.
30 See supporting citations supra note 3.
29
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wisdom emerged: the application of strict scrutiny
generally leads to outcomes just as predictable as those
under rational basis--only, of course, in the opposite
direction: when courts apply this stricter test, they almost
always rule in favor of the party alleging discrimination.
Or, as Gunther famously put it, the suspect class test is
"'strict' in theory and fatal in fact," whereas the traditional
rational basis standard provides "minimal scrutiny in theory
and virtually none in fact."'"
It is thus no wonder that as part of their attempt to
eradicate discrimination, women's rights groups, beginning
in the late 1960s, attempted to convince courts that sexbased classifications should be subject to strict scrutiny
rather than to a rational basis analysis.32 Their litigation
efforts did not succeed, but neither did they wholly fail. In
response to their claims, the U.S. Supreme Court in Craig
v. Boren33 articulated a new standard, often called
intermediate or heightened scrutiny, that falls somewhere
between rational basis and strict scrutiny. 34 Under it, the
31 Gunther, supra note 3, at 8. Justice O'Connor has taken issue with
this claim, asserting strict scrutiny is not always "strict in theory, but
fatal in fact." Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2338. Some scholars agree, arguing
more broadly, as we do in Part II B, that the standard three-tier
approach fails to produce reliable expectations. Nonetheless, it is true
that many contemporary commentators suggest that Gunther's assertion
remains generally apt. See, e.g., EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 3;
MEZEY, supra note 3; Farber et al., supra note 3; Lukey, supra note 16.
See also Part III for our attempt to empirically evaluate this debate.
32 For descriptions of these efforts, see generally Daughtrey, supra note
6; Karen O'Connor & Lee Epstein, Beyond Legislative Lobbying:
Women's Rights Groups and the Supreme Court, 67 JUDICATURE 134
1983).
3 Craig,429 U.S. at 218.
34 For a history of the litigation leading up to Craig, including the
Court's decisions in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) and Frontierov.
Richardson,411 U.S. 677 (1973), see LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT,
THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); Daughtrey, supra note 6;

Gaffney, supra note 12; Weinrib, supra note 7.
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challenged law must be substantially related to the
achievement of an important government objective (see
Table 1)."
Many argue that application of intermediate
scrutiny leads to more favorable outcomes for parties
alleging sex discrimination than did the traditional
standard. 36 At the same time, though, they suggest that the
intermediate approach, as opposed to rational basis or strict
scrutiny, produces far less predictable results: the Court
may more often than not void sex-based classifications, but
it more than occasionally upholds them.
B. Assessments of the Three-TierApproach
As we noted at the onset of this section, no shortage
of critical commentary exists on the Court's three-tier
approach to equal protection. Some comes from the bench
itself, such as Justice Stevens's statement that "there is only
one Equal Protection Clause. It requires every State to
govern impartially. It does not direct the courts to apply
35 As we explained in Part I, in UnitedStates v. Virginia, the majority
articulated a variation on this approach which would require an
"exceedingly persuasive justification" to sustain a sex-based
classification. See supra note 7. But in its two most recent cases the
Court "retreated" to the standard articulated in Craig. See supra note
10.
36 See, e.g., Udell, supra note 13 (noting that "from
a feminist
perspective, the intermediate scrutiny standard was certainly preferable
to the 'mere rationality' formulation"). See also LESLIE F. GOLDSTEIN,
CONTEMPORARY CASES IN WOMEN'S RIGHTS (1994); Case, supra note
2.
37 See, e.g., MEZEY, supra note 3; Deborah L. Brake, Sex as a Suspect
Class: An Argument for Applying Strict Scrutiny to Gender
Discrimination, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 953 (1996); Erin Chlopak,
MandatoryMotherhood andFrustratedFatherhood: The Supreme
Court's Preservationof Gender Discriminationin American
Citizenship, 51 AM. U. L. REv. 967 (2002); Deutsch, supra note 3;
Lukey, supra note 16.
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one standard of review in some cases and a different
standard in other cases. 38 There are numerous critics of the
heightened scrutiny standard in particular. Mary Ann Case,
for example, asserts that "the components" of the
intermediate standard "have rarely been the moving parts in
a Supreme Court sex discrimination decision, 39 whereas
Jason Skaggs points out the inconsistency of "subject[ing]
gender-based affirmative action programs to strict scrutiny
gender-based classifications under
while analyzing all other
' 4°
scrutiny.
intermediate
These scholars make interesting and useful points.
Especially relevant for our project, though, are analyses
centering on the reliability of the results yielded by the
three-tier approach. 4' The issue raised in these analyses38 Craig,429 U.S. at 211-12. Justice Stevens was responding to a
potential critique of the now three-tiered, as opposed to the traditional

two-tiered, approach. As he goes on to say: "Whatever criticism may be
leveled at a judicial opinion implying that there are at least three such

standards applies with the same force to a double standard."

39 Case, supra note 2, at 1449. Rather, she says, "to determine whether
there is unconstitutional sex discrimination, one need generally ask
only two questions: 1) Is the rule or practice at issue sex-respecting,
that is to say, does it distinguish on its face between males and
females? and 2) Does the sex-respecting rule rely on a stereotype?"

Skaggs, supra note 7, at 1174-75. For other critiques, see Shalleck,
supra note 14 (strict-scrutiny standard as applied to gender issues also
40

important for gay and lesbian rights); Katharine B. Silbaugh, Miller v.

Albright: Problemsof Constitutionalizationin FamilyLaw, 79 B.U. L.
REv. 1139 (1999). For more general commentary on the Court's
jurisprudential posture toward women's rights, see JUDITH A. BAER,
OUR LIVES BEFORE THE LAW: CONSTRUCTING A FEMINIST

JURISPRUDENCE (1999) (suggesting that it has worked to reinforce male

dominance).
41 See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules ofInference, 69 U. Cn. L.
REv. 1, 83 (2002):
Reliability, [in empirical research], is the extent to

which it is possible to replicate a measurement,
reproducing the same value (regardless of whether it
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whether various legal standards produce predictable and
consistent outcomes-is important for many reasons, not
the least of which is the implication for the norm of stare
decisis. If courts decline to follow precedential rules of law
or do so in unpredictable ways, they risk undermining their
fundamental efficacy. Members of the legal and political
communities predicate future expectations on the
assumption that others will follow existing rules. Should
courts make radical changes or apply rules inconsistently,
these communities may be left unable to adapt.42
From this general logic emerge two specific
critiques of the Court's equal protection jurisprudence.
One, which has emerged in recent years, suggests that a
three-tier approach no longer provides an adequate
framework for reliable expectations about court decisions;
the other, a more conventional view we previewed in Part
is the right one) on the same standard for the same
subject at the same time. If any one of us stepped on
the same bathroom scale 100 times in a row, and if
the scale [was] working properly, it would give us the
same weight 100 times in a row-even if that weight
is not accurate. (In contrast, a scale that is both

reliable and valid will give a reading that is both the
same and accurate 100 times in a row.) In other
words, in empirical research we deem a measure
reliable when it produces the same results repeatedly
regardless of who or what is actually doing the
measuring.
Id. This, it seems to us, is very similar to the criteria many
commentators use to evaluate the predictability of legal
standards.
42 See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, supra note 34;
Jack Knight &
Lee Epstein, The Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 AM. J. POL ScI. 1018. It is
along similar lines that scholars are concerned with reliability. They
suggest that unreliable measurement procedures might provide
evidence that the researcher, however inadvertently, has biased a
measure in favor of a personal hypothesis, which can then undermine

any inferences reached therein. See Epstein & King, supra note 41, at
83.
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IIA, asserts that while intermediate scrutiny may be
relatively unpredictable, the two lowest and highest tiers
are not. As a general matter, the application of rational
basis leads courts to uphold classifications and the
application of strict scrutiny leads courts to strike them
down.
Those who believe that the standard equal
protection framework no longer produces uniform results
(if, in fact, it ever did) do so for various reasons. For
Ashutosh Bhagwat, the problem is that the "the Court has
failed to develop any coherent framework regarding how,
in applying the tiers of scrutiny, courts are to assess
whether the governmental interest asserted satisfies the
requirements of the level of scrutiny at issue. 43 In Robert
Post's view, the Court can circumvent the three-tier
approach altogether by strategically avoiding (even
obvious) equal protection arguments. 44 The commonalities
among these and other critiques, however,45may be more
43 Ashutosh Bhagwat, Affirmative Action and Compelling Interests:
Equal ProtectionJurisprudenceat the Crossroads, 4 U. PA. J. CONST.

L. 260, 270 (2002).
44 Post, supra note 24, at 99-101. He specifically points to Lawrence v.
Texas, 124 S. Ct. 441 (2003), in which passages in the majority's
opinion "sound almost entirely in equal protection," but which the
Court decided on due process grounds. Id. at 99. Post argues that the
justices took this route to avoid determining "whether classifications
based upon sexual orientation should receive elevated scrutiny or
merely rational basis review." Id. at 100. Such strategic
"instrumentation" on the part ofjudges seems to occur in other areas of
the law, in other forms, and for a range of reasons. See Lee Epstein et
al., Dynamic Agenda-Setting on the Supreme Court: An Empirical
Assessment, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395 (2002); Emerson H. Tiller &
Pablo T. Spiller, StrategicInstruments: Legal Structure and Political
Games in Administrative Law, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 349, 362 (1999).
45 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 3, at 476 (asserting "[t]he Rehnquist
Court is moving away from [a three-tiered scheme of review] toward a
more flexible approach. Moreover, even under the three-tier
framework, the Court balances the importance of the rights or interests
at stake with the government's justification for the discriminatory
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interesting than their differences. Broadly speaking, the
argument advanced in study after study of judicial
decisions is that although institutions-including legal
standards-are certainly important, they are not as
determinative as the three-tier framework might suggest.
Indeed, the extant literature typically defines an institution
as a set of rules that structures an interaction, 46 not as rules
that establish outcome. Furthermore, it typically views the
choices judges make as a function of many other forces,
including personal political preferences, jurisprudential
values, personal attributes, and the external environment in
which they deliberate.47
There are multiple examples within the equal
protection realm that demonstrate the inadequacy of the
three-tier framework. 48 Commentators choose among a
wide array of disputes to justify their position-from
Romer v. Evans, in which the Court "use[d] the
heightened scrutiny mode of analysis when it claim[ed] to
legislation in selecting and defining the appropriate tier. Recent cases
have made it clear that the Court covertly employs [this] approach in
every equal protection challenge.")
46

See, e.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 34; WALTER F. MURPHY,

ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964).
THE
47

See, e.g., DANIEL R. PINELLO, GAY RIGHTS AND AMERICAN LAW

(2003); Gregory A. Caldeira et al., SophisticatedVoting and GateKeeping in the Supreme Court, 15 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 549 (1999);
Erwin Chemerinsky, Understandingthe Rehnquist Court: An Admiring
Reply to ProfessorMerrill, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 659 (2003); Frank B.
Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, JudicialPartisanshipand Obedience to
Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the FederalCourts ofAppeals, 107
YALE L.J. 2155 (1998); Epstein & Knight, supra note 34; Tracey
George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme CourtDecision
Making, 86 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 323 (1992); Gerard S. Gryski et al.,
Models of State High Court Decision Making in Sex Discrimination
Cases, 48 J. POL. 143; DANIEL R. PINELLO, GAY RIGHTS AND
AMERICAN LAW (2003); Richard L. Revesz, EnvironmentalRegulation,
Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997).
41 See supra note 47.
49 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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be employing rational basis review;" 50 to United States v.
Virginia, in which the Court, at least according to Justice
Scalia 5 applied strict (not heightened) scrutiny to assess a
sex-based classification; to Grutterv. Bollinger,2 in which
the Court applied strict scrutiny but nonetheless upheld the
University of Michigan Law School's use of race in
admissions decisions. In short, because "the applicable
level of scrutiny remains susceptible to modificationeither ratcheted up to the most demanding standard or
reduced to the most permissive test" 3-predictability is all
but lost.
Many scholars, perhaps the majority, take issue
with the purported inconsistency as it pertains to the
highest and lowest levels of the three-tier approach. As we
foreshadowed in Part II A, they say, and have long said,
that these two extreme tiers have "evolved sub silentio so
that the highest level, strict scrutiny, equates to an almost
automatic conclusion of unconstitutionality, and the lowest,
rational basis review, leads to an equally likely result of
constitutionality." 4 These analysts are aware of Romer and
Grutter. They simply suggest that these cases are the
exceptions to the general rule, as espoused by Gerald
Gunther: strict scrutiny is "'strict' in theory and fatal in
fact," while rational basis provides55"minimal scrutiny in
theory and virtually none in fact."
While proponents of the three-tier approach differ
with critics on the expectations created by the rational basis
and strict scrutiny tests, there is virtually universal
50 Srmith, supra note 3 at 476.

51See supra note 9. Justice Scalia is not alone. See supra note 8
scholarly works supporting Scalia's contention).
2 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
53 Melanie K. Morris, Ruth Bader Ginsburgand Gender Equality: A
Reassessmentof Her Contribution, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN' S L. J. 1,2021.
54 Bhagwat, supra note 43, at 270.
55 Gunther, supra note 3, at 8.
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agreement on the inherent unpredictability of the
intermediate standard. Or, as Joan Lukey puts it:
Brennan's language in Craigindicated that this
new test was more than the rational basis
standard, under which classifications were
almost always upheld. Still, it fell short of the
onus of the strict scrutiny standard, under which
almost every classification was struck down. It
seemed that the concept of 'intermediate
scrutiny' constituted a malleable, rather
indeterminate standard of review, providing
little or no guidance for lower courts-or even
for future Supreme Court cases.56
Several members of the current Supreme Court agree.
During his confirmation proceedings, Justice Souter
declared that the intermediate scrutiny test "is not good,
sound protection. It is too loose., 57 Prior to joining the
Court, Justice Ginsburg cautioned that "variance within the
federal judiciary will persist until the High Court provides
unequivocal guidance by designating sex as a suspect
classification requiring the application of strict judicial
scrutiny., 58 Dissenting in Craig,Justice Rehnquist asked:
How is this Court to divine what objectives are
important? How is it to determine whether a
particular law is 'substantially' related to the
achievement of such objective, rather than
56 Lukey, supra note 16, at 26. See also Udell, supra note 13, at 547

(arguing that "the Justices can draft such divergent opinions in their
ajplication of the intermediate scrutiny standard..
Skaggs, supra note 7, at 1190.

58 See Morris, supra note 53, at 21. Ginsburg made this claim in Brief
of Amici Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union et al. at 14,
Wengler v. DruggistsMut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (No. 79-381).
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related in some other way to its achievement?
Both of the phrases used are so diaphanous and
elastic as to invite subjective judicial
preferences or prejudices relating to particular
types of legislation, masquerading as judgments
59

Two of the Court's most recent constitutional sex
discrimination decisions illustrate these concerns. In
United States v. Virginia, the U.S. government implored the
Court to apply strict scrutiny to sex-based classifications,
an invitation that Justice Scalia, along with many scholars,
contend the majority "effectively" accepted. 60
Nevertheless, in a scathing critique of intermediate
scrutiny, Norman Deutsch writes that "[t]he shoe was on
the other foot in the Court's most recent gender case,
Nguyen v. INS.'' 61 In the course of upholding the law at
issue-one that privileges a mother over a father in
citizenship proceedings-the Nguyen majority held that the
sex-based classification achieved important government
interests and passed the heightened scrutiny test. Justice
O'Connor disagreed. In a vigorous dissent, she went so far
as to accuse the Court of explaining and applying
"heightened scrutiny... in a manner... that is a stranger to
our precedents. 62 O'Connor went on to say that:
No one should mistake the majority's analysis
for a careful application of this Court's equal
'9 Craig, 429 U.S. at 221 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

60 See supra note 9. See also Delchin, supra note 8 (arguing that

"while Justice Ginsburg never expressly referred to the Government's
argument in her majority opinion, several factors support Justice
Scalia's contention that the Court [adopted strict scrutiny]"); Sunstein,
supra note 8.
61 Deutsch, supra note 3, at 187.
62 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 74.
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protection jurisprudence concerning sex-based
classifications. Today's decision instead
represents a deviation from a line of cases in
which we have vigilantly applied heightened
scrutiny to such classifications to determine
whether a constitutional violation has occurred.
I trust that the depth and vitality of these
precedents will ensure 63that today's error
remains an aberration.
In short, O'Connor "not so subtly implied that the majority
had, in effect, not applied
intermediate scrutiny, but
' €4
rational basis review. /
It is hardly a surprise that many scholars, regardless
of what position they take over rational basis and strict
scrutiny, have come to see that:
[D]ispute over the proper application of the
standard of review in Nguyen and Virginia is
symptomatic of the fact that intermediate
scrutiny is a 'made up' rule that has had little
effect on the outcome of the decisions .... [I]n
the end, the results in the cases turn on how the
Court and the individual Justices view the
underlying facts and policies, rather than on the
verbalization of the standard of review as
intermediate scrutiny.65
If this is true, then as long as the Court continues to invoke
the "murky" Craigrule, it will uphold or void
classifications as it sees fit; and judges on state and lower
federal courts will do the same or even "concoct" their own
63 Id. at 97.

Deutsch, supra note 3 at 187.

64

65

1d. at

187-88.
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approaches to sex discrimination. 66 As a result, all
predictability, reliability, and consistency is lost.
I. An Empirical Analysis of the Equal Protection Tests
Several commentators dispute this view of
intermediate scrutiny, claiming instead that its results are
just as determinant as the rational basis and strict scrutiny
tests. Edward Gaffney is exemplary: "If the formal
language of the standard used to evaluate claims of gender
discrimination is not strict scrutiny, it is something very
close to that sort of exacting review. It rarely meets a
classification that it likes... ,,67 while this claim may be
relatively anomalous, as the discussion above indicates, it is
nonetheless worthwhile to assess this claim against
assertions flowing from more mainstream camps that the
three-tier approach reveals either very little or a great deal
about the likely outcomes of equal protection suits, with the
notable exception of sex-discrimination litigation.
Accordingly, in what follows we undertake this
task. In Part III A, we examine empirically the degree to
which the highest and lowest tiers produce reliable
outcomes: i.e., decisions upholding classifications under a
rational basis analysis and decisions striking down
classifications under strict scrutiny. Then, in Part HI B we
explore the extent to which the intermediate test produces
predictable results.
In conducting these investigations, we focus
66 See, e.g., MEzEY, supra note 3; Brake, supra note 37; Roberta W.

Francis, Reconstitutingthe EqualRights Amendment: Policy
Implicationsfor Sex Discrimination,paper presented at the annual
meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco
(2001) (on file with the authors).
7Gaffiey, supra note 12, at 396-97. See also Bowsher, supra note 7
at 317-18 (arguing that "despite the objections of three members of the
CraigCourt, intermediate scrutiny has since proven to be very

workable").
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primarily on state courts of last resort (and then on sexdiscrimination litigation), 68 even though the vast majority
of commentary has centered on the U.S. Supreme Court.
This focus reflects the difficulty of gneralizing about the
High Court's adjudication of equal protection disputes from
a small number of cases (e.g., since 1960, the Justices have
decided only 30 sex discrimination cases implicating the
Equal Protection Clause) 69 and from a lack of variation in
the standards employed (e.g., with the possible exception of
United States v. Virginia, a majority of the Court has never
applied strict scrutiny to sex-based claims) 70 . These
difficulties evaporate when we move to state supreme
courts. Since 1960, state courts of last resort have
addressed constitutional questions in 416 cases involving
sex-based classifications, and they have done so using all
three equal protection tests: rational basis, heightened
scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.71
68 Throughout this article we use the terms "state court of last resort"
and "state supreme court" interchangeably, even though some state
courts of last resort are not named "supreme court."
69 We obtained this figure from MEZEY, supra note 3, at 16, which lists
the 29 cases decided between 1971 and 2001. The U.S. Supreme Court
Database identifies one case decided before 1971, Hoyt v. Florida,368
U.S. 57 (1961). U.S. Supreme Court Database, at
http://www.polisci.msu.edu/pljp/databases.html (last accessed on
January 1,2003).
70 InFrontierov. Richardson,411 U.S. 677 (1973), a plurality of four
Justices deemed sex a suspect class. But the four could not obtain a
fifth vote, which led to the "compromise" in Craig. See EPSTEIN &
KNIGHT, supra note 34.

7 The figure of 416-and all other data we present in this Articlecomes from a database we amassed on all constitutional sex
discrimination cases resolved in state courts of last resort between 1960
and 1999. Since that database (as well as all the documentation
necessary to use it and an explanation of how we collected the
information) is available on our web site, suffice it to note here that we
included cases in which the state justices addressed a claim of
constitutional sex discrimination and invoked an equal protection test in
the course of addressing it. See Table 1 and infra note 89; see also
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The use of different levels of scrutiny by state
supreme courts with respect to the same class of disputes
raises a number of interesting questions. Most importantly,
why do justices in one state invoke strict scrutiny, while
those in another apply the intermediate standard? On a
somewhat different note, our attempt to gain insight into
how the federal bench (especially the U.S. Supreme Court)
employs the three-tier framework by focusing on the states
and on sex discrimination raises a different set of questions.
We address these matters in Part IV. For now, let us turn to
the results of our analyses of the various tiers
encompassing the judiciary's approach to equal protection.
A. Rational Basis and Strict Scrutiny
Were we to focus our empirical investigation
exclusively on the U.S. Supreme Court's use of rational
basis and strict scrutiny, it is entirely possible that we could
muster support for virtually all existing commentary.
Consider, for example, the conventional view that strict
scrutiny and rational basis lead to predicable results. Using
the former, the Court strikes classification, while under the
latter, it upholds them. If we eliminate affirmative action
cases from consideration, 72 this conventional expectation
seems to hold. Since the 1960s, for example, it is difficult
to identify a single act discriminating on the basis of race
and challenged on equal protection grounds that the
Justices upheld. Conversely, it is equally difficult to
identify a single law involving age discrimination that the
Justices struck down as a violation of equal protection. 7
infra note 90.
We return to these cases momentarily.
73 Using the U.S. Supreme Court Database (see supra note 69), we
identified five age discrimination cases in the employment realm:
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. ofRegents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452 (1991); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); Alexander
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The existence of successful challenges in the race
area only and none involving age discrimination hardly
seems a coincidence: the former are subject to strict
scrutiny, and the latter to rational basis. This distinction in
standard may explain the results we observe. The Court, in
fact, suggested as much in the recent age discrimination
case of Kimel v. FloridaBoard of Regents:
States may discriminate on the basis of age
without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if
the age classification in question is rationally
related to a legitimate state interest. The
rationality commanded by the Equal Protection
Clause does not require States to match age
distinctions and the legitimate interests they
serve with razorlike precision.... In contrast,
when a State discriminates on the basis of race
or gender, we require a tighter fit between the
discriminatory means and the legitimate ends
they serve.... Under the Fourteenth

Amendment, a State may rely on age as a proxy
for other qualities, abilities, or characteristics
that are relevant to the State's legitimate
interests. The Constitution does not preclude
reliance on such generalizations. That age
proves to be an inaccurate proxy in any
individual case is irrelevant.. ..Finally, because

an age classification is presumptively rational,
the individual challenging its constitutionality
bears the burden of proving that the "facts on
which the classification is apparently based
could not reasonably be conceived to be true by

v. Fioto,430 U.S. 634 (1977); MassachusettsBd. ofRetirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). In none of the five did the Court find in
favor of the party alleging discrimination.
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the governmental decisionmaker." 74
If we incorporate affirmative action into our analysis,
however, the picture changes dramatically, lending some
support to those who proclaim the indeterminacy of even
the highest level of scrutiny. Since Regents of the
University of Californiav. Bakke- 75 the Court's first
major foray into the area of affirmative action-it has
decided eight constitutional cases centering on preferences
for minorities. 76 Despite the Court's use of the strict
scrutiny standard to examine the programs at issue, it
upheld four of the eight. "
What should we take away from this analysis, as
limited as it is, of the Supreme Court's use of rational basis
and strict scrutiny? Not much, as it turns out. Too few
cases exist to reach any firm conclusions. Furthermore, as
we suggested earlier, once the Court uses a particular test to
evaluate a particular type of classification, it generally stays
the course. The Court's repeated application of rational
basis in the age context is exemplary. With the possible
exception of United States v. Virginia, a majority of the
Court has never applied strict scrutiny to a sex-based
claim; 78 and in only eight cases prior to Craigdid it invoke
the rational basis standard.
In an effort to overcome these problems, we turn to
74 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83-84 (citations omitted).
7' 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
76 We identified these cases using the U.S. Supreme Court Database.

See supra note 69.
77 The four it upheld were in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448
(1979); UnitedStates v. Paradise,480 U.S. 149 (1987); Metro Broad.,
Inc. v. Fed. CommunicationsComm 'n, 497 U.S. 547 (1990); Grutterv.
Bollinger, 124 S. Ct. 35 (2003). The four it struck were at issue in
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. ofEduc., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Richmond v. J.
A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1988); AdarandConstructorsv. Pena,
515 U.S. 200 (1995); Gratzv. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
78 As we noted supra at note 70, in Frontiero,a
plurality, not a
majority, of the Justices deemed sex a suspect class.
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the states and, in particular, to how their courts of last
resort have employed the two extreme levels of scrutiny to
sex-based classifications. Since 1960, these courts have
resolved 416 constitutional sex discrimination suits. As
Figure 1 shows, minimal scrutiny is used in 45% (n=191),
strict scrutiny in 18.0 % (n=75), and a version of the Craig
intermediate standard in the remaining 150 (36.1%).79 This
is quite a bit of inter-state variation in its own right, and it
is especially noticeable when we compare it against the
U.S. Supreme Court's adjudication of sex-based
discrimination cases. Between 1960 and 2002, the Justices
heard 30 cases, using the intermediate standard, or a variant
thereof, 80in nearly 70%.

79 For information on how we defined these standards, see infra note
89.
80 See supra note 35.
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Figure 1: Use of equal protection tests in constitutional sex
discrimination litigation in state courts of last resort.
N=41681
P-

0

Rational Basis

Intermediate Scrutiny

Strict Scrutiny

Let us consider the extent to which the upper and
lower tiers produce reliable expectations about outcomes.
Do courts invoking rational basis generally uphold
classifications, while those employing strict scrutiny strike
them down? A simple comparison, as seen in Figure 2,
suggests that the answer is yes. The standard used by a
court is, to a statistically significant degree, 82 associated
81See

supra note 69 (information on the database we used to generate

this figure); see also Table 1 and infra note 89 (how we defined these
standards).
82 The association is statistically significant (Chi-Square = 62.64; p <

0.001).
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with case outcomes. Of the 191 suits in which the court
applied rational basis, the party alleging discrimination
failed to prevail in 81.2% (155 of 191); when the state
justices invoked strict scrutiny (22 of 75) the losing
percentage was only 18.8%. 83

Figure 2: Prevailing party by the application of the rational
basis and strict scrutiny tests in constitutional sex
discrimination litigation in state courts of last resort.
N=266.8 4

0 Party defending classification prevailed
Q Party challenging classification prevailed

n -A

Et /
Rational Basis

83

84

Strict Scrutiny

See
infra note
we defined
See supra
note 90
69(information
(informationon
onhow
the database
wecase
usedoutcomes).
to generate

this figure); see Table 1 and infra note 89 (how we defined these
standards); see infra note 90 (how we treated case outcomes). See also
supra note 80 for information on statistical significance.
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From Figure 2, we can say that standards and
outcomes appear to be associated in ways that many
commentators would anticipate. Unfortunately, this sort of
analysis does not enable us to make causal claims about
that relationship; that is, from a simple comparison between
standards and outcomes, we cannot claim that the standard
employed caused the court to reach a particular outcome.
There are many reasons for this, but most relevant here is
that we have considered only the effect of the particular
equal protection test on the case outcome and have failed to
take into account other factors. To the extent that we have
ignored various competing explanations, our simple
comparison suffers from the most severe form of "omitted
variable bias," making inferences reached therein suspect. 85
For example, if we believe that politics plays a role in
explaining court decisions, then failure to address the
political composition of the deciding court could lead to an
incorrect assessment of the true jurisprudential effect of
legal standards.8 6 Indeed, the impact of politics on judicial
decision making could confound our results in any number
of ways; for example, that only left-of-center courts invoke
strict scrutiny or reach decisions in favor of the party
85

Epstein & King, supra note 41; GARY

KING ET. AL., DESIGNING

SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH

(1994). Omitted variable bias occurs when a statistical comparison
excludes variables that are (a) known to affect the outcome and (b)
correlate with the explanatory covariate of interest.

86 For more than six decades, political scientists and legal academics
have documented the effect of the political preferences ofjudges on the

decisions they reach. For recent examples, see JEFFREY A. SEGAL &
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL

MODEL REVISITED

(2002); Theodore W. Ruger, et al., The Supreme

CourtForecastingProject:Legal and PoliticalScience Approaches to
PredictingSupreme Court Decision-Making,COLUM. L. REV.
(forthcoming) (manuscript on file with authors). See generally Lee

Epstein et al., Childress Lecture Symposium: The Political(Science)
Context of Judging,47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 783 (2003); works cited supra
note 47.
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alleging discrimination regardless of the standard
employed.
In light of the large amount of literature suggesting
the importance of ideology, neither of these scenarios is
much of a stretch. 87 More generally, while there may be
good reasons to believe that the adoption of a higher
standard of law will generate outcomes more favorable to
parties alleging discrimination, there are equally good
reasons to question that assertion and believe that other
factors come into play. At minimum, the conventional view
about the determinacy of (the most extreme) tiers of the
Court's equal protection framework may ask too much of
institutions. While rules certainly can serve to structure
choices, it seems imprudent to believe that they do all the
work-especially when so many studies of judging suggest
otherwise.
Accordingly, we must attend to (that is "control
for") the other factors that may affect case outcomes.
Without performing statistical control, comparisons like
Figure 2 are not informative about the possible causal
relationships among the variables of interest. Also, we
ought to account for the possibility that the choice of which
test to employ may be influenced by numerous factors.8 In
87 See supra note 84.
88 To be sure, federal courts are supposed to adhere to legal principles
established by the U.S. Supreme Court, and state courts are supposed to
view federal law as establishing a floor, instead of a ceiling, on civil
rights and liberties. However, as the numerous studies, not to mention
our own reading of state cases indicate, these norms do not always hold
in this area of the law. Commentators point to federal courts that have
all but ignored the current intermediate standard and have instead
invoked higher or lower rules as they so desire; they also point to state
courts of last resort that used a rational basis standard to adjudicate sex
discrimination even after Craig. And, of course, there are states courts
that treat sex as a suspect class. See, e.g., Brake, supra note 37; Branon
P. Denning & John R. Vile, Necromancing the Equal Rights
Amendment, 17 CONST. COMM. 593 (2000); Beth Gammie, State ERAs:
Problems and Possibilities,1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 1123 (1989);
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a previous analysis of the state sex discrimination data, we
took these steps, estimating a statistical model that
incorporated four factors (or "variables") to explain the
equal protection test used by the court 9 and five factors, in
addition to the test, to explain the outcome. 9° To be even
more precise, we analyzed two equations, with two
differentially measured dependent variables-the test (an
ordinal variable that can take on three values: rational basis,
intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny 91 ) and the outcome
Kaufmran, supra note 3; MEZEY, supra note 3; Kevin Francis O'Neill,
The Road Not Taken: State Constitutionsas an Alternative Source of
ProtectionforReproductive Rights, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTs. 5
(1993). See also Part IV, in which we examine factors explaining state
courts' choice of standard.

These variables are as follows: (1) the presence or absence of a state
equal rights amendment, (2) the political ideology of the court, (3) the
proportion of the court composed of women, (4) the existence or not of
a state intermediate appellate court, and (5) whether or not the state had
ratified the national ERA. See
[http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/sexdiscrimination.html] (more details
on these variables); see also Epstein et al., supra note 27 (the rationale
behind including these variables).
90 In addition to the equal protection test employed by the court, these
variables are as follows: (1) the political ideology of the court, (2) the
existence or not of a state intermediate appellate court, (3) a female as
the party alleging discrimination, (4) a claim of a physical difference
between men and women, and (5) the government as a defender of the
sex-based classification. See
[http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/sexdiscrimination.html] (more details
on these variables); see also Epstein et al., supra note 27 (the rationale
behind including these variables).
the data and documentation on our web site; for the rationale behind
including these variables, see Epstein et al., supra note 27.
91 In the intermediate scrutiny category we also include a variation on
that standard-that the government must offer an "exceedingly
persuasive justification" for discriminating on the basis of sex-which
some U.S. Supreme Court justices have endorsed. See supra note 35. In
the strict scrutiny category, we also include a standard invoked
occasionally by a few state courts-a standard that some observers
liken to strict scrutiny, while others describe as "stricter" than strict
89
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(a dichotomous variable in which the court either ruled for
or against the party alleging discrimination 92)-in one
model. Since no standard statistical model adequately
performs this task, we developed one: a bivariate mixed

response probit model, which allows for correlation across
two equations and which we estimate using maximum
likelihood. 93
scrutiny because it supposedly does not allow for sex-based
classifications. To the extent that courts qualify this "stricter" standard
with terms such as "absent compelling justifications" or in cases based
on "actual differences," however, the prohibition is not absolute,
thereby lending credence to the view that it is akin to strict scrutiny.
For our purposes, though, the key point is that it is closer, if not
identical, to strict scrutiny.
92 To code case outcome, we rely on the approach commended by
Gryski et al., supra note 47 and assess whether the party alleging sex
discrimination won or lost the dispute. In taking this route, we are well
aware of normative debates among some feminists over whether, as
Goldstein, supra note 36, at 209, puts it, "to argue for 'protective'
legislation for women on the grounds that without such legislation
women are unfairly disadvantaged by making them play by rules that
were designed with men in mind, and that are ill-adapted to women's
biology and life patterns." While we appreciate this argument, our
coding scheme remains relatively agnostic over it.
93 See Epstein et al. supra note 27, at app. B (statistical model, along
with our estimation methods). What is important here is that even
though the parameter estimates resulting from these procedures admit
to an interpretation akin to probit coefficients, our methodological
approach is distinctive in two regards. First, it enables us to estimate
parameters that, while substantively similar to those that would result
from analyzing decisions over standards of law and case outcomes
independently, are more efficient because we employ all the data to
obtain them. Second, the approach facilitates a more exacting
investigation of the dependence between the choices of standard and
outcome because we are able to obtain a precise estimate of that
dependence, in the form of an estimate of a correlation parameter, as a
result of our ability to control for the factors that may affect both the
standard and outcome in one model. Estimating this bivariate mixed
response probit model leads to the results depicted in the table belowresults that are quite striking: All the variables produce statistically
significant coefficients in the expected direction. The estimate,
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From this model, we gain a great deal of insight into
the resolution of constitutional sex discrimination cases in
the states. For example, we can now account for why state
courts adopt different standards of law to adjudicate the
same class of cases. 94 Furthermore, we can speak to the
matter directly at hand: whether different equal protection
tests lead to different results. The bivariate analysis
presented in Figure 2 suggested that they do; and, as it turns
out, this basic conclusion remains even after we control for
the other relevant factors.
In particular, from our analyses, we find that the
standard a court uses and the outcome it reaches are
significantly correlated 95-in the direction many
commentators would anticipate. Moreover, the probabilities
displayed in Figure 3 reveal that the relationship is
indicating the correlation between the equal protection test used and the

outcome reached, also attains statistical significance.
Parameter
/3
Constant
3,
ERA
/3, Judicial Ideology
/31
ERA Ratification
3
)
Proportion Women
3
/ 1
Intermediate Appellate Court
r1
Cut Point

IVELE
-1.106
0.460
0.011
0.456
2.187
0.354
1.179

/3

Constant
Judicial Ideology
Intermediate Appellate Court
Physical Difference
Government Opposition
Female

-0.794
0.017
0.376
-0.685
-0.725
0.376

p

Correlation

/32
/32

/32
32
/32

0.532

Standard
Error
0.189 *
0.120*
0.004 *
0.143 *
0.566 *
0.138 *
0.084 *
0.225
0.004
0.153
0.160
0.130
0.138

*
*
*
*

*
*

0.060 *

Maximum likelihood estimates and (asymptotic) standard errors for the
bivariate mixed response probit model fit to the constitutional sex
discrimination data. N = 416. lnL = -593.0884. * denotes statistical
significance (? = 0.05.) See supra note 87 and supra note 88
information on the variables used in this model).
We describe these results later in Part IV, in which we explore the
implications of our study.
95 See the P coefficient in the table presented in note 91 supra.
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substantively meaningful as well. Consider the two curves
at the extreme right (representing rational basis) and the
extreme left (strict scrutiny) of the figure, and notice the
monotonic increase in the odds, such that when courts
assess sex classifications via a rational basis test-the
lowest level of scrutiny-the likelihood of finding in favor
of the equality claim is just .20. That probability increases
to a rather large .73 when they invoke strict scrutiny. In
other words, and inline with much extant commentary,
application of the lowest and highest standards leads to
rather predictable outcomes-though in opposing
directions: claims of sex discrimination will, on average,
fail under a rational basis standard, and in all likelihood
prevail under strict scrutiny.
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Figure 3: Kernel density estimates of probabilities of an
outcome favoring the litigant alleging sex discrimination
given the rational basis standard (the left-most dashed line),
the intermediate standard (the middle dashed line), and the
strict scrutiny standard (the solid line). 96
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B. Heightened Scrutiny
What our analysis thus far reveals is that state court

adjudication of sex discrimination cases fits conventional
views about the predictability of results yielded by rational
basis and strict scrutiny approaches to equal protection. But
what of the in-between tier-a tier that many, if not most,
scholars suggest can lead to unexpected results? Are the
outcomes as unpredictable as so many commentators
96 These estimates account for all parameter uncertainty and were
constructed from the simulation outlined in Epstein et al. supra note 27,
at app. B. All covariates are held at their sample means. See supra note
69 (information on the database we used to generate this figure); Table
I and supra note 89 (how we defined these standards); supra note 90
(how we treated case outcomes).
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assert?
The middle curve displayed in Figure 3 (which
represents heightened scrutiny) begins to provide an
answer, and it is in the affirmative: When courts apply the
intermediate standard, the probability that a litigant alleging
discrimination will prevail is 47%. Just as many scholars
would expect, under mid-level scrutiny litigants claiming
sex discrimination are nearly as likely to win as they are to
lose. This is in contrast to the relatively predictable
outcomes generated by rational basis (under which a
litigant faces only 20% likelihood of winning) and strict
scrutiny (with a 73% probability of success).
Further analyses of the data do little to change the
basic conclusion about the predictability-or, more
pointedly, lack thereof--of the intermediate standard. For
example, if we focus exclusively on the 150 cases in which
state courts invoked this approach, we find once again, as
Figure 4 shows, that parties alleging sex discrimination lost
nearly as often as they prevailed (46.7% versus 53.3%).
Moreover, the outcomes in the 150 cases are themselves
somewhat difficult to predict. From analyses designed to
take into account the multitude of factors that may affect
court decisions, we were able to identify only a few that
were substantively significant predictors. One, notably, was
the ideology of the state justices deciding the dispute: the
more left-of-center ("liberal") the court, the more likely it
was to apply intermediate scrutiny in a way favorable to the
party alleging discrimination. Our model suggests that the
most conservative court would find for the plaintiff alleging
sex discrimination in only 26.1 % of the cases, while the
most liberal court would do so in 70.9%. The government
also plays an influential role. When it was the party
defending discrimination, the court was far more likely to
uphold the challenged classification (65.4% versus
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33.0%). 97
Figure 4: Prevailing party by application of equal
protection tests in constitutional sex discrimination
litigation in state courts of last resort. N=416. 98
E

Patydfedigclssfcaioreaie
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defending classification
classificationprevailed
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Intermediate Scrutiny

Strict Scrutiny

What these analyses tell us is that even after
controlling for a range of relevant factors, a good deal of
uncertainty remains about the conclusions state justices
reach in constitutional sex discrimination disputes when
they apply intermediate scrutiny--and those factors that
We performed this analysis using a CLARIFY-like simulation. See
infra note 109. The data and documentation necessary to reproduce
these results are available on our web site.
98 See supra note 69 (information on the database we used to
generate
this figure); Table I and supra note 89 (how we defined these
standards); supra note 90 (how we treated case outcomes).
97
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eliminate some of that uncertainty appear more related to
politics than to the legal standard. If we move to the U.S.
Supreme Court, however, even this degree of predictability
vanishes. Since Craig,the justices have resolved 20
constitutional sex equality cases on equal protection
grounds, 99 with the party alleging discrimination prevailing
in fewer than half (nine out of 20, or 45%). While there
may be some underlying explanation(s) to account for these
outcomes, we were not able to identify a single one. 10o The
Court does not seem to differentiate cases on the basis of
whether a female litigant brought the claim, as some
scholars have suggested; 10 and it is not particularly
deferential to the federal government (or the states, for that
matter) when it attempts to defend a sex-based
classification. Nor does the political ideology of the
justices seem to exert much impact on their resolution of
these cases. Though given the small number of cases we
do not want to make too much of these findings, the latter
is especially surprising in light of the large number of
empirical studies ascribing a significant role for ideology in
Court decision-making.' 02
IV. Implications of the Analysis for Discrimination
Based on Sex and Sexual Orientation

99 See MEZEY, supra note 3.
100 We considered four basic variables (under different measurements
and specification): the ideology of the court, the presence or absence of
women justices, whether a woman was claiming discrimination, and
whether a government defended a sex-based classification. We
measured the Court's ideology using the Segal & Cover scores. See
Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes
of U.S. Supreme CourtJustices, 83 AM. POL. Scl. REv. 557 (1989). See
[http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/sexdiscrimination.html] (data and
documentation necessary to reproduce these analyses).
101 See Baer, supra note 40.
102 See, e.g., studies cited in supra note

47 and supra note 84.
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Given the results of our analyses, it would be
difficult to take issue with Andrew Koppelman's
conclusion about intermediate scrutiny. Even though he
advocates treating laws that discriminate on the basis of
sexual orientation as sex discriminaion for purposes of
equal protection analysis, 10 3 he recognizes that the sex
discrimination argument is not free from indeterminacy.
The question inevitably arises as to whether the state can
offer an adequate justification for what it has done, and
then a court must balance the interests involved in a way
that will unavoidably allow for judicial discretion. 104
Our findings about the apparent indeterminacy of
heightened scrutiny, not to mention our results reinforcing
the relative predictability of rational basis and strict
scrutiny, may lend support to Koppelman's conclusion.
But what lessons should we take from our study? We see
two as particularly important, one pertaining to the future
of sex discrimination litigation, and the other, to the
advancement of legal rights for gays.
We take up both in what follows. But before doing
so, an important cautionary note is in order: Because we
largely base these implications on analyses of state court
decisions, we cannot state with any certainty the extent to
which they transport to all American courts. More
pointedly, using knowledge that we have gained from
investigations of state cases to make inferences about
federal litigation is a risky business indeed. The types of
suits may differ, 10 5 as well as the parties, 106 to name just
two points of distinction. Nonetheless, in light of the
severe problems of addressing debates over equal
103 See Koppelman, supra note 14.
104 Id. at 535-36.
105 For example, state courts typically do not resolve questions
concerning federal immigration law or the military draft.

106 For example, the U.S. government was not a participant in any of
the 416 state cases in our database.
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protection with reference only to federal courts, the state
judiciary provides an antidote. For example, only by
looking to the states-some of which have invoked strict
scrutiny to resolve sex discrimination suits-were we able
to get a handle on the counterfactual world: one in which
federal courts deem sex a suspect class. And only by
looking to the states, as we explain below, are we able to
isolate those factors that could move sex-based litigation
from the counterfactual to the factual: from a federal
judiciary that now applies the intermediate standard to one
that instead employs strict scrutiny.
A. Sex DiscriminationLitigation
Throughout this article we have noted various
expressions of dissatisfaction with intermediate scrutiny.
While the critiques are many in number, one standing
above virtually all others is the test's indeterminacy. From
the vantage point of equality, the in-between approach may
generate "better" outcomes than the traditional rational
basis standard but it is highly unpredictable in application.
Our study confirms the veracity of this critique. As
Figure 3 makes clear, if we believe it is desirable for courts
to produce a larger number of equality-oriented outcomes,
then heightened scrutiny better serves that objective than
rational basis. Controlling for a host of other relevant
factors, litigants challenging sex-based classifications are
more than twice as likely to prevail now than they were
prior to Craig. On the other hand, their odds, even under
the intermediate test, are no better than 50-50, a far cry
from the likelihood of victory under strict scrutiny-73%.
What these results underscore is a claim that
advocates for women's rights have long made: the
importance of elevating sex to a suspect class.10 7 Until the
107

See, e.g., MEzEY, supra note 3; Brake, supra note 37; Francis, supra

53

54

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY [VOL. I, 1]

Supreme Court takes this step, federal courts will continue
to employ the amorphous intermediate rule, sometimes
upholding sex-based classification and sometimes voiding
them-with little predictability.
On this much many agree. The question, of course,
is how to alter the current standard. Our investigation into
why state tribunals apply the equal protection tests supplies
two answers. One is the existence of an equal rights
amendment; the other is the presence of women on the
bench.
1. Equal Rights Amendments (ERA)
Beginning with an ERA, scholars have long argued
that the adoption of a federal ERA will force jurists to
elevate sex to a suspect class, which in turn will lead them
classifications, as they
to eradicate virtually all sex-based
08
now do in the case of race.1
note 64. See also infra note 108.
108 Elevating sex to a suspect class was a primary motivation for the
drive for (and against) the ERA in the 1970s. See, e.g., WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW
(1997); HERMA H. KAY, SEx-BASED DISCRIMINATION: TEXT, CASES
AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1988); Mary E. Becker, Obscuringthe
Struggle: Sex Discrimination,Social Security, and Stone, Seidman,
Sunstein & Tushnet's ConstitutionalLaw, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 264
(1989); Brown, supra note 28; Mary Anne Case, Reflections on
ConstitutionalizingWomen's Equality, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 765 (2002);
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Equal Rights Amendment is the Way, 1
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 19 (1978); Kaufman, supra note 3; Catharine A.
MacKinnon, UnthinkingERA Thinking, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 759 (1987);
Kathleen M. Sullivan, ConstitutionalizingWomen 's Equality, 90
CALIF. L. REv. 735 (2002); Francis, supra note 66; Note, Sex
Discriminationand Equal Protection:Do We Need a Constitutional
Amendment, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1499 (1971). On other hand, some
scholars argue that a formal rule, such as an ERA, will not effectively
end the subordination of women by men at least in part because of the
prevalence of male dominance in most facets of social, political and
economic life. We do not attempt to assess this position, but our
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Our exploration of the standards used in sex-based
discrimination cases supplies some confirmation of the
importance of an equal rights amendment, which over onethird of the states have now incorporated into their
constitutions-with many containing similar language and
purporting to carry analogous objectives as the federal
ERA.'o9 What we find, after controlling for all other
relevant factors," 0 is that the presence of an ERA
significantly increases the odds of a court adopting a higher
equal protection test. Specifically, when we set all other
variables at their mean, the likelihood, on average, of a
court invoking strict scrutiny to adjudicate a sex-based
claim is just 11% in the absence of an ERA. That
probability doubles to 23% when an ERA is in effect.
Of course, because this figure of .23 is relatively
distant from 1.00, it is far from certain that an ERA will
assure the application of strict scrutiny. But it does raise
the probability of state jurists taking that step-and it may
very well have the same effect on U.S. Supreme Court
justices. In fact, in the early 1970s several declined to
elevate sex to a suspect class at least in part because they
thought it "inappropriate to 'amend' the Constitution while
the ERA was pending.""'
analysis does lend support to the claims of others who argue that formal
equality provisions are not always inefficacious, but rather their

effectiveness depends a good deal on who is interpreting them.
Specifically, to foreshadow our results, we find that as the fraction of
women serving on a state supreme court increases, the likelihood of the

court adopting a higher standard of law also increases-and
significantly increases at that. See Part IV.
109 See, e.g., Susan Crump, An Overview of the Equal Rights
Amendment in Texas, 11 Hous. L. REv. 136 (1973); Andrea J. Farone,
The FloridaEqual Rights Amendment: Raising the StandardApplied to

Gender Under the Equal Protection Clause of the FloridaConstitution,

1 FL. COASTAL L.J. 421 (2000).
110 See supra note 91.
1 1ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 108, at 78; see also Ginsburg,

supra note 108.
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The Court's declination came at a time when the
ERA's passage looked promising. What about now, some
thirty years later? What are the odds of adding an ERA to
the U.S. Constitution? Addressing this question is beyond
the scope of this article so we will only note here that,
despite pronouncements in the 1980s to the contrary, the
Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) may not be dead.
Actually, there are signs that the battle may be heating up
yet again. 112 For example, the "three-state" strategy
deployed by organized interests in response to claims
appearing in scholarly journals, policy memoranda, and the
press that ratification of the 27th Amendment in 1992over 200 years after it was proposed-may hold
implications, if not promise, for the ERA." 3 To be sure,
this "reconstituted" drive for the ERA has generated
substantial opposition (especially from Phyllis Schlafly and
her Eagle Forum), but it may very well succeed in Illinois,
where in 2003 65% of voters supported ratification and
only 19% did not (17% had no opinion). 114 Another sign is
the increasing importance attached to the Amendment in
academic and media treatments. By way of illustration,
consider that in the first six months of 1993, just 186 news
articles made mention of the ERA. For the same period in
2003, the number of news articles that mentioned the ERA
was more than double (N=471) the amount of the
corresponding period in 1993.115 Yet a final indication of
the rising importance of the ERA comes from legal
commentators. A passage from Judge Martha Daughtrey's
112 Epstein et al., supra note 27.
113 See, e.g., Denning & Vile, supra note 88. But see Georgia Duerst-

Lahti, Time To Ratify the EqualRights Amendment, NEWSDAY, May
20, 2003, at A30; Ellen Goodman, EqualRights Amendment is Not
Dead Yet, NEW ORLEANS TIMEs-PICAYuNE, Feb. 21, 2000, at B5.
114 Christi Parsons, Not So Controversialto Voters: Poll Says Many
Back Gay Rights, ERA, Gun Limits, Cn. TRIB., June 17, 2003, at C1.
115 We obtained these figures from a LEXIS search (in the news group
file) on the term "Equal Rights Amendment."
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Madison Lecture, delivered at New York University,
provides but one example:
In the course of cleaning out closets
and drawers that bad collected much too
much stuff over a dozen years, I found this
political button, brought home-as I
recall-from an ABA meeting some years
ago. It reads: "Happy Birthday E.R.A.
1923-1993, You Are Long Overdue!"
About the same time that I found the
button, the ABA Journal published a cover
story on the renewed efforts to amend the
United States Constitution to prohibit
discrimination on the basis of gender. As it
turns out, the Equal Rights Amendment
(ERA) which, if ratified, would have
become the twenty-seventh amendment to
the Federal Constitution-but which "died"
for lack of ratification by three additional
states in 1982-has been reintroduced in the
current session of Congress. The prospect
of a renewed effort to pass the ERA in
Congress and to mount ratification
campaigns in the fifty state legislatures
raises a number of questions that I would
116
like to explore with you this evening.
Whether the "renewed effort" of which Judge Daughtrey
speaks will succeed we cannot say. What does seem to be
the case is that the bulk of contemporary commentary now
suggests that the ERA may be as dead as the 19th
Amendment, which took over 40 years to gain

116

Daughtrey, supra note 6, at 2-3 (citations omitted).
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ratification.

7

2. Women on the Bench
Certainly our results indicate that ERAs are
important components in the quest for the eradication of
sex-based discrimination because they increase the
probability of a court applying a higher standard of law to
adjudicate claims of sex discrimination. Furthermore, the
application of a higher standard of law, even after
controlling for other relevant factors, increases the
probability of a court reaching a disposition favorable to
litigants alleging a violation of their rights.
An ERA is not, however, the only factor that lifts
the odds of the adoption of strict scrutiny. As some
scholars have long speculated, the proportion of women on
the deciding court also exerts a statistically significant
effect. 118 As that proportion increases, the probability of
117 See Francis, supra note 66 (parallels between the campaigns for
ratification of the 19th Amendment and the ERA).
118 Virtually from the day Suzanna Sherry penned her classic work
Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72
VA. L. REv. 543 (1986) on the possibility of a "feminine"
jurisprudence, scholars have hotly debated whether female judges
"speak in a different voice." For recent reviews of this literature, see
Herma Hill Kay & Geraldine Sparrow, Workshop on Judging:Does
Gender Make a Difference?, 16 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (2001); Daniel
M. Schneider, EmpiricalResearch on JudicialReasoning: Statutory
Interpretationin FederalTax Cases, 31 N.M. L. REv. 325 (2001).
While the results of various research projects exploring whether male
and female judges vote differently reach decidedly mixed results, those
centering on jurisprudence (Sherry's original target)-especially in the
area of sex discrimination-are clearer. A consensus now exists that
women have "pushed the law forward in sex discrimination cases" with
their distinct approach to legal principles possibly altering the choices
made by their male colleagues. Kay & Sparrow, at 11. See, e.g.,
Sherry; Sullivan, supra note 106. Our study lends empirical support to
this growing consensus. At minimum, it seems rather clear that the
presence of women on state judiciaries exerts an influence on how
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applying a higher standard of law soars even after
controlling for the presence (or absence) of an ERA.
To see the magnitude of the effect, consider a court
composed exclusively of male justices. On average, the
odds of that court using a rational basis standard, setting all
other variables at their mean, is a hefty .50; the probability
of that same court applying strict scrutiny is but. 12. Now
consider a court nearly equally divided between male and
female judges: the probabilities nearly reverse. The odds of
this court applying rational basis are, on average, but 14%
while the probability for strict scrutiny jumps to 47%.
This result commends a rather pointed strategy for
those seeking more equality-oriented outcomes in court
cases, a campaign designed to bring more women to the
federal judiciary. Surely the ultimate target would be the
U.S. Supreme Court: with one more favorably disposed
justice, a majority supporting strict scrutiny could

emerge. 1 9 Of course, history shows that the new justice
need not be a woman; after all, it was William J. Brennan
who was among the first to urge his colleagues to elevate
sex to a suspect class.120 On the other hand, it is perhaps 22
no
2
coincidence that it is Justices O'Connor' ' and Ginsburg
who continue to push the United States v. Virginia
standard-a standard some say is more akin to strict
courts adjudicate sex-based claims.
119 This assumes that the four dissenters in Nguyen, 533 U.S. 53 (2001),
the Court's most recent sex-discrimination case, who invoked the
"exceedingly persuasive justification" of the VA/ case to support their
views, would be willing to elevate sex to a suspect class. Surely this is
true of Justice Ginsburg, who may have viewed VA as the first step in
that direction. See Skaggs, supra note 7; Stobaugh, supra note 8;
Morris, supra note 53. It is not so clear that Justices Breyer, O'Connor,
and Souter viewed the VMI case in the same way.
120 See Frontiero,411 U.S. at 677 (Brennan's judgment for the Court).
121 See, e.g., Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 74 (O'Connor's dissent).
122 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 588 U.S. at 519 (Ginsburg
writing the majority opinion of the Court).
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scrutiny than it is to Craig.1
Nonetheless, however important the U.S. Supreme
Court, ignoring the lower appellate bench in any campaign
designed to increase the number of female judges would be
123 See supra note 8; supra note 9. See also Linda Greenhouse, From
the High Court,A Voice Quite Distinctly a Woman's, N.Y. TIMEs, May
26, 1999, at Al. Greenhouse writes that Ginsburg:
recounted in a 1997 speech to the Women's Bar
Association... that a year earlier, as she announced
her opinion declaring unconstitutional the all-male
admissions policy at the Virginia Military Institute,
she looked across the bench at Justice O'Connor and
thought of the legacy they were building together.
Justice Ginsburg's opinion in the Virginia
case cited one of Justice O'Connor's earliest majority
opinions for the Court, a 1982 decision called
Mississippi Universityfor Women v. Hogan that
declared unconstitutional the exclusion of male
students from a state-supported nursing school.
Justice O'Connor, warning against using "archaic
and stereotypic notions" about the roles of men and
women, herself cited in that opinion some of the
Supreme Court cases that Ruth Ginsburg, who was
not to join the Court for another 11 years, had argued
and won as a noted women's rights advocate during
the 1970's.
Addressing the women's bar group, Justice
Ginsburg noted that the vote in Justice O'Connor's
1982 opinion was 5 to 4, while the vote to strike
down men-only admissions in Virginia 14 years later
was 7 to 1.
"What occurred in the intervening years in
the Court, as elsewhere in society?" Justice Ginsburg
asked. The answer, she continued, lay in a line from
Shakespeare that Justice O'Connor had recently
spoken in the character of Isabel, Queen of France, in
a local production of "Henry V": "Haply a woman's
voice may do some good."
See also Daughtrey, supranote 6, at 21-22.
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in error. Since change from the "bottom up" is not
unknown in American legal history, 124 it is always possible
that women serving in the circuits could exert "hydraulic
pressure" on the Supreme Court, forcing it reevaluate its
current standard. 25 Yet, at the time of this writing, less
An interesting example along these lines comes from early legal
debates over how to define obscenity. While the U.S. Supreme Court
until the 1950s clung to a highly restrictive definition developed in the
British case ofRegina v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868), the lower
federal courts were liberalizing or even rejecting that definition.
Among the most prominent examplars is Judge Augustus Hand's
opinion in United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses" by James
Joyce, 72 F.2d 705 (1934). See EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 3, at
359-60.
125 In the legal annals, the term "hydraulic pressure" (usually
associated
with public pressure on the Court) has taken on a negative connotation
owing to its use by Justice Holmes in his dissent in Northern Securities
Company v. United States:
124

Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great
cases are called great, not by reason of their real
importance in shaping the law of the future, but
because of some accident of immediate
overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings
and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests
exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes
what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before
which even well settled principles of law will bend.
193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1903). See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 405 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("The 'hydraulic pressure[s]'
that Holmes spoke of as being generated by cases of great import have
propelled the Court to go beyond the limits ofjudicial power, while
fortunately leaving some room for legislative judgment."); Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 867 (1991) (Stevens, J. dissenting) ("The
great tragedy of the decision, however, is the danger that the "hydraulic
pressure" of public opinion that Justice Holmes once described-and
that properly influences the deliberations of democratic legislatures
... ."); Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 505
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("Well-settled principles of law are bent
today by the Court under that kind of 'hydraulic pressure."'). But
pressure can, of course, come from sources other than public opinion,
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than 25% of the seats on the federal circuit courts are
occupied by female judges (32 of 134),126 meaning that the
odds of attaining a panel with two women, much less three,
are rather small- and, for some circuits, border on trivial,
as Table 2 indicates. A strategy aimed at increasing these
figures, if successful and if our analysis of the state courts
transports to the federal judiciary, would likely help, and
not impede, the goal of elevating sex to a suspect class.

and it is equally as certain that pressure to change problematic
principles of law, even if well-settled, is hardly the tragedy that some of
these statements suggest.
126

Data are available at

http://www.alliancefojustice.org/judicial/judicial-selection_resources/
selectiondatabase/activejudges.asp (last accessed on December 31,

2003).
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Table 2: The gender composition of the U.S. Courts of
Appeals. Each cell represents the probability of panel
composed of a particular combination of male (M) and
female (F) judges across the appellate courts,
assuming
27
panels.1
three-judge
of
assignment
random

C<ircuit
(Gender Compostion)
'

Probability
Three
Female

of a Panel
f
Two
One
Fernales
Pbrrale

1 t (4 M; 1 F)
(7 M; 2 F)
2 -d
ard
( 7 M; 4 P)

0.00
0.00
0.02

0.00
0.08
0 26

0.60
0.50
0.51

4
t
5
t
6
t
7
t
8t
9

0.00
0.01
0.08
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.00

0.06
0.15
0.42
0.07
0.00
0.13
0.15
0.00
000

0.44
0.51
0.42
0.47
0.38
0.46
0.51
0.33
0.43

0.01

0.11

0.46

t h
h
h
h
h
h

(9 M; 2 F)
(8 M; 3 F)
(5 M; 5 P)
(8 M; 2 F)
(7 M; 1 F)
(15 M; 5 F)

t h

10
(8
t h
II
(8
D.C. (6
Mean

M; 3 F)
M; 1 F)
M; 1 F)

B. DiscriminationAgainst Gays and Lesbians
In an effort to eradicate discrimination against gays
and lesbians, commentators have proposed a number of
doctrinal avenues. 128 One, the Due Process Clause, proved
The data on gender composition are as of January 1, 2003 (derived
from
http://www.allianceforjustice.org/judicial/judicialselectionresources/
selectiondatabase/activejudges.asp and do not include vacancies.
Assuming random assignment of federal appellate judges to panels, we
calculated the probabilities in accord with simple probability rules. See
127

generally SHELDON Ross, A FIRST COURSE

IN PROBABILITY

24-63 (6th

ed. 2002).
128 For reviews, see ESKRIDGE &HUNTER, supra note 108;
Massaro,
supra note 14; ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN
AMERICAN LAW (2002). For a critique of many of these arguments, see
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successful in Lawrence v. Texas. 29 That has not, however,
diminished the importance of equal protection in the battle
30
to eradicate classifications based on sexual orientation. 1
Along these lines, scholars have suggested two
chief courses of action. Some urge the application of
heightened scrutiny to laws that discriminate between
homosexuals and heterosexuals, that is, these commentators
"seek to gamer intermediate scrutiny for gays as gays.'' 131
Another group suggests that discrimination against gays
and lesbians is, in fact, discrimination based on sex.
Hence, courts should apply the sane level of scrutiny to
classifications based on sexual orientation as they now do
for laws that amount to sex discrimination. 132
Cass Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1
(1994); but see Massaro's cogent response, supra note 14.
129 539 U.S. 558, 123 S.Ct. 2472. But see Post, supra note 24. Post
claims that passages in the opinion are framed in the language of equal
protection. Indeed, the Court itself seemed to "meld" equal protection
and due process when it wrote that "[e]quality of treatment and the due
process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the
substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects,"
though it added that "a decision on the latter point advances both
interests." 123 S.Ct. at 2482.
130 See Massaro supra note 14; WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE
FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (1996).
131 See Yoshino, supra note 14; Shalleck, supra note 14. See generally
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). Along similar
lines, some scholars and judges have proposed applying strict scrutiny
to discrimination based on sexual orientation. See, e.g., Watkins v.
U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 711-28 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990); Renee Culverhouse &
Christine Lewis, Homosexuality as a Suspect Class, 34 S. TEX. L. REV.
205 (1993); Note, The ConstitutionalStatus of Sexual Orientation:
Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification,98 HARv. L. REv. 1285.
Our analysis below speaks to this proposal as well.
132 See Clausen, supra note 14; Koppelman, supra note 14; Law, supra
note 14; Massaro, supra note 14; Pharr,supra note 14. See also
ESKRIDGE, supra note 130, at 162 (noting that in Baehr v. Lewin, the
court adopted the argument that "the state's refusal to gixe marriage
licenses to same-sex couples is sex discrimination... [T]he Hawaii
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This last argument has some appeal: if courts treat
sex as a suspect class and if they place discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation under the rubric of sex
discrimination, then the odds are high of eradicating
whatever classification is at issue. This is the central
message of our study; and it is the lesson of Baehr v.
Lewin, as well.
In that case, the Supreme Court of
Hawaii treated the denial of same-sex marriages as sex
discrimination and applied strict scrutiny-the standard it
uses, owing to the presence of state ERA, to assess sexbased classifications. But the argument for treating
discrimination against gays and lesbians as sex
discrimination- as well as, of course, proposals seeking to
"garner intermediate scrutiny for gays as gays"--loses
some of its appeal in the current federal context, as well as
in most states. In those arenas, sex is not treated as a
suspect class, but subject to intermediate scrutiny, which,
as we have demonstrated throughout, is far less likely to
lead to equality-oriented outcomes.
This demonstration, however, is not meant to
suggest that advocates for gay rights should eschew an
equal protection strategy designed to attain heightened
constitutional scrutiny. Actually, we, along with many
legal scholars, see benefits to this approach-some of
which are symbolic, but others, quite practical. For one
thing, as our data suggest, moving from rational basis to
intermediate scrutiny will, in all likelihood, further the
cause of gay rights. Indeed, if the results presented here
generalize across the judiciary and transport from sex
discrimination to sexual orientation, the probability of
success in court will double. For another, as Ruth Bader
Ginsburg points out, the elevation of sex from rational basis
to heightened scrutiny has had salutary effects that
court made the right decision.").
133 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
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transcend the courtroom:
The Supreme Court, since the 1970s, has
effectively carried on in the gender
discrimination cases a dialogue with the
political branches of government. The Court
wrote modestly, it put forth no grand
philosophy. But by forcing legislative and
executive branch re-examination of sex-based
classifications, the Court helped to ensure that
laws and regulations would catch up with a
changed world. 134
On the other hand, there are costs associated with
the strategic pursuit of heightened scrutiny in the name of
advancing the legal rights of gays. Primarily, if courts
began to apply the mid-level test to classifications based on
sexual orientation-either by treating them as a separate
class or folding them into sex discrimination-they would,
in all likelihood, abide by that standard for the foreseeable
future if constitutional sex discrimination litigation is any
indication. To see this danger, we need only to recall that
the test established in Craignearly 30 years ago remains
the test that the Court applies today despite efforts on the
part of Justice Ginsburg and others to "ratchet it up.""13 5
That principles of law endure is no great surprise.
As we noted earlier, 136 if courts do not follow previously
established rules of law, or do so in unpredictable ways,
they risk undermining their fundamental efficacy, for
members of legal and political communities base their
future expectations on the belief that others will follow
134 Ruth B. Ginsburg, ConstitutionalAdjudication in the United States
as a Means ofAdvancing the Equal Stature ofMen and Women Under
the Law, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 263, 270 (1997).
135 See supra note 6.
136 See supra note 42.
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existing rules. However, this phenomenon does not appear
to be the case with regard to Craig, which has generated
unpredictable results in the sex discrimination area and may
very well do the same in constitutional cases centering on
sexual orientation. Advocates for gay rights can expect, if
our results are any indication, to lose as many cases as they
win, with the equal protection test itself providing little
guidance to differentiate between the two.
By explicating these problems, we emphasize once
again that our goal is not to deter advocates from following
the equal protection path (especially in the event of the
Court elevating sex to a suspect class). It is rather to
persuade members of the legal community to undertake an
analysis of its particular costs and benefits-whether with
our data or with other, more tailored observations.
V. Conclusion
For nearly thirty years now, the U.S. Supreme Court
employed
a "heightened scrutiny" test to adjudicate
has
constitutional claims of sex discrimination. While some
commentators endorse this approach, far more have
questioned it. Their critiques are varied in message and
many in number, but chief among them is the test's
seeming lack of determinacy: because the test is so
"amorphous" it fails to establish reliable expectations about
the results of sex-discrimination litigation.
Our empirical results put this normative critique on
stronger footing. We find that when courts apply the
intermediate standard, litigants alleging sex discrimination
are nearly as likely to win as they are to lose. This finding
is in marked contrast to the relatively predicable outcomes
generated when courts apply strict scrutiny, under which
most parties challenging sex-based classifications prevail.
For those desiring a larger number of equalityoriented outcomes, the task is to convince courts to elevate
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sex to a suspect class. We supplied several strategies for
accomplishing this objective, and surely others exist. Until
one or more succeeds, however, Ginsburg's cautionary
not
remark of two decades ago remains apt: "variance," and
1 37
persist.
will
judiciary
federal
the
"within
uniformity,

137

Ginsburg, supra note 58.
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rise to associational issues and the considerations relevant
to their resolution. It does not attempt to develop a general
theory of free association because, given the unresolvable
value disputes underlying all associational issues, I am
skeptical about the possibility of developing such a general
theory. Unpacking how differing associational issues are
resolved in practice within and among societies should,
however, shed some light on those values.
Part A outlines the types of situations in which
associational issues arise. How associational issues are
resolved greatly depends on whether a more individualistic
or collective perspective is brought to bear. Part B
develops this point in general through a discussion of both
Locke and Aristotle. Part C illustrates the point through a
brief excursion into the institution of marriage. Part D
analyzes in more detail how the process plays out regarding
conflicts among society's members. Part E then analyzes
the process when society itself is a party.
. Types of Associational Issues
Associational conflicts abound in social life.
Within a society Party A may wish to associate with Party
B, who, in turn, may not wish to associate with Party A.
Examples of this include: A's desire, not shared by B, to be
friends with, to marry or to remain married to B, A's desire
to go to school with or live in the same neighborhood as B,
to belong to the same club or professional association as B,
2
and many more. To resolve these conflicts, society could

1For other treatments of free association, see, e.g., FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION (Amy Gutman ed., 1998) (articles discussing the
importance of free association within a society and factors relevant to

the resolution of conflicts over free association).
2 Even situations as seemingly impersonal as taxation, when society
seeks to compel those who do not want to participate to financially
support public programs that benefit others, entail associational
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empower A to force the association on B, empower B to
avoid the association, or resolve the matter itself by taking
into account the wishes of the parties and other
considerations it deems relevant.
On the other hand, Party A and Party B may wish to
have an association that society finds objectionable or,
conversely, to avoid an association that society desires.
Under such circumstances, society must decide whether to
abide by the wishes of the parties or to prevent or compel
the association despite the parties' wishes. Examples of
preventing associations that parties wish to have include the
regulation of sexual behavior and criminalizing
conspiracies in restraint of trade. Examples of compelling
associations parties do not wish to have include the draft
and forced integration.
Moreover, society itself may be a party to an
associational conflict. Examples include when someone
wants to leave or enter a society against society's wishes,
or when people occupying part of a society wish
unilaterally to secede. In these instances, society must
decide whether to accede to the other party or attempt to
impose its will on that party. At times, all the parties
involved in an associational conflict may be societies.
Examples include territorial disputes and treaty withdrawal.
Here, the international community may try to intervene in a
way similar to a society's resolution of conflicts among its
members. In the absence of such intervention, societies
have to work it out amo ng themselves.
In all these associational contexts, some individual
or entity ultimately must control whether an association
exists. Parties cannot simultaneously be both friends and
not friends, be married and not married, attend integrated
and segregated schools, participate together in some
conflicts. A relationship between parties on a purely financial level is
still a type of association and poses questions that resemble those
arising in more intimate associations.
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societal venture and not participate together, be a member
and not be a member of society, be a party and not be a
party to a treaty. All societies have methods-through law,
custom, and at times brute force-for allocating the power
to control the outcome in such associational contexts and to
compel or induce the adherence of their members and
others. The purpose of this paper is to examine the ways in
which that power is allocated in order to identify and
evaluate the considerations that underlie differing
resolutions of associational conflicts in divergent social
contexts.
II. Who Should Control: Individual and Collective
Perspectives
One's view of the appropriate resolution of
associational conflicts and who should control the outcome
depends to a great degree on one's view of the nature of
social life. In particular, it depends upon the extent to
which one takes an individualistic or communal view of
social life.
3 This is not the place to attempt a thorough explanation of the meaning

of the concept "society," which involves such factors as
interdependence, common values and culture, authoritative institutions,
territoriality, and the perception of its members. Generally, I use
society to refer to something on the order of a country or nation.
Depending on which factors are emphasized, however, the concept is
flexible enough to include associations from those as small as a nuclear
family to the world community as a whole. Consequently, it is possible
for someone to be a member of many societies at the same time, both
public and private and with or without a formal governmental structure.
Each society may have its particular method of resolving associational
issues, although the types of considerations that come into play may
correspond. On the nuances in meaning of the concepts of society,
community and nation, and on their constitutive factors, see generally,
KARL W. DEUTSCH, NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL COMMUNICATION: AN
INQUIRY INTO THE FOUNDATIONS OF NATIONALITY (1966); ANTHONY

D. SMITH, NATIONAL IDENTITY (1991).
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The extreme individualistic view posits the primacy
of the individual. 4 The individual precedes society and all
relationships. Society and any relationship is only
justifiable or consistent with the rights of the individual
when people freely choose to enter society or form
relationships.
The extreme communal view posits the primacy of
the collective over the individual.5 People are inevitably
and unavoidably enmeshed in relationships because they
are, by nature, social animals born into relationships not
only with their parents but on some level with all others.
Their fates are inescapably intertwined with the fates of all
others, their welfare inescapably interdependent with the
welfare of all others, and in some way, all of their actions
affect all others and the actions of all others affect them. 6
Consequently, many relationships that may seem to
be freely chosen or rejected are, in fact, highly conditioned
by the social circumstances in which people find
themselves. And society at large has a legitimate interest in
preventing and imposing relationships in the name of the
common good. Even those relationships that are left to
private choice entail a collective decision that society is
better off by treating them as such.
The reality of social life in all modem, and perhaps
all historical, societies is some blend of individualistic and
communal thinking. Some types of relationships are more
4 As expressed, for example, in the philosophies of John Locke and
Robert Nozick. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF

GOVERNMENT (Thomas P. Peardon ed., Liberal Arts Press 1952)
1690); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).

As expressed, for example, in the philosophies of Aristotle and
Michael J. Sandel. See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS (Stephen Everson
ed., Cambridge University Press 1988); MICHAEL J. SANDEL,
LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982).

6 Even death does not fully avoid relationships, which may continue in

the form of obligations imposed on one's estate or of the influence one
continues to have on others after death.
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or less freely chosen, while others are more or less
involuntary or imposed. Often the line between free
choice, involuntariness, and imposition is blurry.
Moreover, the treatment of particular relationships as more
open to choice or as more subject to imposition is a
function of both individualistic and collective
considerations that may cut both ways. In most instances,
it is possible to advance both types of considerations for or
against treating relationships as open to choice or subject to
imposition.
This interplay between the individual and the
collective is found in even the most individualistic and
communal thinkers. Consider, for example, Locke and
Aristotle, who certainly represent thinkers close to the
opposite ends of the spectrum. For Locke, political-and
by extension social-life begins when people in "a state of
perfect freedom.., by their own consents... make
themselves members of some body politic." 7 Within given
societies, people then "by compact and agreement"
establish rules regarding the control and distribution of
property and other resources, 8 and "by common consent"
states do the same as among themselves. 9 Locke's
emphasis on consent, which is at the heart of contemporary
libertarianism, 10 is a highly individualistic view that at first
blush would seem to make it difficult to ever justify
imposing a political or any other relationship on someone.
7 LocKE,supra note 4, at 4, 11. "Men being, as has been said, by

nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this
estate without his own consent." Id. at 54.
1LocKE,supra note 4, at 27.
9Id.

10See NOZICK, supra note 4, at 334 ('Voluntary consent opens the
border for crossings ....
Treating us with respect by respecting our
rights, [the minimal state] allows us, individually or with whom we
choose, to choose our life and to realize our ends and our conception of
ourselves, in so far as we can, aided by the voluntary cooperation of
other individuals possessing the same dignity.").
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Yet several qualifications bring collective
considerations into play. First is the obligation Locke
imposes on people not to use their freedom so as "to harm
another,"" and the related limitation on their right to freely
appropriate the common resources of the state of nature
that they leave "enough and as good... in common for
others.' 2 These qualifications force people into
relationships with others in three ways: by having to take
the interests of others into account in planning one's own
behavior; by having to respond to the complaints of others
that one has violated the qualifications; or by having to
bargain and coordinate with others so as to minimize
conflict over and prevent overexploitation of resources.
Such necessities help explain why Nozick describes the
development of his Lockean Minimal State less as a
voluntary coming together than as a spontaneous, almost
automatic process.13
Second, even with regard to voluntary political
relationships, once someone "by actual agreement and any
express declaration" consents thereto, the person becomes
"subject to the government and dominion of that
commonwealth as long as it has a being.., and can never
again be in the liberty of the state of nature. 14 Moreover,
once someone becomes a member of a society "he
authorizes the society... to make laws for him as the
I' LocKE, supra note 4, at 5.
12Id. at 17.
13 NozicK, supra note 4, at 10-25, 108-19 (describing the "invisiblehand" process by which a "minimal state" arises out of the anarchic
state of nature as a means of people's protecting their rights and
interests). "Out of anarchy, pressed by spontaneous groupings, mutualprotection associations, division of labor, market pressures, economies
of scale, and rational self-interest, there arises something very much
resembling a minimal state or a group of geographically distinct
minimal states." Id. at 16-17.
14 LOcKE, supra note 4, at 69.
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public good of the society shall require,"15 and within the
society, "the majority have a right to act and conclude the
rest.",16 In short, by consensually entering into a societal
relationship, one may not withdraw from that relationship
and is then subject to, or is deemed to have consented to,
many other types of relationships imposed upon the party
pursuant to collective considerations.
Locke must, of course, deal with the question of
people who are born into already existing societies, which
is to say most people throughout history. If after a
society's initial consensual founding everyone born into it
automatically and irrevocably became members of it, this
would be the end of the consensual nature of political
relationships. Consequently, Locke propounds that "a child
is born subject to no country or government,"' 7 and upon
is "at liberty what government he will
becoming an adult 18
under.,
put himself
As a practical matter, however, the exercise of that
liberty is often highly constrained and subtle. Thus, "the
son cannot ordinarily enjoy the possessions of his father but
under the same terms his father did, by becoming a member
of the society."' 19 Moreover, the socialization process and a
multitude of economic and emotional bonds that exist in all
societies inhibit most people from choosing to join a
society other than their own. Thus, the process of consent
is such that "people take no notice of it and, thinking it not
done at all, or not necessary, conclude they are naturally
subjects as they are men." 20 Finally, unlike in Locke's
time, the world is now divided into nation-states that
strictly regulate entry, thereby creating significant legal
"
at 50.
16 Id.

Id.
at 55.
67.
68.
19 Id.
at 67.
17
Id.
at
18Id.
at

20 Id.
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obstacles to expatriation. It is only a short step to a general
view that, in reality, many relationships are far from
voluntary, and that the appearance of consent is often
illusory and masks the largely socially constructed nature
of relationships.
This view readily comports with Aristotle's.
Aristotle's starting point, unlike Locke's "state of perfect
freedom," is that "man is by nature a political animal. 21
Rather than arising from consent, the state is a "creation of
nature," 22 and is "clearly prior to the family and to the
individual." 23 Social life is an involuntary relationship
because "a social instinct is implanted in all men by nature"
24
and "the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing."
From this starting point, Aristotle posits a variety of
involuntary relationships in social life. One is the
relationship of ruler and ruled: "For that someone should
rule and others be ruled is a thing not only necessary, but
expedient; from the hour of their birth, some are marked
out for subjection, others for rule., 25 For Aristotle this
extends to gender relationships, in that "the male is by
nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules,
and the other is ruled; this principle, of necessity, entails to
21 ARISTOTLE,

supra note 5, at 3.

22 id.
23Id. at4.

24 Id. Compare SANDEL, supra note 5, at 150:
To say that the members of a society are bound by a sense
of community is not simply to say that a great many of
them profess communitarian sentiments and pursue
communitarian aims, but rather that they conceive their
identity... as defined to some extent by the community
of which they are a part. For them, community describes
... not a relationship they choose (as in a voluntary
association) but an attachment they discover, not merely
an attribute but a constituent of their identity.
25 ARISTOTLE,

supra note 5, at 6.
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all mankind."26 It is possible to reject Aristotle's view of
class and gender roles and still find a case for the nonconsensual nature of many social relationships.
Yet, bearing in mind that the notion of individual
rights was not highly developed in his era, Aristotle's
philosophy also contains the yin-yang of communal and
individualistic thinking.27 Thus, subject to its regulation for
the common good, Aristotle supports private ownership of
property 2 8-the essence of which, as modem commentators
have noted, is the owner's power to choose with whom to
associate regarding its use. 29 Aristotle's reasons have both
26

1d. at7.
27 See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Terence Irwin trans.,
Hackett Publishing Co. 1985). For Aristotle, one's ethical duties
regarding how one should treat others derive from the pursuit of one's
highest end, which is happiness. Happiness is properly sought through
the development of one's excellences and virtues, which include the
way one treats others. See also THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE STATE 1-24
(H. M. Currie ed., 1973) (discussing the roots of respect for the
individual in ancient Greek and Roman democracies, and the
maturation in Western civilization since the Renaissance and
Reformation of "the essential dignity and sanctity of human life,
freedom of thought and criticism.... popular government.. ., [and]
the rule of law based on the impartial administration ofjustice"
beginning with the Renaissance and Reformation periods (at 5)).
28 "It is clearly better that property should be private, but the use of it
common; and the special business of the legislature is to create in men
this benevolent disposition." ARISTOTLE,supra note 5, at 26. "The
true forms of government, therefore, are those in which the one, or the
few, or the many govern with a view to the common interest." Id. at
61.
29 See, e.g., Thomas Kleven, PrivatePropertyand Democratic
Socialism, 21 LEGAL STUD. F. 1, 12-21 (1997) ("Ownership confers
decision making power over things, the right to determine how things
are to be used and who may have access to them, which in turn means
that others who do not have the right to share therein, i.e., who are not
co-owners, have the duty not to interfere with the owner's control." (at
18)); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth
Century: The Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29
BUFF. L. REV. 325, 360 (1980) ("To say that one owned property was
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collective and individualistic overtones. "[W]hen a man
feels a thing to be his own," this contributes to personal
pleasure and thereby to the development of one's
excellence; 30 the greatest pleasure is "doing a kindness or
service [to others], which can only be rendered when a man
has private property.'
Private property enables people to
"set an example of liberality" or "liberal action," deriving
from "the use which is made of property., 32 Finally, "there
is much more quarreling among those who have all things
in common, 3 3 such that with private property "men will
not complain of one another, and they will make more
progress, because everyone will be attending to his own
business. ' 34
In addition, though people are naturally political
animals, Aristotle acknowledges that "they are also brought
together by their common interests, 35 implying that free
choice is at play in establishing political relationships.
Furthermore, while Aristotle is not an unadulterated
advocate of democracy, he does note as among its virtues
that "a man should live as he likes," 36 a further
acknowledgement of freedom of choice in relationships.

to say that the owner had some set of rights, privileges, powers and

immunities. Moreover, one who did not own property had a set of no
rights, duties, disabilities, and liabilities relative to the owner.") But
compare State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 374 (N.J. 1971) (overturning
trespass conviction of legal services attorney and poverty worker
assisting migrant farm workers on ground that a property owner does
not have the right to prohibit visits with farm workers in on-premises
living quarters so as to deny them "opportunity to enjoy associations
customary among our citizens").
30 ARISTOTLE,
31 Id.
32

supra note 5, at 26.

1d. at 27.

33 Id.
34 Id. at 26.

31 Id. at 60.
36

Id. at 144.
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To conclude this part of the discussion, I do not
propose to try to resolve here which of the foregoing
perspectives, the individualistic or the communal, is the
more correct or appropriate for addressing associational
issues. Indeed, the debate over that question probably
cannot be resolved. In the real world, most or all societies
have an ethos that incorporates some aspects of both
approaches, albeit with differing emphases in different
societies. Therefore, we should expect to find divergent
societies resolving associational issues differently in
keeping with the nuances of their mores. And within
societies, we should expect to find associational issues
resolved differently over time as mores evolve.
IlI. The Institution of Marriage
To illustrate how societies resolve associational
issues differently from each other and over time, let us
briefly consider the institution of marriage. In the United
States, the establishment of a marital relationship is widely
viewed as the choice of the two parties, both of whom must
agree and either one of whom may block its establishment.
In this context, the party who does not want an association
prevails over the party who does and, therefore, controls
the outcome.
Both individualistic and collective values, flowing
from cultural notions of what marriage entails, would seem
to underlie this arrangement. From an individualistic
perspective, to force one to marry against one's will would
violate human dignity and the fundamental right to control
one's destiny with regard to such personal matters. The
intimacy of marriage, ideally based on love and typically
involving sexual relations, is one obvious element. More
collective notions are also likely at work, such as the
importance of marriage based on mutual choice to the
success of the nuclear family and, in turn, the perceived
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importance of the nuclear family to the successful
functioning of society.
Underlying all these elements are debatable value
judgments. A society in which the extended family is a
more important institution than the nuclear family might
well see marriage based on love and mutual choice as
promoting the nuclear family at the expense of the
extended family. This may help explain the practice in
some societies of arranged marriages, perhaps more
common in the past, though still found today.3 7 Those
societies may view marriage based on intense interpersonal
intimacy and mutual choice as weakening the ties to other
members of the extended family and leading couples to
separate themselves from it. In marriages arranged by
one's family or parents, on the other hand, it is common for
the new couple to live with one of their families, thereby
strengthening extended family ties.

37 See, e.g., GWEN J. BROUDE, MARRIAGE, FAMILY, AND
RELATIONSHIPS: A CROSS-CULTURAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 192-95 (1994)
(comparing arranged marriage practices in various cultures); Xu

Xiaohe & Martin King White, Love Matches and ArrangedMarriages,
NEXT OF KIN 420 (Lome Tepperman & Susannah J. Wilson, eds. 1993)
(comparing and contrasting arranged marriage practices in China and

Japan). For articles on recent efforts at reform in societies with
historical traditions of patriarchal marital practices, including arranged
marriage, see, e.g., Michele Brandt & Jeffrey A. Kaplan, The Tension

Between Women's Rights and Religious Rights: Reservations to
CEDA W by Egypt, Bangladesh and Tunisia, 12 J.L. & RELIGION 105
(1995-96); Mark Cammack et al., Legislating Social Change in an
Islamic Society - Indonesia's MarriageLaw, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 45

(1996); Anna M. Han, Holding Up More Than Half the Sky:
Marketization and the Status of Women in China, 11 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 791 (2001); Sherifa Zuhur, Empowering Women or

Dislodging Sectarianism:Civil Marriagein Lebanon, 14 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 177 (2002); Shirley L. Wang, Note, The Maturation of

Gender Equality Into Customary InternationalLaw, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 899 (1995).
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Without question, arranged marriages have often
taken into account the wishes of the parties. When it does
not, arranged marriage is an example of an association that
one or both of the parties may not want. While ultimately
it may be difficult to force an adamantly unwilling party to
marry, various social pressures may be applied to induce
compliance. Threats of disinheritance and ostracism have
frequently been used, even in societies as individualistic as
the United States, to induce compliance with parental
wishes, and some societies have condoned or accepted even
the killing of a recalcitrant child.3 8
While mutual choice is the prevailing approach to
the establishment of a marriage in this society, the right to
freely choose to marry has been severely limited by
requirements such as being unmarried and of different
genders. Such requirements reflect societal concerns, like
promoting procreation or perceived moral offensiveness,
that are thought to trump the value of individual choice,
even with regard to a matter as intimate as marriage. For
example, anti-polygamy laws might be justified as
protecting women and children from perceived oppression
or ensuring that there are potential partners for everyone
who wants to marry. Banning same-sex marriage might be
justified as promoting procreation or preventing practices
that violate societal mores. Nevertheless, polygamy has
been widely practiced in other societies, and there are

38

For reports on countries where "honor killings" of women are

common for various reasons, including refusal to submit to arranged

marriages, and on the indifference and complicity of the authorities,
see, e.g., Amnesty International, Pakistan:HonorKillings ofGirls and
Women, at http://www.anesty.org/library(Doc.# ASA 33/018/1999);
Gendercide Watch, Case Study: "HonourKillings and Blood Feuds,"
at http://www.gendercide.org/case-honour.html; Human Rights Watch,

Violence Against Women and "Honor" Crimes, at
http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/04/unorall 2_0405.htm.
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strong individual rights claims for allowing it. 39 The same
is true for same-sex marriage, for which movements exist
here and elsewhere. 4°
39

For divergent views regarding polygamy, see, e.g., Keith E. Sealing,

Polygamists Out of the Closet: Statutory and State Constitutional
ProvisionsAgainst Polygamy Are UnconstitutionalUnder the Free
Exercise Clause, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 691 (2001 ) (arguing that antipolygamy laws intentionally discriminate against Mormons without a
legitimate secular purpose); Maura I. Strassberg, DistinctionsofForm
or Substance: Monogamy, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 75
N.C.L. REv. 1501 (1997) (arguing that anti-polygamy laws are
justifiable per the contribution of polygamy to despotic and
inegalitarian societies and of monogamy to the modem liberaldemocratic state); Stephanie Forbes, Note, Why Have Just One?: An
Evaluation of the Anti-Polygamy Laws under the Establishment Clause,
3 9 Hous. L. REV. 1517 (2003) (arguing that laws banning polygamy
violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment per
promotion of particular religious views and absence of an overriding
secular purpose); Richard A. Vasquez, Note, The Practiceof
Polygamy: Legitimate Free Exercise ofReligion or Legitimate Public
Menace? Revisiting Reynolds in Light of Modern Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. & POL'Y, 225 (2001-2002)
(arguing that harms of polygamy to women and children constitute a
compelling government interest justifying its prohibition).
40 See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941
(Mass.
2003) (finding that denial of benefits of civil marriage to same-sex
partners infringes fundamental rights of individual liberty and equality
in violation of Massachusetts Constitution); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d
864 (Vt. 1999) (holding that exclusion of same sex couples from
benefits and protections of marriage violates Common Benefits Clause
of Vermont Constitution); Clifford Krauss, Gay MarriagePlan: Sign of
Sweeping Social Change in Canada,N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2003, at 8A
(reporting on Canada's decision to legalize same-sex marriage). For
arguments in favor of same -sex marriage, see, e.g., Elvia R. Arriola,
Law and the Family of Choice and Need, 35 LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 691
(1996-1997); MARK STROSSER, LEGALLY WED 23-74 (1997) (arguing
that bans on same sex marriages violate the Equal Protection and Due
Process clauses); Cindy Tobisman, Marriagevs. Domestic
Partnership:Will We Ever ProtectLesbians'Families,12 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 112 (1997). For arguments against or counseling a
gradual approach to the recognition of same -sex marriage, see, e.g.,
George W. Dent, Jr., The Defense of TraditionalMarriage, 15 J.L. &
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The free choice model is also not fully applicable to
the termination of a marriage through divorce. In some
societies, including the United States in earlier times,
divorce has been nearly impossible to obtain, even when
both parties desire it. 4 1 When divorce became generally

permitted in the United States, it was ordinarily necessary
to show a cause such as adultery, desertion, or cruelty.42
This usually posed little problem when both parties wanted
out since they could stipulate to, or fabricate, a cause.43
But a requirement of cause could pose a substantial
obstacle when one party wanted out and the other did not.
In such instances, the party wanting the association to
continue controlled if the party not wanting it was unable to
POLITICS 581 (1999); Linda S. Eckols, The MarriageMirage: The
PersonalandSocial IdentityImplications of Same-GenderMatrimony,
5 MiciI. J. GENDER& L. 353 (1999).
41 Most of Europe, prior to the 1800s, was largely influenced
by
religious doctrine proclaiming the indissolubility of marriage. Divorce
was virtually unknown and annulment very hard to obtain. Couples
who wanted out of marriage had to settle for living apart while
remaining formally married. Likewise in colonial America, divorce
was difficult to obtain and uncommon, especially in the South,
although legislative divorces were occasionally granted. After
independence, the situation in the South remained the same while
largely restrictive judicial divorce laws were developed in some
Northern states. By 1880, legislative divorce was dead and most states
had general divorce laws of varying degrees of stringency. See, e.g.,
LAWRENCEM. FRIEDMAN, AHISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 181-82, 43640 (1973); MAX RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE, AND
THE LAW 7-27 (1972).

Comprehensive divorce laws began to arise in the United States in
the mid-1800s. Although initially a few states established fairly
permissive grounds for divorce, by the late 1800s restrictive divorce
laws were the norm. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 41, at 436-40;
RHEINSTEIN,supra note 41, at 28-55; Walter Wadlington, Divorce
Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L. REV. 32, 35-44 (1966).
43 See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 41, at 439 ("collusion was
a way of
life"); RHEINSTEIN, supra note 41, at 55-63; Elizabeth S. Scott,
Rational DecisionmakingAbout MarriageandDivorce, 76 VA. L. REV.
9,15-16(1990).
42
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show cause. While the party wanting out might be able to
physically leave, so that the parties were no longer living
together as a married couple, the formality of the marriage
and its attendant legal and social obligations would still
remain.
It is possible to reconcile the requirement of cause
with the mutual choice model. The choice to marry in the
face of the cause requirement could be seen as akin to an
agreement not to sever the association without cause. This
rationale would seem more convincing if the parties could
choose to marry under either a regime permitting unilateral
divorce or a regime requiring cause, as is currently being
tried or considered in some states. 44 When the only
available option is divorce for cause, individuals who want
the benefits of marriage are induced by society to have their
ability to exit the relationship limited by the wishes of the
other party. This empowers the party who wants the
relationship to continue.
Currently in the United States, a marital relationship
is fairly easily severed through divorce because most states
either have no-fault divorce or impose easily proven
standards, such as incompatibility or irreconcilable
differences. 45 Consequently, when one party wants a
44 Both Arizona and Louisiana have recently adopted "covenant

marriage" statutes enabling parties to choose to marry under a system
requiring traditional fault grounds for divorce rather than the generally
applicable no-fault system. ARiz. REv. STAT. §25-901 etseq. (1998);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §9:272-75,307 (1997).
45 See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN
LAW 64-81 (1987) (identifying eighteen states as having divorce on nofault grounds only, two as requiring mutual consent for no-fault
divorce, and thirty states as having mixed fault and no-fault systems
that impose various waiting periods for contested unilateral no -fault
divorce; and comparing the United States to Western Europe);
HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF

DIVORCE LAW INTHE UNITED STATES 1-2,43-103 (1988) (detailing the
history of the no-fault movement in the United States); Wadlington,
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marriage to continue and the other wants out, the latter
controls. Yet, although unilateral divorce is now fairly
easy, society's requirement of support for ex-spouses and
children impinges on one party's ability to terminate all
aspects of the relationship against the will of the other
party. Support requirements might be rationalized in a
number of ways, involving both individualistic and
collective concerns: on the basis of a party's having
voluntarily undertaken such obligations by choosing to
marry or have children; or of the perceived unfairness of
allowing total exit when a less well-off spouse may have
foregone opportunities for self-sufficiency in the interest of
the marital or family relationship; or of a judgment that
individuals should be responsible for providing for their
offspring rather than leaving it entirely to the other parent
or to society as a whole; or of the contribution of support
requirements to the preservation of the nuclear family as an
integral societal institution. In any event, support
requirements depart, at least to some degree, from total
freedom to exit an unwanted relationship that another party
wants. In fact, support requirements may be imposed even
against the wishes of both parties to a divorce, as through
laws requiring divorcees to reimburse the state for welfare
benefits paid to ex-spouses and children. 46
In sum, despite the intimacy of the marital
relationship, societies frequently intervene through law and
social practice to prevent people who want to marry from
doing so and to compel or induce people who do not want
to marry or remain married to do so. Both individualistic
and collective considerations govern the institution of
marriage, and different balances are struck among and
within societies.
supra note 42, at 44-52 (discussing the operation of divorce laws based
on incompatibility).

See Paul K. Legler, The Coming Revolution in Child Support Policy:
Implications of the 1996 Welfare Act, 30 FAM. L.Q. 519 (1996).
46
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IV. Associational Considerations Among Parties Within
a Society
In this section I intend to flesh out more thoroughly
some of the considerations relevant to deciding who should
control the existence or non-existence of associations
among society's members. 47 Assume a society is deciding
(i) whether to allow, prohibit or mandate particular
relationships, and (ii) who should control the outcome in
case of conflict over the existence of a relationship. Every
such society will have a bias, derived from its culture and
mores, about the relative significance of the decision of
various individual and collective considerations.4 8
Although these biases will often produce different
outcomes in similar associational contexts, the
considerations that come into play may yet be the same.
Like the concept of society, supra note 3, the concept of membership
is complex and variable, depending on the emphasis placed on the
various factors that might be thought relevant, such as formal
citizenship, voluntarily joining and/or agreeing to be a member, and
presence in a society and/or participation in its activities. Since
members of a society frequently receive more favorable treatment than
non-members, the issue of whether someone is a societal member may
be hotly contested. See infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text
regarding the lesser rights of prospective immigrants. See also Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (Equal Protection Clause applies to
undocumented alien children present within state such that state must
provide free public education to citizens and lawful aliens); Martinez v.
Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983) (finding no violation of the Equal
Protection Clause where state denies free public education to children
residing in district for primary purpose of attending public school).
48 In this society, for example, when the law is silent, the presumption
is that parties are free to mutually decide to have or not to have an
association. An alternative approach is possible, at least with respect to
the establishment of an association; namely that all associations require
prior collective approval. That the former rather than the latter is the
case reflects the society's individualistic bias.
47
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A. Terminatingan Existing Relationship
Since individual freedom is so highly valued in this
society, let us assume that interpersonal relations are
ordinarily up to the parties involved. 49 Also assume in case
of conflict that the party not wanting a relationship
ordinarily controls, unless there are sufficient
countervailing considerations either to socialize the
decision or to empower the other party to control. First, let
us address a party desiring to terminate an existing
relationship voluntarily entered into that the other party
wants to continue.5 °
49 Like the concepts of society and membership, what it means to say

that someone is involved in a relationship is subject to a variety of
interpretations depending on such factors as whether they have agreed
to the relationship and their degree of interdependence with others.
With a common destiny, there is a sense in which everyone in the
world is involved in a mutual relationship. However, the extent of the
relationship may have legal significance. For example, laws requiring
parental consent before a minor can obtain an abortion seem premised
on the existence of a relationship with the child that warrants parental
involvement in the decision, subject to the child's right to opt out of
that aspect of the parent-child relationship if the child can demonstrate
sufficient maturity to a judge who thereby becomes involved in the
decision as a kind of surrogate parent. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). In contrast, holding that parents have
the right to deny visitation privileges to grandparents seems premised
on the absence of a sufficiently strong grandparent-child relationship to
overcome the parent-child relationship. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S.
57 (2000). See also, infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text
(regarding lesser rights of prospective immigrants as against societal
members).
50 Where one party wants out of an existing relationship and the other
does not, several resolutions are possible. One is to allow unilateral
termination. A second is to allow unilateral termination subject to the
requirement that the party wanting out somehow compensate the other
party. A third possible resolution is to allow the party wanting the
relationship to continue to specifically enforce the agreement against
unilateral termination. Finally, a fourth possible resolution is to allow
specific performance subject to the requirement that the party wanting
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As noted above with regard to marriage,
individualistic considerations do not necessarily support the
right of a party wanting out always to have the absolute
privilege to completely terminate an existing relationship
against the will of the other party. Suppose at the inception
of a relationship the parties agree that the relationship may
be terminated only by mutual agreement and that neither
shall have the right to terminate it unilaterally. If one party
later wants out, the other who does not want out might
claim that the first party has thereby voluntarily waived
whatever right not to have or continue an unwanted
relationship it might otherwise have had. To reject such a
claim, it is necessary to treat the unilateral right to
terminate an unwanted relationship as inalienable, thereby
making the stipulation against unilateral termination void.
A commitment to individualism may support
viewing some individual rights as inalienable, as when
parting with those rights would overly undermine what it
means to be a person and pervert a commitment to

in somehow compensate the party wanting out. See Guido Calabresi &
Douglas Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability Rules, and Inalienabilty:
One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). Only the
first alternative fully satisfies the individualistic claim of an absolute
privilege to terminate an unwanted relationship over the other party's
objection. The second alternative is next most favorable to the party
wanting out, but it is inconsistent with an absolute privilege to
terminate because having to compensate the other party impinges on
the privilege and may at times be so costly as to induce someone to
remain in an unwanted relationship. Furthermore, it entails a
concession to the party wanting a relationship to continue, empowers
that party in bargaining over the relationship's future, and requires that
the relationship continue in the form of whatever the required
compensation consists of. Still this second alternative, as well as the
third and fourth which are even more favorable to the party wanting in,
are all consistent with an individualistic approach to social life.
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individualism. 5' For example, it might be claimed that
people have an inalienable right to life and liberty, and thus
should not be permitted to agree to allow others to kill or
enslave them. 52 But, as the debate over physician assisted
suicide shows, it is far from clear that a commitment to
individualism supports making even these fundamental
rights inalienable in all instances.53 It is even possible to
claim that inalienability itself is inconsistent with a
commitment to individualism because people should be
free to part with all their individual rights, at least as long
as they do so voluntarily and without coercion (assuming
that to be a possible state of affairs - a point to be

developed more fully below). 55
The problem in the present context is that there are
competing individual rights claims. Disallowing unilateral
withdrawal from a relationship limits the freedom of the
party wanting out, but allowing it also impacts the freedom
51 See, e.g., Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability,100 HARV. L.

REV. 1849 (1987) (arguing for the non-commodification of aspects of
the self that are integral to personhood).
52 See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 95 (W.W. Norton & Co.
1975) (1859) ("The principle of freedom cannot require that [someone]
should be free not to be free. It is not freedom to be allowed to alienate
Ione's] freedom.").
3 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (assistance
for terminally ill patients in committing suicide not a fundamental
liberty interest protected by Due Process Clause); Raphael CohenAlmagor & Monica G. Hartman, The Oregon Death With Dignity Act:
Review and Proposalsfor Improvement, 27 J. LEGIs. 269 (2001); Neil
M. Gorsuch, The Right to Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia,23 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 599 (2000); Christine N. O'Brien et al., Oregon's
Guidelinesfor Physician-AssistedSuicide: A Legal andEthical
Analysis, 61 U. Prrr. L. REv. 329 (2000); PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE
(Robert F. Weir ed., 1997); Melvin I. Urofsky, JustifyingAssisted
Suicide: Comments on the OngoingDebate, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETICS & PUB. POL'Y 893 (2000).
54 See, e.g., NoZICK, supra note 4, at 58, 331 (arguing that a free
society must allow someone to consent to being killed or enslaved).
55 See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
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of the party wanting in. Thus, the assertion that a party has
an inalienable right to unilaterally withdraw from any
relationship, even after agreeing otherwise, must contend
with the individual right claim of the party wanting the
relationship to continue that it has changed its position and
passed up other opportunities in reliance on the agreement.
Arguing that the party wanting in has no legitimate claim of
detrimental reliance, because that party should realize at the
outset and thus assumes the risk that the other's right to
withdraw is inalienable, is not sufficient to rebut this claim.
The issue is whether individual rights considerations
provide greater support for the recognition of an inalienable
right of unilateral termination, or for a right to hold a party
to an agreement not to unilaterally withdraw, or at least for
a right to be compensated in the event thereof.
When conflicting individual rights are implicated,
which will often if not always be the case, one must decide
whose interests are weightier. This requires a contextual
analysis of which side's interests seem stronger under the
circumstances. For example, the claim for a right to
unilaterally withdraw from a marriage seems stronger
when, shortly after marrying, one party wants out and the
other stands to suffer no more than a brief emotional hurt.
The claim seems weaker, on the other hand, when one party
has sacrificed a career in order to assist the other party's
career and then years later, after achieving success, the
other wants out and would leave the sacrificing party
destitute. At a minimum, the sacrificing party would seem
to have a strong claim for a right to receive support from
the party wanting out of the relationship.
Now let us assume that there is no agreement not to
terminate -- that the parties have voluntarily entered into a
relationship without specifying whether there is a right of
unilateral termination or not -- and that now one party
wants out, whereas the other wants the relationship to
continue. Again, it must be decided which side's interests
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are weightier in context. Compare two situations: first, two
parties establish a friendship, and later one party wants to
end it while the other wants it to continue; second, two
parties mutually undertake some joint economic venture,
and later one party wants out. In American society, the
right to unilaterally terminate a friendship is the norm,
whereas measures are sometimes taken to induce the
continued existence of business relationships, or at least to

require comlensation in the event of unilateral
termination.

56

For example, although courts have been unwilling to compel

performance of personal service contracts, they will at times enjoin
breaching parties such as entertainers and others with unique skills
from working for competitors. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS §367 (1981); William L. Schaller, Jumping Ship: Legal
Issues Relating to Employee Mobility in High Technology Industries,
17 LAB. LAW. 25, 33-34(2001). Similarly, express and, at times,
implied non-competition clauses and covenants not to disclose between
employer and employee or in professional associations are enforced.
This enforcement is subject to a reasonableness test that depends on
whether there exists a legitimate protectable interest such as trade
secrets or money invested in training, or whether the purpose is simply
to tie someone to the firm or the effect is to overly undermine mobility.
See, e.g., Rachael S. AmowRichmon, Bargainingfor Loyalty in the
Information Age: A Reconsiderationof the Role of Substantive
Fairnessin Enforcing Employee Noncompetes, 80 OR. L. REv. 1163
(2001); Gillian Lester, Restrictive Covenants, Employee Training,and
the Limits of Transaction-CostAnalysis, 76 IND. L.J. 49 (2001); Suellen
Lowry, Inevitable Disclosure Trade Secret Disputes:Dissolutionsof
ConcurrentPropertyInterests, 40 STAN. L. REV. 519 (1988); Stewart
E. Sterk, Restraints on Alienation ofHuman Capital,79 VA. L. REV.
383 (1993); Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes Over
the Ownership of Human Capitalin the ChangingWorkplace, 34
CONN. L. REv. 721 (2002); Sela Stroud, Non-Compete Agreements:
Weighing the Interests ofProfession and Firm, 53 ALA. L. REv. 1023
(2002). When successful, such actions, although not specifically
requiring the continuation of a business relationship, may induce its
continuance by preventing people who want out from establishing
alternative relationships.
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The two situations cannot readily be distinguished
on the notion that a friendship is inherently terminable at
any party's will because it depends on an emotional
commitment that cannot be imposed. In fact, by forcing
people to associate, it may well be possible to induce
emotional commitments that one or both parties would
otherwise reject, as with the bonds that develop among
soldiers drafted into military service or workers brought
together in the workplace5 7 Moreover, a successful
business relationship also requires a type of emotional
commitment among its associates, a commitment that is in
many ways as intimate as that of a friendship. 58 Nor can
the situations readily be distinguished by the contractual
nature of the economic venture, or by the reliance and
opportunity costs associated with it. A friendship too is a
type of agreement. Although ordinarily more tacit,
perhaps, than the usual business relationship, friendships
typically entail a mutual commitment to respond to the
other when asked and when able to do so. In reliance on
that commitment, and to one's detriment if the commitment

57 See, e.g., CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: How
WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 3-29, 69-83
(2003); GERALD F. LINDERMAN, THE WORLD WITHIN WAR:
AMERICA'S COMBAT EXPERIENCE IN WORLD WAR 11263-99 (1997);
JOHN C. MCMANUS, THE DEADLY BROTHERHOOD 244-46,273-90

Q1998).
8 See, e.g., DON COHEN & LAURENCE PRUSAK, IN GOOD COMPANY:
How SOCIAL CAPITAL MAKES ORGANIZATIONS WORK 4 (2001)
(emphasizing the importance to an organization's success of "the trust,

mutual understanding, and shared values and behaviors that bind the
members of human networks and communities and make cooperative
action possible"); W. EDWARDS DEMING, THE NEw ECONOMICS FOR
INDUSTRY, GOVERNMENT, EDUCATION 28-29 (2d ed. 2000)

(emphasizing the importance to an enterprise's success of"giv[ing]
everyone a chance to take pride in his work," "informal dialogue,"
"comradeship," "study-groups and social gatherings," and generally
developing a spirit of cooperation).
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is withdrawn, friends frequently change position and pass
up other opportunities.
Perhaps collective considerations distinguish
friendship from business, like the centrality of business
relations to the materialistic ethic that prevails in American
society and the perceived dependence upon binding
contracts for the successful functioning of the economic
system. Absent such considerations, attempts to impose
intimate relations like friendships might be thought to
offend human dignity. Yet, a society is certainly
conceivable in which friendship is perceived as so integral
to its success that the unilateral termination of friendships,

at least without good cause, is discouraged.5 9 Even in this

highly individualistic society, people are discouraged
through social pressure from cavalierly ending friendships
unilaterally, such as a bad reputation that makes it difficult
to establish friendships in the future.

B. Establishingan Initial Relationship
59 See, e.g., Joan G. Miller et al., Perceptionsof Social Responsibilities
in India and in the United States: Moral Imperatives or Personal
Decisions, 5 8 J. OF P ERSONALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 33 (1990) (finding
that Indians tend to view responsibilities to others, especially to friends
and strangers, more in terms of moral obligations, whereas Americans
tend to view them as more a matter of personal choice); Niloufer Q.
Madhi, Pukhtunuali: Ostracism and HonorAmong the Pathan Hill
Tribes, 7(3/4) ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 295 (1986) (reporting on
the practice of ostracism, including expulsion from the tribe, as a means
of deterring behavior contrary to tribal norms and of unifying the
group); Paras N. Singh et al., A ComparativeStudy of Selected
Attitudes, Values, and PersonalityCharacteristicsofAmerican,
Chinese, and Indian Students, 57 J. OF Soc. PSYCHOL 123, 130 (1962)
("The American culture gives more emphasis to personal autonomy and
individuality. In contrast to this, Indian and Chinese students give
more emphasis to sympathy, love, affection, mutual help and family
bonding, resulting in sympathetic and sacrificing attitudes.").
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Thus far the analysis has been skeptical of the right
of a party not wanting an association to control the outcome
in all instances, at least with regard to an already existing
relationship.
Now, let us turn to the inception of three
hypothetical proposed associations: one both parties want
but which others find objectionable; one that one party
wants and the other does not; and one that neither party
wants while others do.
1. Relationships Both PartiesWant
When both parties want to have a relationship in a
society favoring the individual right of free association,
preventing them from doing so would seem clearly to
violate their rights, absent overriding collective
considerations. Examples of such collective considerations
are laws prohibiting conspiracies to overthrow the
government or in restraint of trade. In other instances,
however, assertions of collective considerations may not
suffice to overcome the value of free association.
Consider the practice of forced separation of the
races, as with mandatory segregation in the United States
and South African apartheid, and as still practiced in some
societies today. 60 Through the use of governmental power,
See, e.g., YAAKOv KoP & ROBERT E. LITAN, STICKING TOGETHER:
THE ISRAELI EXPERIMENT IN PLURALISM 20-21, 30-34,74-75, 86, 98
(2002) (discussing various government practices promoting the
segregation of Arab Israelis and their separation from mainstream life
and characterizing the situation as "separate but not equal"); BRENDAN
60

MURTAGH, THE POLITICS OF TERRITORY: POLICY AND SEGREGATION IN

NORTHERN IRELAND 34-43, 46-49, 151, 163-67 (2002) (detailing

extensive segregation in Northern Ireland along religious lines, but
finding, despite the use of peace lines in Belfast to separate religious
enclaves so as to avoid conflict, a lack of evidence to support the use of
planning instruments to achieve ethno-political objectives and
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forced separation imposes the preference of those who do
not want interethnic relationships on those who do. In the
United States, for example, anti-miscegenation laws and
laws mandating school and residential segregation
prevented those blacks and whites who wanted to marry, or
go to school, or live together, from choosing to have those
associations. 61
characterizing goxernment policy more as one of "benign acceptance"
of separation than of design); Tracy Wilkinson, Bosnia'sEthnic
Division Relocates to the Classroom,L.A. TIMES, October 19, 1997, at
Al (reporting on the segregation of students in schools in the MuslimCroat Federation with "separate-but-equal" programs for Bosniak
Muslim and Roman Catholic Croatian children).
61 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (prohibition against
interracial marriage constitutes invidious discrimination based on race
with respect to a fundamental individual liberty and therefore violates
Equal Protection Clause); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917)
(city ordinance prohibiting both blacks and whites from living in
neighborhoods where other race is in the majority violates Equal
Protection Clause); Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1927) (per curiam)
(city ordinance prohibiting both blacks and whites from living in
neighborhoods where other race is in the majority, except with consent
of majority of other race, violates Equal Protection Clause); Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (judicial enforcement of racially restrictive
covenants in deeds constitutes discriminatory state action in violation
of Equal Protection Clause); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954) (mandatory segregation of the races in public schools violates
Equal Protection Clause). Compare Herbert Wechsler, TowardNeutral
Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 (1959)
(viewing the issue posed by enforced segregation as one of "denying
the association to those individuals who wish it and imposing it on
those who would avoid it," and opining that there is no neutral
constitutional basis for favoring one claim over the other); ALEXANDER
M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 57 (2d ed., 1986) (replying to Wechsler:
What, on the score of generality and neutrality, is wrong
with the principle that a legislative choice in favor of a
freedom not to associate is forbidden, when the
consequence of such a choice is to place one of the groups
of which our society is constituted in a position of
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In support of laws against race mixing, the right of
groups to preserve their ethnic purity might be asserted.
Evaluating the merit of the ethnic purity argument
ultimately demands a value judgment about which there
may be disagreement. To some, the pursuit of ethnic purity
amounts to racism, whereas to believers it represents ethnic
pride and group solidarity. 62 In the United States today,
judging the worth of people on the basis of race is generally
perceived as wrong and as contrary to society's ethos that
people are to be judged on their individual merits, such as
their character and actions, 63 and especially so when the
government makes invidious race distinctions. 64 While in
permanent, humiliating inferiority .... )
62 Racism may take different forms, and what racism consists of is
contestable. A helpful way to conceptualize racism is to view it on a
continuum. On an individual level, the continuum might range from
overt bigotry to unconscious bias. See, eg., Taunya Lovell Banks,
Exploring White Resistance to Racial Reconciliation in the United
States, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 903, 949-50 (2003); Charles R. Lawrence,
The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:Reckoning With Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987). On a societal level it might
range from laws explicitly discriminating on the basis of race to
institutional racism in the form of facially colorblind structures and
practices that perpetuate racial inequalities deriving from past explicit
discrimination. See, e.g., JOE R. FEAGIN & CLAIRECE BOOKER FEAGIN,
DISCRIMINATION AMERICAN STYLE: INSTITUTIONAL RACISM AND

SExISM (1978); Ian F. Haney Lopez, InstitutionalRacism: Judicial
Conduct and a New Theory ofRacial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J.
1721, 1806-11, 1822-30 (2000).
63 As most eloquently expressed by Martin Luther King, Jr.
in his "I
Have A Dream" speech: "I have a dream that my four children will one
day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their
skin but by the content of their character." MARTIN LUTHER KING JR.,
ACALL TO CONSCIENCE THE LANDMARK SPEECHES OF DR. MARTIN

LUTHER KING, JR. (Claybome Carson & Kris Shepard eds., 2001).
64 See Loving, supra note 61. The debate over the permissibility
of
affirmative action, see infra note 68, ultimately turns on one's view of
whether all race distinctions are inherently, or at least presumptively,
invidious in that affirmative action amounts to impermissible
discrimination against whites by denying them benefits based on race
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keeping with the society's individualistic ethic people may
be entitled to their personal prejudices and even to practice
them to some extent, they are not to use the government as
a means of imposing their views and practices on society as
a whole. Thus, if some community were to attempt to
reinstate the forced separation of the races for the purpose
of preserving ethnic purity, even if supported by a majority
of both blacks and whites, that would be unacceptable
today because it clearly violates society's prevailing mores.
Nevertheless, a society is conceivable, and some may exist
today, in which the preservation of the group is seen as
more important than the rights of individual members.
rather than judging them on their merits, or whether race distinctions
are more permissible when the purpose is benign and seeks to eradicate
the effects of racial oppression. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (affirmative action in granting of
government contracts must be judged under strict scrutiny standard);
Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
("In my view, government can never have a 'compelling interest' in
discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for past racial
discrimination in the opposite direction."); Id. at 241 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("[G]overnmentsponsored racial discrimination based on benign prejudice is just as
noxious as discrimination inspired by malicious prejudice... ."); Id. at
243 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("There is no moral or constitutional
equivalence between a policy that is designed to perpetuate a caste
system and one that seeks to eradicate racial subordination.").
65This sentiment was reflected in the past generation in an
intensification of ethnic conflict and an increased division of groups o f
people along ethnic lines in several parts of the world. Examples
include the partition of colonial India into largely Hindu India and
largely Muslim Pakistan, the creation of Israel as a religious state
primarily for Jews and the resultant struggle for the establishment of a
Palestinian state, the civil war in Lebanon between Arab Christians and
Muslims, the Hutu genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda, and the break-up
of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia into more ethnically homogeneous
states. See, e.g., SUZANNE M. BIRGERSON, AFTER THE BREAKUP OF A
MuLTI-ETHNIC EMPIRE: RUSSIA, SUCCESSOR STATES, AND EURASIAN
SECURITY (2002); NOEL MALCOLM, BOSNIA: A SHORT HISTORY
(1994); GtRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS 1959-1994: HISTORY
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2. Relationships One Party Wants
Now, let us examine the appropriateness, in a
society that generally favors free choice, of forcing on an
unwanting party an association another party wants. 66 As
OF A GENOCIDE (1995); EDWARD W. SAID, THE POLITICS OF
DISPOSSESSION: THE STRUGGLE FOR PALESTINIAN SELFDETERMINATION, 1969-1994 (1994); KAMAL SALIBI, AHOUSE OF
MANY MANSIONS: THE HISTORY OF LEBANON RECONSIDERED (1988);
IAN TALBOT, INDIA AND PAKISTAN (2000); YUGOSLAVIA AND AFTER
A STUDY IN FRAGMENTATION, DESPAIR AND REBIRTH 87-115, 138-54,

196-212,232-47 (David A. Dyker & Ivan Vejvoda eds., 1996). In
many of these areas the now-divided groups, while maintaining ethnic
identity and varying degrees of insularity, intermingled and interacted
for many years in relative harmony. Various historical factors, not all
yet fully examined, may have contributed to the recent ethnic division.
For example, historical ethnic identification and nationalism; the
exploitation of ethnic differences for their o wn ends by colonial powers
or indigenous actors; the imposition of nation states from without rather
than spontaneous development from within; the collapse of or failure to
develop unifying structures; population growth and scarcity of
resources; and the uneven development of and increasing disparities
among and within various regions of the world. That the entire
situation may be socially constructed does not make the ethnic
divisions and the emphasis on the group any less real, just less endemic
and more readily subject to change under different - more humane social conditions.
66 Here the obverse of the four alternatives discussed above,
see supra
note 50, would be first, to allow the party wanting a relationship to
impose it on the unwanting party; second, to allow the relationship to
be imposed but require the party wanting the relationship to
compensate the unwanting party; third, to allow the unwanting party to
avoid the relationship but require compensation to the party wanting
the relationship; and fourth, to allow the unwanting party to avoid the
relationship entirely. Only the last alternative fully favors the party not
wanting the relationship, whereas the first three all concede something
to the party wanting the relationship. Even the third alternative, which
of the first three is least favorable to the party wanting the relationship,
imposes a relationship on the unwanting party since requiring the
unwanting party to compensate the other party is in itself a type of
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with already existing relationships, one problem with the
initiation of a relationship when the parties are not in
agreement is parallel individual rights claims. Allowing
someone to impose a relationship impinges on the freedom
of the party not wanting it, whereas enabling the party not
wanting a relationship to avoid it impacts the freedom of
the party wanting the relationship. So again, a balancing of
interests is required. But here, the detrimental reliance
argument of the party wanting in is unavailing, since it
turns on the existence of an agreement that induces the
reliance. Thus, the individual right claim of a party
involved in a long-term marriage, that the other party
should not be able to unilaterally terminate the relationship,
seems stronger than the claim that a party wanting in
should be able to force an unwanted marriage on another
party in the first instance.
In other contexts, however, there may be sufficient
reasons for empowering one party to initiate an unwanted
relationship with another. To illustrate, let us revert to the
race relations example and examine possible scenarios once
the mandatory separation of the races has been outlawed.
Let us first assume that whites prefer segregation while
blacks prefer integration, or, in other words, that blacks
want a relationship that whites do not.67 One context might
relationship. And it is inconsistent with an absolute privilege to avoid
an unwanted relationship since having to compensate strengthens the
bargaining position of the party wanting in and may induce the
unwanting party to establish a relationship that would otherwise not

come about.
67 A divergence of opinion exists between the black and white
communities over the desirability of integration versus separation. See
infra notes 95, 98, and 102. Historically, the leadership of the black

community has also been diverse, with some like Martin Luther King,
Jr. and Thurgood Marshall pushing for integration, while others like

Marcus Garvey and Malcolm X were more nationalistic. See, e.g.,
ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. (1995); MODERN
BLACK NATIONALISM: FROM MARCUS GARVEY TO Louis FARRAKHAN

100

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY [VOL. I, 1]

101

be the desire of blacks for access to public employment or
colleges previously reserved for whites. Integration might
come about once public institutions begin to operate on a
color blind basis and apply the same hiring and admissions
criteria to both blacks and whites. 68
One response to whites who object to integration in
this context is that the relationship is not forced since they
have willingly entered into it by accepting public
employment or by choosing to attend public colleges. But
since public institutions may, as a practical matter, be the
only viable options for many people, there is a sense in
which the relationship is less than fully voluntary. A
stronger response, even acknowledging a degree of forced
association, is that to satisfy white preferences for non(William L. Van Deburged. 1997); JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD
MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY(1998).

68 Achieving integration in public institutions may, on the other hand,
require affirmative action that sets aside positions for blacks, or at least
takes race into account in ways that promote integration. See Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)(public law school may consider race or
ethnicity as a factor in admissions process per compelling interest in
attaining diverse student body provided it does not set aside slots or
establish quotas for minority applicants and employs the same general
standards for all applicants); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003)
(public university's consideration of race in admissions process not
narrowly tailored to achieve compelling interest in diversity where all
minority candidates received a bonus without making individualized
determination of merit and per effect of bonus in making race the
decisive factor such that amounts to virtual set-aside). See also supra
note 64. One possible justification for affirmative action in this context
is that without it, the advantage that whites have as a result of past
racism that failed to judge blacks on their merits would become
entrenched. See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993). Another justification is that merely
prohibiting discrimination against blacks is insufficient in practice to
assure judgments based on merit because the lingering racism of the
past is difficult to prove and often operates on a subconscious or
unconscious level, even when people think they are and may appear to
be judging based on merit. See Lawrence, supra note 62.
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integration would require the government to reinstate
mandatory segregation in violation of its obligation to treat
people as equals and not to discriminate against them on
the basis of race.
Moving from the public to the private arena, assume
that various entities (schools, clubs, professional
associations, political parties, housing, public
accommodations, and the like) are discriminating against
blacks in accordance with the preferences of their white
clientele. Assume further that laws are proposed to ban
those practices, and that whites object that such laws would
violate their freedom of association by forcing them to
associate with blacks. They might assert that in a society
valuing individual freedom, people must be allowed the
latitude to hold and practice beliefs that may be offensive to
others, as long as they function in the private spheres of
social life and do not attempt to use the power of
government to impose their beliefs on others. As strong as
these claims may be in the abstract, in context there are
strong individual rights considerations to the contrary.
First, the equal freedom argument is strongest
when, in practice, there is genuine mutuality. It becomes
weaker when mutuality is absent and the exercise of
freedoms by some adversely affects the exercise of
freedoms by others. For example, the mutuality argument
seems quite strong with regard to people's sexual
preferences, particularly when they are practiced in the
privacy of one's home so that others are not forcibly
exposed to them and remain free to similarly pursue their
own sexual preferences. 69 The mutuality argument

69 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (state statute
criminalizing sexual conduct between persons of the same sex violates
rights of liberty and privacy protected by the Fourteenth Amendment).
Lawrence overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)
(sodomy statute as applied to consensual sex between gay men in
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collapses, however, in a society where whites control the
means of achieving success and use that control to maintain
their dominance by denying access to others. Against the
individual freedom to choose with whom to associate must
be counterbalanced the value of the individual right to
equal opportunity, which may at times outweigh
associational considerations. 70
Second, the free association argument is stronger in
the private context and weaker in the public context. The
free association claim asserts the right to do in private that
which the government itself could not legitimately do or
mandate. A society with a strong individualistic ethic
requires a distinction between the public and the private
spheres of social life because if everything were viewed as
public, little or nothing of individual freedom remains. 71
bedroom of home does not violate fundamental right of privacy).
Compare id. at 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting):
This case involves no real interference with the rights of
others, for the mere knowledge that other individuals do
not adhere to one's value system cannot be a legally
cognizable interest,.., let alone an interest that can
justify invading the houses, hearts, and minds of
citizens who choose to live their lives differently.
70 See Brown, supra note 61, at 493:
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied
the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity,
where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right
which must be made available to all on equal terms.
71 See Kleven, supra note 29, at 20-2 1:
[A] democratic society in which people have no
rights as individuals and groups, but only as members
of society at large.... would be an undesirable state
of affairs ... because individuals and groups do have
legitimate interests which any society worthy of
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The distinction between the public and the private
is, however, often blurred. For example, white dominance
in the nominally private sphere of social life is to a great
extent a byproduct of past racist action on the part of the
government. 72 Furthermore, when racist practices in the
nominally private sphere of social life become widespread,
they take on a public character. There is little practical
difference, for instance, between a law prohibiting blacks
from living in white neighborhoods and the widespread
practice of whites refusing to sell or rent to blacks. 73
being called democratic must recognize and accord.
See also Robert H. Mnookin, The Public/PrivateDichotomy: Political
Disagreementand Academic Repudiation, 130 U. PA. L.REv. 1429
(1982) (discussing the distinction between public and private spheres as
a means of identifying when government regulation is and is not
justified, and academic critiques of the meaningfulness of the
distinction).
72 See, e.g., Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundariesof Race: Political
Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1841, 1849-57,186078 (1994) (arguing that "even in the absence of racism, race-neutral
policy could be expected to entrench segregation and socio -economic
stratification in a society with a history of racism," (at 1852)); Harris,
supra note 68, at 1715 -21,1737-57 (discussing slavery, segregation,
and the racialization of the law in general in the United States);
KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER THE SUBURBANIZATION

OF THE UNITED STATES 195-203, 207-218, 225-30 (1985) (discussing
"redlining" black and poorer neighborhoods following World War II);
DESMOND KING, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL BLACK AMERICANS AND

THE US FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (1995) (detailing the history of the
U.S. government's involvement in fostering segregation of its workers
and in federal programs through the mid 2 0 th century, which "could not
help but define in part the character of the American polity and ensure
unequal treatment for Black American employees," (at 16)).
13 Compare Buchanan and Harmon,supra note 61 (struck down city
ordinances mandating racially separate neighborhoods) and Shelley,
supra note 61 (invalidated judicial enforcement of racially restrictive
covenants). Racially restrictive covenants are still a valid means of
maintaining neighborhoods' ethnic purity, so long as they are
informally adhered to and there is no outright refusal to sell to someone
on account of race. See id., at 13 ("So long as the purposes of [the
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The balance between the individualistic values of
free association, non-discrimination and equal opportunity
depends on context and scope. To illustrate, let's compare
race and religion. The freedom to practice one's religion is
constitutionally protected in the United States because of
the centrality of religious beliefs to people's world views,
and because, historically, societies' dominant religions
have used governmental power to oppress minorities and
advance a single view.74 Such domination is inconsistent
with all of the values discussed above. Therefore, the
purpose of protecting free exercise is to assure all religious
groups an equal opportunity to associate freely and without
discrimination, even though some of their beliefs and
practices may be quite reprehensible to others.75
Furthermore, to ensure the government's neutrality
toward differing religious and other world views, it may
neither promote one religion over others nor religion in

restrictive] agreements are effectuated by voluntary adherence to their
terms, it would appear clear that there was no action by the State and
the provisions of the [Fourteenth] Amendment were not violated.").
See also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (Civil
Rights Act of 1866 bars private discrimination based on race in the sale
or rental of property).
74 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717-18
(2002)
(Justice Breyer's dissent from Court's decision upholding parents' use
of government-funded school vouchers to enroll children in religious
schools).
75 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (free exercise
rights of Amish entitle parents to remove their children from school
after eighth grade without violating state's compulsory attendance law).
But compare Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687
(1994) (violates Establishment Clause for state to create special school
district for religious group, overriding religion's free exercise claims);
Oregon v. City of Rajneeshpuram, 598 F. Supp. 1208 (D.Or. 1984)
(violates Establishment Clause for state to allow incorporation of city
completely controlled by religious organization, overriding religion's
free exercise claims).
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general. 76 However, this separation between church and
state does not prevent government, in order to promote the
common good, from intervening in religious affairs when a
religious practice contravenes important secular values 77 or
from incidentally benefiting religion in the furtherance of
legitimate secular objectives. 78 Thus, the overall picture is
of a society where people in their private spheres of
association enjoy a relative autonomy, which fluctuates as
their private actions are perceived as more or less of public
moment.
Analogously in the racial context, on the one hand
we have whites who prefer to be with whites asserting the
right to associate so as to practice beliefs that others find
objectionable and to exclude blacks in order to do so, much
like a religious group might confine membership to
believers. On the other hand, we have the fundamental
76

See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (statute

forbidding teaching of evolution unless accompanied by creationism
violates Establishment Clause per purpose of promoting particular
religious belief); Wallace v. Jaffree, 466 U.S. 924 (1984) (statute
authorizing period of silence in public schools for meditation or
voluntary prayer impermissibly endorses religion in violation of
Establishment Clause); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203 (1963) (statute requiring Bible reading at beginning of school day
violates Establishment Clause); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)
lstate prescribed non-sectarian prayer violates Establishment Clause).
See, e.g., Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Oregon v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (denial of unemployment benefits due to
termination for the use of peyote, a prohibited controlled substance,
does not violate free exercise rights of Native Americans who use
peyote in religious rituals); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944) (upholding against free exercise claim prosecution of parent for
violation of child labor laws for the use of child to distribute and sell
religious literature).
78 See, e.g. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (state
provision of educational vouchers used by parents to enroll children in
religious schools does not violate Establishment Clause per secular
purpose of improving educational opportunities and freedom of parents
to select schools of their choice).
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secular value that people should not be discriminated
against on account of race. This value is as central to
people's humanity as is the sanctity of their religious
beliefs, and the need to protect it also arises from a history
of oppression. If society is to accommodate both of these
fundamental individual interests, then racial exclusivity can
only be acceptable the narrower and more private its scope
and is less acceptable the more it spills into the public arena
and perpetuates historical oppression. Thus, for example,
the case for racial exclusivity is far weaker for a political
party or professional association than for a genuinely
private club, 79 and is stronger when the preference is
mutual and leaves avenues for those who prefer integration
than when it undermines equal opportunity. 80
79 Compare Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (nominally private

white voters' association's pre-primary selection of candidates, where
primary and general elections ratify those selections, violates Fifteenth
Amendment's prohibition against state abridgement of the right to vote
on account of race per state entanglement in process) and Smith v.
Allright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (exclusion of blacks from Democratic
Party's primary elections violates the Fifteenth Amendment), with
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (no state action in
violation of Equal Protection Clause regarding the granting of a liquor
license to private club that excludes blacks).
80 A balancing test that takes into account the extent to which assertions
of free association, if protected, would perpetuate historical oppression
or undermine equal opportunity, as against the extent of the impact on
associational interests of requiring unwanted associations, might help
explain the divergent results in a series of Supreme Court cases dealing
with exclusion based on race, gender and sexual orientation. Compare
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (application of federal nondiscrimination statute to prohibit private, commercially operated, nonsectarian school from denying admission based on race does not violate
free association rights of school or parents) and Roberts v. U.S.
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 1 (1984) (state requirement that Jaycees admit
women does not violate male members' freedom of association); with
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S.
557 (1995) (application of state public accommodations law prohibiting
discrimination on basis of sexual orientation so as to bar organizers of
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To illustrate this point further, suppose that in the
name of promoting ethnic identity, people of a common
ethnic heritage congregate in a particular locale, and even
take steps to preserve the ethnic character of the area and
prevent outsiders from living there. 81 Consider two
scenarios. In the first, while some people separate along
ethnic lines others do not, such that there are ample
communities available for people preferring ethnic
homogeneity and for those preferring diversity. In the
second, the vast majority of the major ethnic group in a
society separate themselves, leaving those in the minority
who prefer diversity no choice but to live in a minority
community.
The first scenario seems less problematic than the
second. In the first, some people may be deprived of the
opportunity to enter some communities due to their
ethnicity; for instance, people who disapprove of voluntary
segregation and want into communities of a different
ethnicity in order to promote integration. Yet, there are still
available integrated communities that meet their
associational preferences, whereas empowering them to
force their way into the separate communities would
St. Patrick's Day parade from disallowing Group to march as a group
and to carry banner stating its purpose, although allowing members of
Group to participate as individuals, violates organizers First
Amendment right of expressive association by requiring inclusion of
disfavored message) and Boy Scouts of AmL v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640
(2000) (application of state law to prohibit Boy Scouts from expelling
scout master who publicly declared his homosexuality violates First
Amendment right of expressive association). Does the diversity of the
results reflect less sensitivity to the interests of gays than of women and
ethnic minorities?
81 One approach might be the use of restrictive covenants limiting
residency to members of that ethnic group, see Shelley, supra notes 61,
73; another might be the acquisition of a large tract of land to be
collectively owned and occupied by an organization whose
membership is limited to that ethnic group, see City ofRaneeshpuram,
supra note 75.
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undermine the associational preferences of those living
there. In the second scenario, on the other hand, the
associational preferences of most or all of the major ethnic
group are met while the preferences of many minorities are
not. By virtue of being deprived of the opportunity to
associate with the majority, minorities may also be
deprived of comparable life chances because, say, there is
more money and therefore better education in majority
communities, or because the majority have access in their
communities to information and contacts that are
unavailable in minority communities and are integral to
success in life.82 If so, that would contribute to the
majority's perpetual dominance within the society as a
whole, and thus strengthen the minority claim for being
empowered to force an unwanted relationship on the
majority.
3. Relationships Neither Party Wants
Finally, let us consider proposed associations that
none of the parties want. As with associations that both
parties want, in a society generally favoring free choice, the
presumption would ordinarily be that the parties control
when they are in agreement, unless there are overriding
collective considerations. To illustrate, let's continue with
the example of race relations and examine the
appropriateness of imposing integration on blacks and
whites when neither want it and both prefer separation.
Suppose that, following mandatory segregation,
race-conscious desegregation plans --including such
measures as forced busing--are proposed for the purpose of
82

See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) ("The law school,

the proving ground for legal training and practice, cannot be effective
in isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the law
interacts").
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promoting public school integration. 3 Suppose that both
black and white parents oppose the plans, and prefer a
freedom of choice approach that would enable parents to
select the schools their children attend. Further suppose
that, if implemented, the freedom of choice approach would
result in substantially segregated schools.84
Both black and white parents might argue for
freedom of choice on grounds of free association, so that
everyone can decide for themselves with whom to attend
school. They might also assert that just as mandatory
segregation violates people's rights by preventing
associations they want, conversely, so do integration plans
that force people to associate who do not want to associate
with each other.85
83 See Swann v. Charlotte Mechlenburg Board of Educ., 402 U.S. I
(1971) (upholding forced busing as desegregation remedy in formerly
de jure segregated system).
84 See Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968)
(overthrowing freedom of choice desegregation plan in formerly de jure
segregated system containing only two schools where all whites and
85% of blacks chose to attend former segregated schools).
85 People may be forced together under non-race-conscious as well
as
race-conscious desegregation plans. For example, rather than freedom
of choice or forced busing, a neighborhood school approach might be
implemented and might force people who do not want to associate for
racial or other reasons to be together. Indeed, where education is
compulsory, even freedom of choice may force some to attend schools
with others with whom they don't want to associate. However, a raceneutral neighborhood school approach that forces unwanting parties
together might be thought preferable to a freedom of choice plan likely
to result in a dispersal of students throughout a school district in that
neighborhood schools enable greater parental involvement and expend
less time and money on transportation, all of which may produce better
educational outcomes. Assuming that individual rights claims do not
always on principle trump collective considerations, relevant questions
might be whether the evidence really supports the asserted collective
concerns (bearing in mind that at times collective considerations are
speculative and may require a period of experimentation to see if in fact
they pan out), and whether some types of collective considerations are
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One possible response is that a major purpose of
public education is to help build a cohesive society through
the development of widely shared basic values, like
tolerance and understanding, which promote the
cooperative behavior necessary for society to thrive as well
as the respect for others that a society valuing individual
freedom demands. 86 So it might be claimed that society is
better off in the long run when people are forced to
integrate against their wishes because forced integration
reduces racial prejudice, thereby reducing the social turmoil
that would otherwise occur and enhancing productivity
through a greater willingness of racially diverse people to
work cooperatively together.
A second response has to do with the way in which
preferences are formed. Considered from the perspective
of the current moment, it does appear that forced
integration negates the preferences of those who prefer
separation. But preferences develop over time, are the
result of exposure and conditioning, can change over time
and under different conditions, and might well be different
on principle weightier than others when balanced against individual
rights claims. For example, when stacked up against the freedom to
associate, the benefits to society of reduced racial prejudice or of better
educational performance might be thought weightier than efficiency
considerations such as increased costs, although at some level the cost
of protecting some individual rights might impinge on the ability to
Promote others or might become prohibitive as a practical matter.
See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 94-116 (1926)
(developing "a democratic conception of education"); AMY GUTMAN,
DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 41-47 (1987) (discussing and favoring a
"democratic state of education" where "all citizens must be educated so
as to have a chance to share in self-consciously shaping the structure of
their society," and that to accomplish this end must "aid children in
developing the capacity to understand and to evaluate competing
conceptions of the good life and the good society," and must "use
education to inculcate those character traits, such as honesty, religious
toleration, and mutual respect for persons, that serve as foundations for
rational deliberation of differing ways of life").
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in the present had past exposure and conditioning been
otherwise. 87 Thus, the current separatist preferences of
both blacks and whites might be the by-product of a history
of past racism and of government participation therein, and
the very same people who currently prefer separation might
prefer integration had history been otherwise. In a sense,
then, current separatist preferences may be imposed rather
than freely chosen, or at least so highly conditioned as to be
virtually involuntary. It could be argued, then, that a period
of forced integration is needed in order to counteract past
conditioning and put people in a position to more freely
choose whether to integrate or separate. 8 Considered from
87

See, e.g., PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF

THE JUDGEMENT OF TASTE 468 (Richard Nice, trans., 1984) (a study of
how social life conditions people's tastes):
The cognitive structures which social agents implement in
the practical knowledge of the social world are
internalized, 'embodied' social structures. The practical
knowledge of the social world that is presupposed by
'reasonable' behavior within it implements classificatory
schemes..., historical schemes of perception and
appreciation which are the product of the objective
division into classes (age groups, genders, social classes)
and which function below the level of consciousness and
discourse.
88 See, e.g., GROUPS IN CONTACT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF

DESEGREGATION (Norman Miller & Marjorie B. Brewer, eds. 1984)
(containing studies in various societies and contexts of the conditions
under which the "contact hypothesis," which posits that "one's
behavior and attitudes toward members of a disliked social category
will become more positive after direct interpersonal interaction with
them," (at 2), holds true; identifying such factors as contact under
egalitarian circumstances that minimize preexisting status differentials
and enable cooperative behavior involving mutual interdependence and
intimate interpersonal associations; but noting the absence of studies of
the carryover of improved inter-ethnic relations in structured
environments like schools to everyday life); Note, Lessons in
Transcendence: ForcedAssociations and the Military, 117 HARv. L.
REv. 1981, 1981 (2004) (arguing that forced racial association in the
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this more long-term perspective, forced integration does not
derogate from, but actually promotes, freedom of
association.
This point is particularly significant in the case of
young children who may be thought not yet capable of
freely choosing with whom to associate or not, and who,
due to their tender age, may be especially susceptible to
conditioning by their parents. This poses a possible
conflict between the individual rights of children and of
parents, and raises the question of whether parents have the
individual right to raise their children as they see fit even
though to do so derogates from their children's individual
rights. 89 An associational issue is at stake here because the
claimed parental prerogative to control children's
upbringing asserts the right to impose on children a
relationship the child might not choose to have if the child
were in a position to decide.
In response, it might be asserted that while some
degree of parental prerogatives exist on individual rights
grounds, society as a whole may intervene in the parentchild relationship so as to protect the individual rights of
children as against parents. 90 Alternatively, it might be
military has made it "the most successfully racially integrated
institution in American society... with lasting effects on the individuals
who pass through it").
89 See Casey, supra note 49, at 899-900 (parental consent requirement
for abortion by minor child valid provided accompanied by by-pass
procedure enabling minor to obtain abortion upon judicial
determination that minor is mature enough to give consent or that
abortion would be in her best interests).
90 For example, while the fundamental right to raise their children
entitles parents to educate their children in private school as against
state requirement to enroll them in public school, Piercev. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), it is implicit in Pierce that compulsory
education laws are valid and that the state may compel parents to
educate their children in order to protect their best interests. See also
Prince,supra note 77 (holding that parental prerogatives and free
exercise of religion do not entitle parents to violate child labor laws).
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asserted that society as a whole has a collective interest in
raising children that is as strong as, or stronger than, the
parental prerogative claim. Consequently, society has the
right to intervene in, or supplant entirely, the parental
upbringing of children when intervention serves the
common good. 9'
Therefore, the fact that children are involved may
strengthen the argument for the forced integration of
schools. First, since children may not yet be in a position
to freely choose with whom to associate, the collective
interest in conditioning children to prefer integration may
outweigh the parental interest in conditioning them to
prefer segregation. Second, society as a whole may have a
legitimate interest, as a surrogate for children, in protecting
their right to receive an adequately balanced education so
that they can more freely choose whether to factor race into
their associational preferences as adults. 92
Again, a contextual analysis is necessary in order to
fully evaluate the strength of these competing
considerations. In the real world, not only may current
preferences be culturally conditioned, but blacks and whites
supra note 86, at 22-28 (considering and
ultimately rejecting the "family state" model of education whose
"defining feature... is that it claims exclusive educational authority as a
means of establishing a harmony - one might say, a constitutive relation
91Compare, e.g.,

GUTMAN,

- between individual and social good based on knowledge,"); PAULA
53-55,

RAYMON, THE KIBBUTZ COMMUNITY AND NATION BUILDING

233-36 (1981) (discussing the communal living arrangements of
children in Israeli kibbutzim as based on the "socialist principle that the
community should replace the family" and the tension this caused for
mothers who desired a more family oriented approach to child-rearing).
92 See, e.g., GUTMAN, supra note 86; Smith v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs of
Mobile County, 827 F.2d 684, 692 (11 th Cir. 1987) (rejecting parental
challenge to public school texts as teaching "religion of Humanism" in
violation of Establishment Clause per the state's "indisputably non
religious purpose.. .to instill in.. .public school children such values as
independent thought, tolerance of diverse views, self-respect, maturity,
self-reliance and logical decision making").
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may be on unequal footing in asserting and realizing their
preferences. For example, in some circumstances blacks
may prefer integration but opt for separation due to social
pressure from whites who control their access to a
livelihood or whose outright hostility to integration poses
risks of physical or emotional harm. 93 In addition, blacks
who prefer integration may choose separation because so
many whites opt for separation that integrated settings are
unavailable, inaccessibly located, or prohibitively
expensive. 94 Where either situation occurs, not only does it

strengthen the arguments for forced integration just
advanced, but it also implicates those raised in the

93 See, e.g., ROBERT L. CRAIN, THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL

(1968) (a study of school desegregation in 15 cities,
some of which experienced resistance as hostile as mob violence and
others a more cooperative response, and generally concluding that
extent of actual conflict was overblown); NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE,
THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA (2001) (reporting that 32% of blacks
polled said they have chosen not to move somewhere because they felt
DESEGREGATION

unwelcome); GARY ORFIELD, HARVARD UNIVERSITY CIVIL RIGHTS
PROJECT, HOUSING SEGREGATION: CAUSES, EFFECTS, POSSIBLE
CAUSES, at note 25 (2001)at

http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/metro/housing-gary

.php ("Black fears of violence and intimidation in some white
communities are still serious obstacles to housing choice"); R.A.V. v
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (overthrowing as violation of free
speech Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance as applied to burning of cross
on lawn of black family in predominantly white neighborhood).
94 Since whites are still economically better off than blacks, see infra
note 99, they may use their greater wealth to isolate themselves in
communities that are beyond the means of blacks and may use private
deed restrictions or zoning to maintain the price of housing at levels too
high for blacks to afford. See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro.
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (rejecting race-based equal
protection challenge to denial by suburb of Chicago with over 64,000
residents of whom only 27 were black of rezoning for low cost housing
where center city blacks would likely reside absent showing of
discriminatory intent or purpose).
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discussion of forced integration where whites do not want it
but blacks do.
On the other hand, after a period of
experimentation, the result may be that forced integration
does not improve, but in fact worsens, race relations and
increases individual preferences for educational
separation." Or suppose blacks and whites continue to, or
95 Here the real-world data is mixed and subject to differing
interpretations. See, e.g., GARY ORFIELD, HARVARD UNIVERSITY CIVIL
RIGHTS PROJECT, SCHOOLS MORE SEPARATE CONSEQUENCES OF A

DECADE OF RESEGREGATION 6-7 (2001)
http://civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/SchoolsMore-Sep
arate.pdf (Gallup polls during 1990s showed majority and growing
belief among both blacks and whites that integration improves
education for both groups, while at same time both groups favored
neighborhood schools.); STEVE FARKAS & JEAN JOHNSON, PUB.
AGENDA FOUND., TIME TO MOVE ON: AFRICAN-AMERICAN AND WHITE

PARENTS SET AN AGENDA FOR PUBLIC (1998) (finding that 80% of
black parents and 86% of whites believe improving educational quality
is more important than integration). Measured over time, white support
for the principle that blacks and whites should go to the same schools
has increased substantially over the years, from 1956 when 50%
supported separate schools to 1995 when 96% supported integrated
schools. HOwARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA:
TRENDS AND INTERPRETATION 103 (1997) (reporting on and analyzing
Gallup, National Opinion Research Council, and other attitudinal
polls). When the issue is personalized, there has been a substantial
increase in white willingness to send their children to school with
blacks, although that willingness declines as the numbers change. With
few black students, white willingness has been consistently high over
the years; with half black students, whites were evenly divided in the
late 1950s and early 1960s, but by the 1990s less than 20% voiced
objections; with blacks in the majority, white objection was in the 70%
range in the earlier years, whereas by the mid 1990s whites were about
evenly divided. Id. at 140-41. On the other hand, whites have
generally been unsupportive of forced integration. Whites consistently
answered no more often than yes when asked whether the federal
government should "see to it" that white and black children go to
school together. Whites have consistently opposed forced busing,
although opposition has declined somewhat from over 80% between
the mid 1970s and mid 1980s to 67% opposed in 1996. Id. at 123-25.
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increasingly, prefer separation even after the effects of

historical conditioning have attenuated. 96 Suppose further
that, as a result of governmental efforts to equalize
opportunity in other areas of social life, white dominance
diminishes and the economic and political power of blacks
and whites becomes more equivalent. A society is certainly
conceivable where ethnic groups freely choose to live and
Black support over time for the principle of integrated schools has
always been nearly unanimous, and blacks have expressed little
opposition to attending school with whites no matter what the numbers.
Id. at 240-41,254-55. Yet black support for federal efforts to "see to
it" consistently declined from over 80% in the mid 1960s to less than
60% in the mid 1990s. On the other hand, while blacks were about
evenly divided between support for and opposition to forced busing
when it first started in the mid to late 1970s, by the mid 1990s support
for forced busing rose somewhat to about 60%. Id. at 248-49.
96 The debate in recent years over whether previously dejure
segregated schools should be relieved of their judicially supervised
obligation to desegregate turns on differing perceptions of whether the
vestiges ofdejure segregation have in fact sufficiently attenuated,
despite the persistence of de facto residential and school segregation,
that school districts should not be held responsible for the on-going
segregation. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,495-96 (1992):
Where resegregation is a product not of state action but
of private choices, it does not have constitutional
implications. As the dejure violation becomes more
remote in time and these demographic changes
intervene, it becomes less likely that a current racial
imbalance in a school district is a vestige of the priorde
jure system.
Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Schs. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249-50
(1991) (standard for determining whether desegregation decree should
have been terminated is whether school board "had complied in good
faith with the desegregation decree since it was entered, and whether
the vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent
practicable."); Id. at 251-52 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("I believe a
desegregation decree cannot be lifted so long as conditions likely to
inflict the stigmatic injury condemned in Brown Ipersist and there
remain feasible methods of eliminating such conditions.").
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go to school separately in order to preserve their ethnic
identity or because they just do not get along well in those
arenas, while they interrelate on equal terms in other areas
of social life. Under such circumstances, the justification
for forced integration weakens and can be seen as violating
the individual right to choose one's associations.
The United States seems somewhere in the middle.
As a result of both voluntary and forced integration, school
and neighborhood segregation decreased somewhat
following the demise of mandatory segregation. However,
most blacks and whites still continued to attend largely
segregated schools and live in
largely segregated neighborhoods, and racial separation in
those spheres has increased in recent years. 97 Overt racial
prejudice has decreased somewhat, 98 and the avenues of
opportunity have
97 Racial segregation in schools began to diminish in the late 1960s and
early 1970s when courts began to vigorously enforce desegregation.
The degree of racial separation of black children reached its lowest
point in the mid to late 1980s, has been increasing since then, and has
now returned to about the level of the earlier years. See, e.g., ERICA
BRANDENBURG & CHUNGMEI LEE, HARVARD UNIVERSITY CIIL
RIGHTS PROJECT, RACE IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS: RAPIDLY
RESEGREGATING SCHOOL DISTRICTS (2002) at

http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/Race in Ame
ricanPublic_Schoolsl.pdf, ORFIELD, supra note 95, at 11-12, 15-16,
23-26, 28-42. These studies attribute the increased school segregation
of the 1990s to the movement of whites to suburbia, the increased
concentration of minorities in central cities, and the Supreme Court's
deemphasis on desegregation. See supra note 96. Orfield also reports
on high and unchanging levels of residential segregation between 19802000. ORFIELD, supranote 93, at 39-40. Despite black preference for
and increasingly favorable attitudes of whites toward residential
integration, see id. at n. 25, 44-45, 50 and infra note 98, segregation
may be high in fact due to the wide income differentials between blacks
and whites. See infra note 99.
98 Over the years there has been a substantial increase in white

willingness to vote for a black presidential candidate (from 63% "no"
in 1958 to 95% "yes" in 1997) and in favorable attitudes toward
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interracial marriage (from 62% support for laws against intermarriage
in 1963 to 87% opposition in 1996, and from 96% disapproval of
intermarriage in 195 8 to 67% approval in 1997). RACIAL ATTITUDES,
supra note 95, at 106-07. White support for the principle of integrated
education and willingness for their children to attend integrated schools
have also increased substantially, although they have been generally
unsupportive of forced integration. See infra note 95. Likewise, while
still somewhat ambivalent, whites have become more supportive of
residential integration. In 1963, 39% of whites strongly agreed and
only 19% strongly disagreed that whites should have the right to keep
blacks out of their neighborhoods; whereas by 1996, 65% strongly
disagreed and only 6% strongly agreed. Similarly, white support for
open housing laws grew from 34% in 1972 to 67% in 1996. RACIAL
ATTITUDES, supra note 95, at 106-07, 123-25. And while in 1958, 45%
of whites indicated they would definitely or might move if blacks
moved next door and 79% if blacks moved into the neighborhood in
great numbers, by 1997 the respective figures were 2% and 25%;
similarly, 69% of whites preferred all or mostly white neighborhoods in
1972, whereas by 1995 the figure declined to 43%. Id. at 140-41. See
also Maria Krysan, Data Update to RacialAttitudes in America (2002)
at http://tigger.uic.edu/ -krysan/racialattitudes.htm (reporting on polls
showing a decline between 1990 and 2000 from 48% to 31% in the
number of whites opposed or strongly opposed to living in
neighborhoods more than half black). By way of caveat, however,
surveys may not accurately reflect the extent of racial prejudice in light
of evidence that at times people answer survey questions falsely, either
intentionally so as to avoid responding in socially unacceptable ways or
unintentionally due to non-recognition of the disconnect between their
professed beliefs and their actual conduct. See, e.g., ROGER
TOURANGEAU, LANCE J. RIPS & KENNETH RAsINsKI, THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF SURVEY RESPONSES 269-88 (2000).
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opened a bit; 99 but blacks are still subjected to substantial
racial discrimination, lOO and whites still disproportionately
99 The gap in high school graduation between whites and blacks has
decreased substantially over the years: in 1978, 67.9% of whites and
47.6% of blacks 25 and over had completed four or more years of high
school, whereas by 1998 the gap had decreased to 83.7% for whites
versus 76.0% for blacks; and for 25-29 year olds, the completion rates
for whites and blacks were virtually identical, 88.1% versus 87.6%.
However, while the gap has decreased over the years, the annual
graduation rate for blacks continues to lag behind that of whites (73.4%
versus 81.6% in 1998), and the gap actually increased a bit between
1994 and 1998. WILLLAM B. HARVEY, AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC.,
MINORITIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION 2000-2001, Tables 1 & 3 (2001).
On the other hand, while many more blacks attend college now than
before, due to a substantially lower graduation rate the gap in
completion rates has not improved over the years; between 1978 and
1998 the four-or-more-years-of-college completion rate for blacks 25
years or older increased from 7.2% to 14.7%, while the rate for whites
actually increased a bit more from 16.4% to 25.0%. Id. at Tables 3, 4,
9. Likewise, the income gap between whites and blacks continues to be
substantial, has remained about the same percentage-wise for the past
40 years or so, and in gross dollars has grown substantially over that
time. In 1967 mean family income for whites was $9,116 and for
blacks was $5,916, 65% of that for whites, whereas in 1998 the figure
for whites was $62,384 and for blacks was $38,563, 62% of that for

whites.

JOINT CENTER DATA BANK, JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL AND

at http://
www.jointcenter.org(DB/detaillincorm.htm#l (last updated Aug. 5,
ECONOMIC STUDIES INCOME AND WEALTH

2003).
100 See, e.g., Krysan, supra note 98 (reporting on 2000 survey showing
64% of blacks and 33% of whites believe discrimination is a cause of
racial inequality; 1999 survey showing 59% of blacks believe they do
not have as good a chance as whites to get jobs for which they are
qualified; and 2001 survey showing 51% and 47% of blacks believe
they do not have as good a chance as whites to get, respectively, either
housing they can afford or a good education, whereas almost 90% of
whites believe they do);

NAT'L URBAN LEAGUE, supra note

93

(reporting that of those blacks polled who have tried to get a mortgage,
25% said they experienced discrimination); ORFIELD, supra note 93, at
nn.42-43 (reporting on continuing and massive discrimination against
blacks in housing); U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYMENT COMM 'N,
RACE-BASED CHARGES at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/race.html (last
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dominate positions of power.' 0 ' Meanwhile, the
integrationist push following the end of mandatory
segregation seems to have waned somewhat in recent
years, 102 and there seems to be substantial support among

modified Feb. 6, 2003)(reporting during fiscal years 1992 -2001 an
annual average of more than 29,000 complaints of race-based
employment discrimination, of which roughly 12%-13% on the average
and 19% in 2000/2001 received meritorious resolutions).
101 African-Americans comprise about 12% of the population of the
United States. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PROFILE OF GENERAL
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS: 2000 (2001). As of Jan. 31, 2000,
the number of black elected officials, although at an all time high and
almost seven times the number in 1970, represented less than 2% of all
elected officials. DAVID A. BOSITIS, JOINT CTR. FOR POLITICAL AND
ECON. STUDIES, BLACK ELECTED OFFICIALS: A STATISTICAL

SUMMARY, 2000 (2002) at http://www.jointcenter.org/whatsnew/beo2002/beo-map-charts/BEO-00.pdf. Additionally, blacks represent less
than 5% of federal judges, less than 4% of lawyers, and own only about
4% and account for less than 1% of the profits of the nation's non-farm
businesses. FED. JUDICIAL CTR. at
http://air.jc.gov/history/judgesfrm.html; ABA COMM'N ON RACIAL
AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN THE PROFESSION, MILES TO Go 2000:

PROGRESS OF MINORITIES IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 9 (2001) at
http://www.abanet.org/minorities; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, BLACKOWNED BUSINESSES: 1997 (Oct. 2000).
102 See, e.g., FARKAS, supra note 95 (reporting that both black and
white parents believe educational quality to be more important than
integration); NAT'L URBAN LEAGUE, supra note 93 (reporting on 2001
survey of black adults showing 60% believing the primary focus of
black organizations should be economic opportunity, 24% political
leadership, and only 7% integration). But compare id. (also reporting
that 80% of blacks polled prefer living in racially mixed
neighborhoods); ORFIELD, supra note 93, at n.25 (reporting on a 1997
Gallup poll showing that blacks overwhelmingly prefer integrated to all
black areas); ORFIELD, supra note 95, at 7, 9-11 (arguing that
continuing efforts to desegregate schools is consistent with black
support for quality education in light of evidence that integration
improves opportunities for blacks).
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both blacks and whites for school vouchers and other free
choice options.' 03
At this juncture, it is an open question whether the
considerations supporting efforts to promote school
integration continue to outweigh those supporting freedom
of choice, as once thought. If a shift to freedom of choice
were to result in schools and communities available both
for those blacks and whites preferring ethnic homogeneity
and for those preferring diversity, and if it were to
contribute to equalized opportunity for blacks, then
freedom of choice would promote both associational and
egalitarian values. However, freedom of choice would
produce a stark conflict between these values and therefore
be of more dubious merit if it were to result in an inferior
education and fewer opportunities for blacks.

103

The degree of public support for vouchers may depend on the

wording of the question. In a 2003 Kaiser/Pew poll, 37% of the
respondents favored and 24% opposed government vouchers for private
or public schools, while 40% reported they didn't know enough to have
an opinion, at
http://www.publicagenda.org/issues/major-proposals-detail.cfm?issue_
type=education&list=14. In a 2003 Gallup/Phi Delta Kappa poll 38%
favored and 60% opposed allowing the choice of private schools at
public expense, while in a 2003 CBS News/New York Times poll 47%
agreed with and 49% disagreed with tax-funded vouchers for private or
religious schools, at
http://www.publicagenda.org/issues/major-proposalsdetail.cfm?issue_
type=education&list=15. The support for vouchers appears to be
somewhat greater among blacks than whites, although the support
among both groups may be declining. In polls conducted by the Joint
Center for Political and Economic Studies, in 1998, 48.1% of blacks
and 41.3% of whites supported vouchers, whereas in 1997 the figures
were 55.8% for blacks and 47.2% for whites. See JOINT CTR DATA
BANK, NATIONAL OPINION POLL 1996-2000 at
www.jointcenter.org/DB/detail/NOP.htm#Education (last updated Aug.
5, 2004). And the NAT'LURBAN LEAGUE, supra note 93, reported that
41% of blacks polled in 2000 supported vouchers, but only 34% in
2001.
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V. Associational Issues When Society Is a Party
Now let us address associational conflicts when
society itself is a party. First, consider situations when
some party wants out of an existing relationship with a
society, using emigration and secession as examples.
Currently, international law guarantees the right of people
to freely leave their countries, and most countries adhere to
this norm. 104 This right came about only after an intense
international campaign and over the objections of countries
(mostly underdeveloped or from the Communist bloc) who
feared that free emigration would harm them by the loss of
people whom they devote their resources to educate and 05
train and who might contribute to national development. 1
Individualistic considerations support the right to
freely emigrate, which is tantamount to empowering people
who do not want to associate with their countries to
unilaterally terminate that relationship. 106 This is akin to
allowing a party to a marriage to freely exit and is, in fact,
more favorable than the common practice under permissive
divorce laws that allow unilateral termination but often
require the relationship to continue through the imposition
of support obligations. Analogously, some countries allow
people to emigrate only after completing military or other

See Thomas Kleven, Why InternationalLaw FavorsEmigration
Over Immigration, 33 U. MIAMI INTER-AM ER. L. REV. 69, 71-73
(2002). The right to leave is guaranteed by the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, Art. 13, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Art. 12(1)(2), and various regional treaties.
105 For a history of the international recognition of the right to freely
104

emigrate, see ALAN DOWTY,

CLOSED BORDERS: THE CONTEMPORARY

ASSAULT ON FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT 1 11-41 (1987).

For a more thorough discussion of the individualistic and collective
considerations relating to freedom of movement in the international
context, see Kleven, supra note 104, at 74-83.
106
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mandatory public service and for professionals, like
doctors, only after practicing for a time.' 07
Such limitations represent a balancing of interests
between the claimed individual right to associate or not
with whom one chooses and collective considerations like
compensating society for the benefits one has received
during the association. Looking at society as analogous to
another person with whom a party might have an
association, compensation might be justified in
individualistic terms. The receipt of benefits from a society
can be seen as giving rise to a tacit agreement to perform
expected social obligations in return, or to an implied
contract to do so lest the party otherwise be unjustly
enriched at society's expense. As noted above, Locke
comes surprisingly close to using such reasoning to posit
that thereby someone becomes permanently tied to a
society so that one cannot later sever the relationship
without society's consent. 108 Furthermore, societies are
certainly conceivable where people are seen, akin to
Aristotle's view, as being irrevocably tied to their society
by virtue of birth, much like a family.
Although current international practice regarding
emigration is not so collectively tilted, such is not the case
with secession. When a group of people occupying a
particular portion of a country desire to withdraw and either
form their own nation or join another, the current
international standard and practice is that a nation's
sovereignty over its territory entitles it to prevent secession

107

See generally BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND

LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 1999 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN

RIGHTS PRAcricEs Feb. 2000, at

http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1 999. Cuba, for example, requires
doctors and other professionals to practice 3 to 5 years before being
eligible for an exit permit.
108 LocKE, supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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without its consent. 109 There is, though, a free association
claim here, analogous to that of an emigrant's claim not to
have to remain in a society against one's will; or analogous
to the claim of religious or other groups within a society to
the right to a relatively autonomous sphere.
Again, the explanation for this divergence seems
one of context and scope, based on factors that heighten the
significance of collective considerations when a portion of
a country secedes. In the case of secession, people, land,
and other resources are lost, intensifying the harmful
1 refer here to the ability of part of an established international state
to freely secede without the consent of the State -- bearing in mind that
since international law is still not very highly developed and is still
heavily intertwined with power politics among nations, it is difficult to
be definitive about it. That said, the principles of self-determination
and non-intervention in the internal affairs of a State would seem to
imply that a State's laws govern when parts of a State may withdraw.
If a State's law permits withdrawal, even unilaterally, then there is
consent. If not, then it would seem that a State ordinarily has the right
to prevent a unilateral secession, by force if necessary, and that other
states are ordinarily obliged not to intervene (except perhaps to prevent
the excessive use of force or in those instances when there is a right to
secede). See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 84-106, 114-18,215-18 (1979). While a part of
a State might assert that unilateral secession is justified by its own right
of self-determination, the State's right of self-determination would
ordinarily seem to be overriding, except perhaps in the case of
oppression or misgovernment of an area. Id. at 86, 100, 115-17
(referring to "the possibility that the principle [of self-determination]
will apply to territories which are so badly misgoverned that they are in
effect alienated from the metropolitan State," but suggesting that the
concept is highly controversial and applicable, if at all in modem times,
only to Bangladesh). See also infra notes 111, 119. Now as a practical
matter part of a State may be strong enough to successfully secede
without consent, to establish de facto self-governance and other
incidents of statehood, and to receive recognition as a State by the
international community. Here it would seem more appropriate to say
not that the new State had a right to secede but that the international
community has acknowledged practical reality and ratified the
109

successful secession after the fact. See CRAWFORD, supra,at 248-66.
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impact on the rest of society. While the cumulative effect
of individual emigration can be substantial over time,
secession may cause an immediate and tremendous impact
with which society has more difficulty coping. 110 Unlike
group autonomy within a society, secession entails a more
complete departure from the association, whereas relatively
autonomous groups within a society are still subject to its
ultimate authority.
Still, if freedom of association is to be taken
seriously as a fundamental individual and group right, the
interests of territories that want to secede from a society
must be considered. Here, the rationale for the secession is
relevant. A portion of a society desiring secession because
it is being oppressed by the rest of society would have a
stronger claim than one that desires secession in an effort to
gain control over the bulk of a society's resources or to
engage in some practice like slavery that contravenes
society's fundamental values."' If society is not willing to
let a territory go, then it may have the obligation to
accommodate the desire for separation by providing
opportunities for relative autonomy, like decentralizing
110 Societies do at times suffer immediate mass emigrations in times of
famine, war or internal strife, frequently resulting from oppression

within the societies themselves. See, e.g., infra note 119 (regarding the
mass migration of millions of Hindus and Moslems between India and
Pakistan following partition); Susanne Schmeidl, Conflict and Forced
Migration:A QuantitativeReview, in GLOBAL MIGRANTS, GLOBAL

62 (Aristide R. Zolberg & Peter M. Benda, eds., 2001).
11 For commentary on the right to secede, see, e.g., Lea Brilmayer,
Secession and Self-Determination:A TerritorialInterpretation,16
YALE J. INT'L L. 177 (1991)(arguing for right to secede when territory
illegally annexed but not on grounds of nationality or group
REFUGEES

cohesiveness alone); Alan Buchanan, Federalism,Secession, and the

Morality ofInclusion, 37 ARIz. L. REv. 53 (1995)(arguing for right to
secede of groups suffering severe injustices at the hands of the state but
otherwise no general right to secede); Robert W. McGee, The Theory of

Secession and EmergingDemocracies:A ConstitutionalSolution, 28
STAN. J. INT'L L. 451 (1992)(arguing for a right to secede).

126

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY [VOL. I, 1]

127

society into states
or provinces with their own governments
112
and powers.
Now let us address situations when some party
wants to establish an association with a society, using
immigration and the merger of societies as examples.
Current international practice regarding immigration is
opposite from emigration. While a party is substantially
free to leave and sever the relationship with one's country,
there is no comparable right to enter and become a member
of another society. Pursuant to the principle of national
sovereignty, societies have the virtually unfettered right to
refuse entry to outsiders." 3 Similarly, a society's national
sovereignty4 entitles it to reject mergers sought by other
1
societies.
The principle of national sovereignty is analogous
to an individual's absolute right to refuse associations with
others. Just as there is reason to question the absoluteness
of such a right when its exercise would oppress others or
harm society, however, so the principle of national
112 See, e.g., Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. J.
INT'L L. 1, 66:
In most instances, self-determination should come to
mean not statehood or independence, but the exercise of
what might be termed 'functional sovereignty.' This
functional sovereignty will assign to sub-state groups
the powers necessary to control political and economic
matters of direct relevance to them, while bearing in
mind the legitimate concerns of other segments of the
population and the state itself.
113 See Kleven, supra note 104, at 71.
114 Before the world-wide extension of the nation-state system, a state's
acquisition of territory by conquest or cession (typically under threat of
force) from indigenous peoples not inhabiting a recognized state was
commonplace. See CRAWFORD, supra note 109, at 173-74. In modem
times, forcible annexation or consolidation would clearly seem to
violate the principles of self-determination and non-intervention. Id. at
106-07, 112-13.
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sovereignty may overly protect nations' self-determination
against legitimate competing considerations. On the other
hand, there may be situations when a society is justified in
rejecting or limiting associations with outsiders in its
pursuit of collective self-determination. Again, a balancing
of interests is required, taking into account context and
scope.
Consider several scenarios, beginning with
immigration. Because it is virtually absolute, the principle
of national sovereignty entitles nations to treat outsiders in
ways that would violate the fundamental rights of its own
members. In American society, for example, while the
government may not discriminate on the basis of race
against its members (i.e., citizens and those allowed to
enter), it may indiscriminately do so, and did for much of
the twentieth century, when dealing with prospective
immigrants. 115 Members of this society have the right to
travel and settle where they please, and states and localities
may not refuse to accept them in their communities. 11 6 Yet
with regard to immigration, a nation's right to collective
self-determination overrides almost all competing
considerations. 117

115 See Kleven, supra note 104, at 86-87. Some commentators believe
the U.S.'s immigration practices are still racist, if not as explicitly so as
in the past. See id. at note 58.
116 See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999)(invalidating statute limiting
welfare benefits during first year of residency); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969)(invalidating statutes denying welfare assistance to
residents of less than one year); Edwards v. Cal., 314 U.S. 160 (1941)
(invalidating statute prohibiting the transport of indigents into the
state).
117 The only exception is that if someone can find their way into a
country, they may not be deported to another country where they would
face persecution. U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
Art. 31-33 (adopted July 28, 1951 and entered into force Apr. 22,
1954).

128

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY [VOL. I, 1]

129

This leaves little room for individualistic values in
situations where human dignity is at stake. Suppose a
minority of the world's population occupies a
disproportionate share of the available land, wherein is
located a disproportionate share of the world's resources,
and as a result enjoys a disproportionately high standard of
living. And suppose people are suffering due to
burgeoning overpopulation and other crises to which welloff societies may have contributed through colonial
exploitation and environmental degradation. 8 Under
118 The world's population, now at about 6 billion, is expected to reach
between 8 and 11 billion by 2050, and most of the population grovwh
will be in the less developed parts of the world. World Population
Prospects: The 2000 Revision, U.N. Population Div., at 5, at
http://www.
un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2000/wpp2000_volume3.htm.
The relationship between population growth and poverty is unclear due
to the many variables. Does population growth in underdeveloped
areas cause poverty, such that what is needed are efforts to control
population growth to alleviate poverty? Or does poverty cause
population growth, such that development is needed to reduce poverty
which will lead to reduced population growth? The answer seems to be
sometimes one, the other and both, and sometimes neither because
other causal factors like environmental degradation are also at play.
See, e.g., Alain Marcoux, Populationand EnvironmentalChange:from
Linkages to Policy Issues, Sustainable Dev. Dep't, Food & Agric. Org.
of the U.N. (Jan. 1999), at
http://www.fao.org/sd/WPdirect/WPre0089.htm Geoffrey McNicoll,
Population and Poverty: The PolicyIssues, Sustainable Dev. Dep't,
Food & Agric. Org. of the U.N. (Jan. 1999), at
http://www.fao.org/sd/WPdirect/WPre0088.htm Some argue that
poorer countries should be responsible for solving their own
developmental and poverty problems. However, to the extent that
poverty does cause population growth and that the countries
experiencing the greatest population growth are poor as a result of past
and present exploitation by the richer nations, then the argument that
the richer nations should somehow assist either through helping to
relieve the population strain or with economic development and family
planning becomes stronger. See, e.g., ANDRE G. FRANK, CAPITALISM
AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT INLATIN AMERICA (1967); WALTER
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these circumstances, according the well-off societies the
absolute privilege to refuse admittance based on the right of
national self-determination seems one-sided. Indeed, it
seems unlikely that nations would be accorded such a right
under a more highly developed international order, and its
existence today demonstrates the dominant power of the
world's wealthy nations over the rules of the game.
Similar considerations compete in the context of
societal mergers. To illustrate, consider the following two
hypotheticals: first, India proposes a reconsolidation with
Pakistan into a single unified nation; second, Puerto Rico
proposes that it be admitted to the United States as a state.
Although under current international practice both Pakistan
and the United States have the absolute right to reject these
associations, there are competing considerations and
arguable differences between the two situations.
One difference is that while India and Pakistan were
unified under British colonialism, that relationship was
severed;119 whereas as a territory of the United States,
RODNEY, How EUROPE UNDERDEVELOPED AFRICA (1981); Edward
Goldsmith, Development as Colonialism,in THIE CASE AGAINST THE

GLOBAL EcONOMY253 (Jerry Mander & Edward Goldsmith eds.,
1996). Moreover, a more communal view of the world as an
interdependent community might suggest that the world's richer

nations have a duty to aid the less well-off, whatever the cause of the
disparities. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A
DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 31-51 (1983)(discussing the
"duty to aid").

119 The division of the subcontinent into separate nation-states along

largely religious/ethnic lines (India being largely Hindu and Pakistan

largely Muslim) is an outgrowth of both the area's pre-colonial history
and also the impact of British domination of the subcontinent between
the middle of the 191h and 20h centuries. See, e.g., TALBOT, supra note

65, at 1-133. Despite Indian efforts to bring about a unified, multiethnic, secular nation in which Hindus would be the substantial

majority, Pakistani/Muslim separatism led to partition and the
establishment of India and Pakistan (with a western and eastern portion
on opposite sides of India) as separate nation-states in 1947,
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Puerto Rico is arguably a member of the society 120 and is
seeking the full-fledged statehood accorded to other
members. 121 To analogize to interpersonal relationships,
accompanied by the mass migration of millions of mostly Muslims
from India to Pakistan and of mostly Hindus from Pakistan to India.
Id. at 134-61. Both countries have experienced struggles among
various minority religious and ethnic groups. In Pakistan, Bengali
separatism led to the break away of Pakistan's eastern wing and the
formation of Bangladesh as an independent nation in 1971. Id. at 25259. India has experienced Sikh ethno -nationalism and demands for
internal autonomy as well as secession in the Punjab region. Id. at 26573. And India and Pakistan have been at loggerheads since
independence. See infra, note 122.
120 U.S. interest in Puerto Rico stems back to the earliest days of the
nation. Following the Spanish-American War, Spain ceded Puerto
Rico to the U.S. in 1899, and Puerto Rico was made and has since
remained a dependent territory of the U.S. Jost TRIAs MONGE,
PUERTO RIco: THE TRIALS OF THE OLDEST COLONY IN THE WORLD 21 29 (1997). In 1900, a civil government under the ultimate control of
the U.S. was established. Id. at 36-43. In 1917, Puerto Ricans were
granted American citizenship. Id. at 67-76. In 1951, following a
referendum approving it and subject still to ultimate U.S. authority,
Puerto Rico became self-governing and the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico was established; and in 1952, the citizenry adopted and Congress
approved Puerto Rico's Constitution. Id. at 107-18. Throughout its
history as a territory, Puerto Rico's economy has been integrated into
and dependent on that of the U.S. James L. Dietz & Emilio PantojasGarcia, Puerto Rico's New Role in the Caribbean:The High-

Finance/MaquiladoraStrategy, in

COLONIAL DILEMMA: CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON CONTEMPORARY PUERTO RICO 103 (Edwin

Melendez & Edgardo Meldndez eds., 1993); Edwin Meldndez, Politics
and Economic Reforms in Post-War PuertoRico, Id. at 79.
1
Puerto Rico's status has been part of a long-standing debate.
MONGE, supra note 120. Within Puerto Rico, there have been three
non-binding plebiscites: in 1967, 1993 and 1998. In all three, there has
been substantial support for statehood, ranging from 39% in 1967 to
almost 47% in 1998. Independence has received minimal support,
below 5%. In 1967 and 1993, commonwealth status outpolled
statehood, although by a much larger margin in 1967 (60% to 39%)
than in 1993 (49% to 46%). See 1998 Status Plebiscite Vote Summary,
availableat http:/ electionspuertorico.org/1 998/summary.html; Estado
Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico, Escrutinio del Plebscito del 23 de Julio
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one might say that India and Pakistan were at one time
married, divorced, and are now independent parties
deciding whether to renew the marriage; whereas, the
United States and Puerto Rico are now defacto married as
at common law, and Puerto Rico wants that status
legitimized in order to receive all the benefits of a formal
marriage.
A second difference is that the history of the
relations between Pakistan and India differs from that of
the United States and Puerto Rico, and the impact of a
merger on Pakistan and the United States differs. India and
Pakistan split primarily because of internal conflict
between Hindus and Muslims, and there is on-going
animosity between the two. 2 2 Pakistani Muslims would be
a small and disfavored minority in a unified country, and
even if India agreed to a relatively autonomous provincial
status for Pakistanis, they would have a legitimate fear of
oppression. On the other hand, Puerto Rico is arguably
already part of this society, has many of the responsibilities
de 1967, availableat http://electionspuertorico.org/archivo/1967.html.
Interpreting the results of the 1998 plebiscite is difficult because
statehood and independence were competing with two commonwealthlike alternatives - one similar to the present status of subjection to the
ultimate authority of Congress and the other consisting of full selfgovernance subject to undefined economic and defense ties to the U.S.
and with U.S. citizenship only for those already having it and their
descendents. Both alternatives received less than 1% support and
neither received 50% of the vote. See Manuel Alvarez-Rivera,

Elections in Cuba, 1998 PlebisciteStatus Definitions, at

http://eleccionespuertorico.org/home-en.html.

122 The on-going animosity has resulted in four wars and several near

wars, and has revolved largely around the Kashmir region of India,
whose population is largely Muslim and which both countries claim.
The causes of the conflict are varied and contested, and include not
only the religious/ethnic factor but also both countries' efforts at
nation-building and other geo-political factors as well. See, e.g., SuMrr
GANGULY, CONFLICT UNENDING: INDIA-PAKISTAN TENSIONS SINCE

1947 (2001).
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(e.g., military service, subjection to U.S. law) but not all the
benefits (e.g., seats in Congress, the right to vote for
President) of statehood,'2' and may have lost other
opportunities to flourish had it remained independent.
Under these circumstances, Pakistan seems to have a
stronger claim than the United States to avoid an unwanted
relationship with the other party. Furthermore, if the
United States were unwilling to admit Puerto Rico as a
state, it would seem obligated, after forcing it into an
unwanted relationship in the first place, to allow Puerto
Rico to become an independent nation if it so chooses.

VI. Conclusion
While the casual remark that people should be free
to choose with whom to associate or not to associate may
often be an appropriate response, I have tried to show that
in many contexts it is not. At times it may be appropriate
for society to prevent associations harmful to a party or
society as a whole, and at times it also may be appropriate
to impose associations on parties, even highly intimate
associations, when they have made commitments that
others have relied on or when it serves the common good.
Moreover, these considerations may be implicated when
society itself is a party to a contested relationship.
Inevitably, when associational conflicts arise, there
will be assertions of individual and group rights and of
collective interests on all sides, and it will be necessary to
assess the strength of the competing considerations in
social context. Rather than attempting to thoroughly
categorize the relevant contexts and considerations, I have
tried to establish that the notion of free choice in
123 MONGE, supra note 120, at 162-64; InfoPlease: Puerto Rico, at
http://infoplease.com/ipa/AOI 13949.

133

134 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY [VOL. I, 1]
associations is overly simplistic and to show that
associational conflicts are ubiquitous in social life and
relate to issues, like marriage, race relations, and
membership in society, that are central to human dignity
and the well-being of society.
As always when there is conflict over such issues,
there may be many perspectives and passionate
disagreement over the appropriate outcome and who should
be empowered to decide. The struggle for power in social
life is on-going, and associational conflicts are at the heart
of the struggle.
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The Sullivan Decision*
Anthony Lewis**
Professor Stephens, 124 ladies and gentlemen, thank
you for letting me join in this great celebration of a great
case. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan125 was, and remains,
one of the most remarkable judicial decisions of my
lifetime. In commenting on it, I must begin with a
confession. I watched the case from its beginnings. I
worked for The New York Times when the libel action was
brought, and I covered the case in the Supreme Court.
Professor Herbert Wechsler, who briefed and argued the
case, was a revered teacher of mine. In the forty years
since the case was decided, I have written and talked about
it innumerable times.
But - now the confession - over those years I have
found, again and again, that I did not altogether understand
the decision. That has been true from the beginning.
Recently, I had occasion to look back at the story I wrote
on March 9, 1964, which appeared on the front page of The
Times the next morning. To my chagrin, I found that in
significant part I had gotten it wrong. It was only much

* Keynote Address, "Head Their Rising Voices: New York
Times v.
Sullivan-40 Years Later," The University of Tennessee College of

Law, February 27, 2004.

** Mr. Lewis is a Pulitzer Prize winning author
and columnist. He

reported on the Sullivan case for The New York Times and later wrote
MAKE No LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(1991), which Judge Alex Kozinski called a "tour de force" that "no
responsible journalist will be without."
124 Otis Stephens is the Alumni Distinguished Service Professor of

Political Science and Resident Scholar of Constitutional Law at the
University of Tennessee College of Law. Professor Stephens is also a
Faculty Advisor to this publication.
125

376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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later in teaching the case that I began to penetrate its
mysteries.
The Sullivan decision had diverse, far-reaching
consequences. It revolutionized the law of libel in the
United States. It gave new meaning - broader meaning - to

the constitutional protections of freedom of speech and
freedom of the press, and it removed a serious threat to the
civil rights movement, whose success in the 1960s so
greatly changed this country.
The sweeping character of Justice Brennan's
opinion of the Court is signaled by its opening words. "We
are required in this case," it begins, "to determine for the
first time the extent to which the constitutional protections
for speech and press limit a State's power to award
damages in a libel action brought by a public official
against critics of his official conduct." 126 Of course, no one
can require the Supreme Court to decide anything. That
opening declaration is a bit like that of another
revolutionary decision, Erie Railroadv. Tompkins ,l27
which in 1938 stripped the federal courts of their power to
rmke common law on state questions. Justice Brandeis's
opinion began: "[t]he question for decision is whether the
oft-challenged doctrine of Swift v. Tyson shall now be
disapproved."'' 28 This, however, was not the question
presented by the parties. It was the question that the
Justices, especially Justice Brandeis, wanted to decide.
Please forgive the digression. I want only to point
out that the scope of what the Supreme Court decided in
New York Times v. Sullivan - the grand scale, the grand
style - was a choice made by the Justices, and very much
by the author of the Court's opinion, Justice Brennan.
To appreciate how great an impact the case had on
American law and American society, we have to take
"' Id.
at 256.
127

304 U.S. 64 (1938).

12 1Id.
at

82.
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ourselves back to the year when the libel action started,
1960. We have to understand two things about that time:
what the state of race relations was, and what limits the
United States Constitution put on libel judgments. The
events of 1960 came six years after the Supreme Court, in
Brown v. Board of Education,129 had held racial segregation
to be unlawful in public education. Yet, in that year not a
single black child attended a public school with white
children in Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, Louisiana, or
South Carolina. The state universities remained segregated
in those same states. Blacks were prevented from voting in
large parts of the Deep South by force or trick. In 1960,
only four percent of black citizens of voting age had
managed to register to vote in Mississippi, and only 14
percent in Alabama.
Those were the realities that Martin Luther King, Jr.
and his colleagues were trying to change, along with
segregation in the rest of life, in hospitals and cemeteries
and department stores. Dr. King had an idea, an optimistic
one. He thought that most Americans, if confronted with
the ugliness and brutality of racism, would disapprove. It
was true that most Americans at that time were actually
unfamiliar with the realities of racism. Dr. King set out to
confront them with those realities. The press, both print
and broadcast, had an essential part to play if Dr. King's
optimistic strategy was to work. It was the media that
would show Americans the ugly reactions to the civil rights
movement: the snarling police dogs, the assaults on black
and white passengers on interstate buses when they reached
terminals in Alabama, the sheriffs who threatened would-be
black voters. Newspapers and magazines did a good job of
reporting those episodes, and television had an even greater
impact.

129

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Professor Alexander Bickel of the Yale Law
School, after the confrontations over school desegregation
in New Orleans and Little Rock, wrote that racial
segregation had been an abstraction to most Americans.
The riots, he said, "showed what it means concretely. Here
were grown men and women furiously confronting their
enemy: two, three, a half dozen scrubbed, starched, scared
and incredibly brave colored children. The moral
bankruptcy, the shame of the thing, was evident."13 °
I need not go into the advertisement in the Times, or
Commissioner Sullivan's claim that he was libeled by it,
although it did not mention his name when it denounced
"Southern violators" of the Constitution. This audience
knows all about that. I simply do what Justice Holmes
once said was necessary: elucidate the obvious. The
purpose of that libel action, and of others that were brought
soon after, was to frighten the national press out of
covering the civil rights movement in the South.
It was a serious threat. An all-white jury awarded
Commissioner Sullivan all the damages he claimed
$500,000. Another jury returned a verdict for the same
amount in another official's libel action over the
advertisement. Altogether, The Times was going to owe
over $2,500,000 in libel damages from the ad - and no
doubt more in suits over new stories in the paper. It was
enough to put the paper out of business in those days.
Other lawsuits targeted magazine and broadcast
entities. After the judgment for Commissioner Sullivan,
the Montgomery Advertiser headlined a story: "State Finds
Formidable Legal Club to Swing at Out-of-State Press. 13 '
That brings me to the second thing that has to be
understood about the year 1960: the state of libel law.
130 ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE

SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).

131 Rex Thomas, State FindsFormidableLegal Club To Swing At OutOf-State Press, MONTGOMERY

ADVERTISER, Sept.

25, 1960, at Al.
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There were no constitutional constraints then - none - on

libel judgments. Libel was entirely a matter of state law,
regarded from the beginning as being outside the First
Amendment. No libel award, however outlandish, had ever
been found to violate the Federal Constitution. An
associate at the law firm that for years had represented The
New York Times wrote an article for the paper's house
organ, Times Talk, about how the lawyers planned to
appeal the judgment for Commissioner Sullivan. He did
not mention the First Amendment.
In hindsight, it all looks so obvious. Here was a
lawsuit aimed at cutting off publication of a comment on a
central political issue. How could it more directly engage
the First Amendment? But that perspective is plain only in
hindsight. At the time, Commissioner Sullivan's lawyer,
Roland Nachman, thought the First Amendment was a
March hare, not worth pursuing. The Alabama Supreme
Court dismissed it in a sentence. When Professor Wechsler
raised the idea of a First Amendment argument with Times
executives, some of them were wary of such a novel idea.
But Professor Wechsler boldly told the Supreme Court in
his brief that this was a classic test of First Amendment
values. "This is not a time," he said, "there never is a time
- when it would serve the values enshrined in the
Constitution to force the press to curtail its attention to the
tensest issues that confront the country .... 132
The challenge to Professor Wechsler was the long
history of universal acceptance that libel fell outside the
reach of the First Amendment. He answered that history
with another history, the history of the struggle against the
Sedition Act of 1798, which made it a crime to criticize the
President. "Though the Sedition Act was never passed on
by this Court," Wechsler wrote, "the verdict of history
132 Herbert Wechsler, Brief for the Petitioner, New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) ((Nos. 39, 40) availableat 1963 WL
66441 ,*68).
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that it was inconsistent with the
surely sustains the view
33
First Amendment." 1
Justice Brennan put that history at the heart of his
opinion. "Although the Sedition Act was never tested in
this Court," he wrote, "the attack upon its validity has
carried the day in the court of history."' 134 With that, he and
the Court in effect held unconstitutional a statute that had
expired 163 years earlier, in 1801. It was the great
controversy over the Sedition Act, Justice Brennan said,
with James Madison leading the attack, that "first
crystallized a national awareness of the central meaning of
the First Amendment,"135 that is, the right of Americans to
criticize officials whom they choose to govern them.
That is one constitutional theme in the Sullivan
opinion. It is buttressed by pages of quotation from some
of the great free speech opinions in American law. They
show, Justice Brennan said, "a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it
may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes
unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government and public
136
officials.'
To this Justice Brennan added a second ground, not
so often noticed, but I think extremely important. Officials
have a privilege not to be sued over statements made in the
course of their duties. An analogous privilege is needed by
"the citizen-critic of government. It is as much his duty to
criticize as it is the official's duty to administer.' 37 The
idea comes straight from Justice Brandeis, who once said
the most important office in a democracy was the office of
citizen.
...Id. at 47.
114 376 U.S. at 276.
' Id. at 273.
13 6 Id. at 270.
137 Id. at 282.

140

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY [VOL. I, 1]

141

From today's standpoint, again, the enshrining of
the right to criticize government as a central meaning of the
First Amendment seems unchallengeably correct. But we
think that in good part because of New York Times v.
Sullivan. It was the first opinion for a majority of the
Supreme Court that so broadly spread the mantle of free
expression. Many of the ringing words about freedom that
we remember by, for example, Justices Holmes and
Brandeis, appeared in dissenting and concurring opinions.
It was Holmes in dissent who said, "we should be eternally
vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinion
that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death .... 38
Notice also that Holmes spoke of freedom for
"opinion." The Sullivan case involved something very
different: facts. False facts, because The Times admitted
and the Court found that there were errors in the
advertisement that was the subject of this libel action.
Justice Brennan said the lesson to be drawn from the
Sedition Act controversy was that "neither factual error nor
defamatory content," nor a combination of the two,
"suffices to remove the constitutional shield from the
criticism of official conduct.... ,,139
Now, ladies and gentlemen, we have to confront
one of the mysteries of the Court's opinion in New York
Times v. Sullivan. Through all of the discussion about the
Sedition Act, the quotations from Madison and Brandeis,
Justice Brennan seemed to be taking an absolute view of
the right to criticize government. Madison certainly did,
saying that "abuse" by the press must be accepted as part of
the price of freedom. 140 Indeed, at the oral argument of the
case, Justice Brennan asked whether there were "any limits
whatever" to the right to criticize officials. Professor
138

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.

dissenting).
1'9
14 0 Id. at 273.
Id. at 271.
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Wechsler answered that, "if I take my instruction from
James Madison" there were none. Justice Brennan said:
"You say, then, the First Amendment gives, in effect, an
absolute privilege to criticize.... 141
But that is not the holding of the Sullivan case.
Justices Black, Douglas, and Goldberg urged that outcome,
calling for absolute immunity for attacks on officials. The
opinion of the Court, however, stopped well short of
absolute immunity. It held that a public official could not
recover damages for a defamatory falsehood "unless he
proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice' that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not." 142 That is the
famous Sullivan formula, allowing the libel plaintiff to
recover damages if he can show that he was defamed by a
falsehood that was deliberate - a knowing lie - or reckless.
Why did Justice Brennan and the Court stop short
of total freedom to criticize? Why did they leave a
loophole for official libel actions that has led to much
litigation about what kind of falsehood is "reckless?" (The
Court in time said it was a statement published despite
subjective awareness of probable falsity.)
Some have speculated that Justice Brennan really
preferred the absolute Madisonian position but drew back
in order to carry a majority of his colleagues with him. I
am sure that was not the case. In the draft opinion he
showed to his law clerks a few weeks after argument - the
first of eight drafts - he noted Wechsler's argument that
Madison would have:
barred sanctions against defamatory criticism of
public officials reflecting upon their official
141

Audio tape: Oral Argument of N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, U.S.

Supreme Court (Jan. 6, 1964), at
http://www.oyez.org/oyez/resource/case/277/audioresources.
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Id. at 279-80.
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conduct even when tainted with express malice.
We do not think that the Amendment reaches so
far . . . . The line may surely be drawn to
exclude from constitutional protection the
statement which is not criticism, or intended as
such, but, in the guise of criticism, is deliberate,
malevolent and knowing falsity, or utterance
reckless of the truth ....
This was the age of Senator Joe McCarthy and antiCommunist demagoguery.
In another libel case decided shortly after Sullivan,
Garrisonv. Louisiana,144 Justice Brennan's opinion of the
Court explained why absolute immunity for defamatory
false statements about officials was an unwise idea:
At the time the First Amendment was adopted,
as today, there were those unscrupulous enough
and skillful enough to use the deliberate or
reckless falsehood as an effective political tool
to unseat the public servant or even topple an
administration .... [T]he use of the known lie as
a tool is at once at odds with the premises of
democratic government and with the orderly
manner in which economic, social, or political
45
change is to be effected. 1
So there we have what is known as the Sullivan rule, a
substantial but incomplete immunity for unpleasant
comments on public officials.
But Justice Brennan did not leave it there. He went
on in his opinion to test the facts of the case against the
43
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144 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
141 Id. at 75.
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new rule, and found that the evidence in the record could
not constitutionally support a judgment for Commissioner
Sullivan. That was a highly unusual step. When laying
down a new or reformulated constitutional rule, the
Supreme Court would ordinarily remand the case to the
lower court to determine the rule's application to the facts
of the particular case. The reason for departing from the
ordinary is not in doubt. Justice Brennan feared that the
Alabama officials who had sued over the Times
advertisement would demand a new trial and try to show
that the statements in the ad were knowingly or recklessly
false. Justice Black, who came from Alabama, warned that
Sullivan and the others would persuade a jury to find
knowing or reckless fabrication. (In fact, Sullivan did not
seek a trial.)
In the course of measuring the evidence against the
constitutional standard, Justice Brennan did something
quite extraordinary. After finding no deliberate or reckless
falsehoods on the part of The Times, he said: "We also
think the evidence was constitutionally defective in another
respect: it was incapable of supporting the jury's finding
that the allegedly libelous statements were made 'of and
concerning' [Commissioner Sullivan]." 146 In other words,
by finding that an ad without his name could be understood
to defame Sullivan, the jury and the Alabama courts
violated the Constitution.
Think about that. It is an independent ground of
decision, unconnected to the whole argument about the
Sedition Act and the right to criticize officials. But then the
Supreme Court could have rested on that ground without
more. It could have decided the case and reversed the
judgment against The New York Times without taking the
bold step of laying down a new constitutional rule for libel.
The case would still be meaningful. The Alabama Supreme
146

376 U.S. at 288.
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Court had said it was logical to impute criticism of Sullivan
from general statements about police wrongdoing in the ad.
Justice Brennan's opinion stated that it would allow
criticism of government to be transmuted into personal
libel, and that this country has no such thing as libel of the
government. But it would hardly be the great decision it
was.
Why did Justice Brennan and the Court not rest on
that narrower ground? I think we have to conclude that the
Court thought it was the moment for a decision that would
ensure open channels of information about the racial crisis.
Justice Brennan did not frame his opinion in terms of Dr.
King's hope - the hope of arousing Americans to
understand the evils of racism. It is, in fact, a singularly
detached opinion. But the Court knew what was at stake.
One profound result of the decision in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan was to keep the channels of
information about the civil rights movement and its
opponents open. Dr. King's statement about how
Americans would react to racism when they saw it naked
proved to be correct. Americans pressed for federal
legislation guaranteeing the right to vote and other rights.
By the end of 1966, two years after the Sullivan decision,
that legislation was on the books. It led to profound
changes in American politics and society. I can, perhaps,
sum them up with a small story.
Ralph McGill was the great editor of the Atlanta
Constitution. He fought against racism for years, often in
lonely circumstances. Some years after the passage of the
civil rights laws, a friend came to his office and asked
McGill to come with him. They went to a hall where black
elected officials in the South were meeting. Ralph stood in
the back of the hall, and tears rolled down his face.
The decision remade the law of libel in this country.
Today, virtually every libel action engages the First
Amendment in some way. What was once a matter of state
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law has become a federal specialty. More broadly, this has
become a much freer country in terms of what we can
speak and publish.
Of course that freedom was not the sole result of the
Sullivan case. There has been a gradual trend toward
outspokenness, gathering momentum in the last fifty years.
It is hard to believe now that the Supreme Court, during
and after World War I, upheld criminal convictions for
political criticism of the President. I think freedom to say
and write what we will is stronger in America now than
ever, and greater than in any other country. The Sullivan
case was a spur to that trend.
Not everyone welcomes the world of uninhibited,
caustic, sometimes unpleasantly sharp criticism of public
officials. I have debated politicians on the subject, and they
can be explosively negative. The dissenting view these
politicians hold is that Sullivan has become a license for
shoddy journalism, transforming it into a profession where
legal excuses are sought for falsehood. They argue that the
atmosphere of continuous attack and investigation makes
political life hard to bear and discourages the thoughtful
and sensitive from going to it.
I cannot dismiss that argument out of hand. I think
the standards ofjournalism are less than lofty. We live in a
world in which an Internet purveyor of trash can put a
totally false rumor about a Presidential candidate on his
website, and tabloids around the world pick it up as
"news." I doubt, though, that this sensationalism and lack
of ethics can be traced to New York Times v. Sullivan, or
even to the zeal of today's journalists to look for official
wrongdoing.
Rather, the main source of that investigative zeal
lies in two transforming events: Vietnam and Watergate.
The leading columnists, Washington bureau chiefs, and the
like used to consider themselves on the same team as high
officials. I well remember how chummy my superiors at
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the Times were with Secretaries of State and the like, and it
was not evil. They shared premises, such as the need to
win the Cold War, and they respected officials' good faith
and superior knowledge.
Vietnam ended all that. Practically all of us in the
business came to doubt the superior knowledge of officials
about the war. In fact, David Halberstam and Neil Sheehan
and other young correspondents there knew more about the
war than Presidents did. Good faith? You had to wonder
about that, too.
Then came Watergate, with its lies and criminality.
It made us forever skeptical about official truth. One can
hardly blame that on the Sullivan case.
Am I, then, an unambiguous admirer of all that
Sullivan wrought? No, I am not. I think the Supreme
Court made a mistake when it extended the rule of the case
- the need to prove knowing or reckless falsification - from

public officials to public figures. The Court defined public
figures as either people generally well-known, like movie
stars, or people who have "thrust themselves into the
vortex" of public controversy, as Justice John Marshall
Harlan memorably put it. 147

The first step to enlarge the sphere of the Sullivan
case was taken by the Supreme Court in 1967, when it
decided Time, Inc. v. Hill,148 a privacy case. James Hill and
his family lived in a suburb of Philadelphia. Three escaped
convicts invaded their home and held the Hills hostage for
19 hours but treated them well. The press covered the story
intensely, to the distress of the family and especially of
Mrs. Hill, who greatly valued privacy. To escape the glare
of publicity, they moved to Connecticut and sought
obscurity.

147 Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 146 (1967).
148 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
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Two years later, a play entitled "The Desperate
Hours" appeared on Broadway. It depicted a reign of terror
by convicts who held a family hostage and included
brutality and sexual threats. The play was set in
Indianapolis. Life magazine ran a feature on the opening
and photographed the actors in the Hills' former home near
Philadelphia. Life described the play, with all its terror, as
a reenactment of what had happened to the Hills.
The
Life story devastated the Hill family and caused Mrs. Hill
to suffer a psychiatric breakdown. Thereafter, Mr. Hill
sued Time, Inc., the publisher of Life, under the New York
privacy statute, claiming that the article placed his family in
a false light. He was awarded a modest $30,000 in
damages by the New York courts, but the Supreme Court
reversed. The Court's opinion, penned by Justice Brennan,
said the judgment was constitutionally flawed because Mr.
Hill had not been required to prove that Life's falsification
had been knowing or reckless.
What did James Hill, a private person, have to do
with the reasoning of New York Times v. Sullivan, or with
the Sedition Act controversy and its lesson that the central
meaning of the First Amendment is the right to criticize
those who govern us? My answer is-nothing. I think the
Court, in Time, Inc. v. Hill,149 applied the compelling logic
of Sullivan in a situation where it was quite inapposite.
As someone who thinks privacy is a crucially
important value in our increasingly intrusive society, I also
regret the Court's failure in the Hill case to give privacy the
weight it deserves. That was brought poignantly home
years after the decision. It happens that Richard M. Nixon
argued the case for Mr. Hill. His one-time law partner and
White House counsel, Leonard Garment, published an
article about the case in The New Yorker in 1989. He

14 9 Id.
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disclosed, with James Hill's permission, that in 1971 Mrs.
Hill had committed suicide.
Leonard Garment's article followed the disclosure
in Professor Bernard Schwartz's book, The Unpublished
Opinions of the Warren Court,150 of what went on inside
the Supreme Court during its consideration of the Hill case.
After it was first argued, the Justices voted, 6 to 3, to affirm
the New York court's judgment in favor of Mr. Hill. The
opinion was assigned to Justice Abe Fortas, who used the
occasion for two distinctive purposes: an eloquent
definition of privacy, and a savage attack on journalistic
ethics. As to the latter, Justice Fortas decried what he
called life's "needless, heedless, wanton and deliberate
injury." 151 He wrote that "magazine writers and editors are
not, by reason of their high office, relieved of the common
obligation to avoid inflicting wanton and unnecessary
injury." 52 Perhaps his sarcastic language helped to bring
about a switch in the Justices' votes; after a second round
of oral argument, the Court issued a 5-4 decision in favor of
Time, Inc. A compelling dissent by Justice Harlan opined
that the "marketplace of ideas" would not function in a case
like this because James Hill would have a hard time finding
a platform to answer Life magazine. 153 The case showed,
wrote Justice
Harlan, "the dangers of unchallengeable
untruth." 154
The more common extension of the Sullivan rule is
to libel actions brought by people who, though not officials,
are regarded as public figures. The consequences can be
curious. Wayne Newton, a Las Vegas entertainer, was
deemed a public figure when he sued for libel. Other
150 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE

WARREN COURT (1985).
151 Id.

152 Id.
153 385 U.S. at 407-08.
154 Id.at 408.
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singers and actors have had to meet the Sullivan test
because they were famous. But what, if anything, did they
have to do with government or public affairs? I should,
perhaps, add that my question would be different if the
actor were Arnold Schwarzenegger. The public figure
category would be more logical if it were limited to people
who have thrust themselves into the vortex of public
controversy. The Supreme Court may have taken an
unacknowledged step toward that limitation when it said in
1986 that a public figure who brings a libel action has to
meet the Sullivan test only if the suit concerns a "public
issue. 155
Despite my doubts about public figures and privacy,
I think the decision in New York Times v. Sullivan has been
a great liberating force in American law and life. I may
feel especially strongly on the subject because I spent nine
years of my life in England, where the old common law of
libel reigns in good part unchanged. In libel cases, the
burden of proof is on the defendant, usually a newspaper, to
prove that the challenged statement is true. That can be an
impossible burden to meet, so most newspapers give up and
settle when sued. Under Sullivan, as the Supreme Court
made clear in 1986, the burden is on a libel plaintiff to
prove falsity.
In Britain the plaintiff does not have to show any
fault on the part of the defendant. A newspaper writer and
editor may have made strenuous, good-faith efforts to
check everything before publishing an article, but if there is
an inadvertent error in the published article that defames
someone, that person can recover damages. Under
Sullivan, of course, a public official or public figure has a
high degree of fault to prove: knowing or reckless
falsification. Under the 1974 Supreme Court decision in

155

Phila Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986).
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Gertz v. Welch, 156 even a purely private plaintiff has to
show at least that there was negligence on the part of the
defendant in publishing a falsehood. Innocent mistake is
not subject to penalty.
Ladies and gentlemen, I said at the start that over
the years I realized from time to time that I had not
altogether understood the decision in New York Times v.
Sullivan. No doubt I still have some learning to do. With
its grand sweep and its mysterious turnings, Justice
Brennan's opinion is a challenge for all time - and what a
thrilling challenge it is.

156 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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I. Introduction
In Cone v. Bell,' the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit overruled the District Court's denial of a
prisoner's habeas corpus petition. The Sixth Circuit held
that the jury relied on an unconstitutional statutory
aggravating factor in its decision to impose the death
sentence. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit remanded the case
with instructions to grant the habeas2 corpus petition,
thereby vacating Cone's death sentence.
After convicting Gary Bradford Cone of two counts
of first degree murder for brutally killing an elderly couple,
the jury sentenced Cone to death. 3 The jury found four
aggravating factors were present, including, in particular,
that the murders were "especially heinous, atrocious and
cruel." 4 In his habeas corpus petition, Cone argued that the
were
terms
"heinous,
atrocious
and
cruel"
5
unconstitutionally vague. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit was
asked to decide whether Cone's death sentence violated the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. 6
Before addressing Cone's Eighth Amendment
challenge, the Sixth Circuit resolved two key preliminary
1Cone v. Bell, 359 F.3d 785 (6th Cir. 2004).
2 Id. at 799.
3 Id. at 787; Cone v. Bell, 243 F.3d 961,965 (6th Cir. 2001).
4 Cone, 243 F.3d at 965; see TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i) (2003)
(citing 12 aggravating factors that a jury can consider in deciding
whether to impose death penalty when defendant has been convicted of

first degree murder). Many courts refer to the "especially heinous,
atrocious and cruel" factor as the "HAC aggravator," and I will also
refer to it as such throughout this note.
5 See Cone, 243 F.3d 961 (affirming district court's refusal to issue writ

of habeas corpus).
6Cone, 359 F.3d at 787.
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issues.7 First, the court held that under Tennessee law, the
Tennessee Supreme Court implicitly reviews a death
sentence for arbitrariness, regardless of whether the
challenge is explicitly asserted by the petitioner.8 Second,
the court held that although the petitioner did not explicitly
raise an Eighth Amendment claim in his first petition for
post-conviction relief, the issue had been implicitly
reviewed by the Tennessee Supreme Court. Accordingly,
Cone's Eighth Amendment challenge had not been
"procedurally defaulted" and, therefore, was a valid
consideration for the court. 9
After resolving the preliminary issues, the Sixth
Circuit analyzed Cone's primary Eighth Amendment claim.
Granting Cone's habeas corpus petition, the court held that
the Tennessee Supreme Court's implicit decision regarding
the constitutionality of the HAC aggravator was contrary to
"clearly established" United States Supreme Court
precedent existing at the time of Cone's state court
conviction.10 By vacating Cone's death sentence, the Sixth
Circuit furthered the primary purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus - to ensure that a petitioner's imprisonment is
lawful.
Astonishingly, three years earlier, in 2001, the Sixth
Circuit had concluded that it was unnecessary to address
Cone's vagueness challenge when it determined he was
entitled to habeas relief. Taken together theses decisions
emphasize that, when reviewing a state prisoner's sentence
and conviction for the purposes of a habeas corpus petition,
the Federal courts must exercise the utmost care and
diligence.

7Id. at 790-91.
8Id.

9Id.
10 Id. at 797.
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II. The Development of Habeas Relief for State
Prisoners Sentenced to Death
A. Writ of Habeas Corpus. A HistoricalPerspective
A writ of habeas corpus is most often used to
examine the legality of the petitioner's imprisonment."'
The writ of habeas corpus originated in England in the
thirteenth century. As is evidenced by its inclusion in the
Constitution, the Founders clearly recognized the
importance of the writ of habeas corpus. 2 Initially, only a
federal prisoner could petition a court for habeas corpus
relief. 13 However, in 1867, the Habeas Corpus Act
extended the writ to include state prisoners and enabled
federal courts to grant the writ in "all cases where any
person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of
the [C]onstitution."' 14 Although the federal habeas corpus
statute has undergone numerous amendments since its
enactment, the "jurisdictional grant" endured. 5
Today, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 gives federal courts
the authority to grant habeas corpus relief. 16 The current
version of Section 2254 contains revised procedural
guidelines that a court must follow in granting the writ to

state prisoners.'

7

Congress, however, did not pass

11BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 715 (7th ed. 1999).
12 U.S. CONST. art. I, §9 cl. 2 ("The privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or
invasion the public safety may require it."); Stuart E. Walker, Note,

"What We Meant Was.. "The Supreme Court Clarifies Two
Ineffective Assistance Cases in Bell v. Cone, 54 MERCER L. REV. 1271,
1275 (2003).
13 Walker, supra note 12.
14 Id. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28 § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
15
16

Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 362, 375 (2000).
Walker, supranote 12.

17 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2004).
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legislation outlining these substantive guidelines until April
24, 1996, when it enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (hereinafter the "AEDPA"). 18 The
AEDPA limited the circumstances under which a federal
court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner.' 9 The
most substantial change effectuated by the AEDPA
regarding federal habeas relief came in the form of an
amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court shall not be granted
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated
on the merits in State court proceedings unless
the adjudication of the claim- (1) resulted in a
decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonableapplication of clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a
decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court
proceeding. 20
B. From Teague to Williams: The Evolution of Federal
Habeas Corpus Practice
Prior to the AEDPA amendments, state prisoners
had greater latitude from which to appeal their convictions.
More specifically, habeas relief was not limited only to

18 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified in scattered sections of title 28 of the
U.S. Code).
19 Id.
20 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (emphasis added).
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decisions that were either "contrary to" or "unreasonable
applications of clearly established Federal law."
1. Teague v. Lane Sets the Stage
The limitation on habeas relief originated with the United
States Supreme Court's holding in Teague v. Lane.21 In
Teague, during the process of jury selection, the prosecutor
utilized all ten of his preemptory challenges to exclude
potential black jurors. Subsequently, the defendant, a black
man, was convicted of attempted murder and other related
offenses by an all-white jury.22 On appeal, the petitioner
argued that he had been "denied [] the right to be tried by a
jury that represented a fair cross section of the
community."23
In ruling on Teague's habeas claim, the Court
clarified when a "new rule" should be applied retroactively
and when a petitioner's claim for habeas relief is
procedurally barred in collateral review cases. 24 According
to the Court, "[a] case announces a new rule if the result
was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the
defendant's conviction became final. 2m Hence, the Court
adopted Judge Harlan's view of retroactivity for collateral
review cases and found two narrow exceptions to the
general rule that "new rules" should not be applied
retroactively. 26
21 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
22 Id. at 292-93.
23 Id. at 293.

24 See, e.g., Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989) (holding that "a
procedural default does not bar consideration of a federal claim on
either direct or habeas review unless the last state court rendering a
judgment in the case 'clearly and expressly' states that its judgment
rests on a state procedural bar").
25 Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.

26 Id. at 307; Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 682 (1971).
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According to the Court, a "new rule" should be
applied retroactively "if it places 'certain kinds of primary,
private individual conduct beyond the power of the
criminal law-making authority to proscribe'
or "if it
requires the observance of 'those procedures that . . .are
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' ' 27 Ultimately,
the Court "noted the fundamental importance of finality to
our system of criminal justice and commented that
'[w]ithout [it], the28 criminal law is deprived of much of its
deterrent effect.'
2. Williams v. Taylor Aligns the Supreme
Court with the Post-AEDPA Writ
Eleven years later, in Williams v. Taylor,29 the Supreme
Court thoroughly analyzed the scope of habeas corpus
relief, when it interpreted the amended version of 28
U.S.C. § 2245(d)(1) 30 for the first time. Williams, a state
prisoner convicted of capital murder, collaterally attacked
his conviction, arguing that his attorney failed to discover
mitigating evidence during sentencing. 3' After exhausting
his state court remedies, Williams sought a writ of habeas
corpus in district court. 32
27 Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693).
28 Walker, supranote 12, at 1277 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 309).
29 Williams, 529 U.S. at 362; see also Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S.
156, 168 (2000) ("On review of state decisions in habeas corpus, state
courts are responsible for a faithful application of the principles set out
in the controlling opinion of the [Supreme] Court.").
30 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2004) ("An application for a writ of habeas
corpus... shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was
adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the
adjudication of the claim - resulted in a decision that was contraryto,
or involved an unreasonableapplicationof clearly establishedFederal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.")
(emphasis added).
'3Williams, 529 U.S. at 370-71.
32 Id. at 372.
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The federal trial judge granted the petition, holding
that Williams's sentence was unconstitutional because it
was reasonable to conclude that his punishment would have
been different but for his counsel's failure to discover the
The Fourth Circuit reversed the
mitigating evidence.
district court's decision, however, holding "that a federal
court may issue habeas relief only if 'the state courts have
decided the question by interpreting or applying the
relevant precedent in a manner that reasonable jurists
would all agree is unreasonable. ' ' ' 4 Ultimately, the
Supreme Court granted Williams's petition for habeas relief
concluding that "the Virginia Supreme Court rendered a
'decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law.'35
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens noted that
the "AEDPA codifie[d] Teague to the extent that Teague
requires federal habeas courts to deny relief that is
contingent upon a rule of law not clearly established at the
time the state conviction became final. 36 While Teague
prohibited a reliance on "new rules," 37 the AEDPA
expanded that premise, mandating that habeas relief be
granted only if the claim's adjudication "resulted in a
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as
38
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."
Consequently, the AEDPA did not simply codify the
Rather, it expressly limited the
Teague holding.
application of the Teague holding to those cases where a
" Id. at 373.
34 Id. at

376 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 163 F.3d 860, 865 (4th Cir.

1998)).

31
31

Williams, 529 U.S. at 399.

Id. at 380.

Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); 110 Stat. 1214 (codified in scattered sections
of title 28 of the U.S. Code).
37
38
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lower court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent
existing at the time of the petitioner's state court
conviction.39
Additionally, the Williams Court carefully
considered the standard of review applicable to habeas
corpus proceedings. In particular, the Court analyzed the
phrases "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" as
they are used in § 2254(d)(1). 40 Ultimately, the majority
relied on the Webster's Dictionary to define the phrase
"contrary to" as meaning "in conflict with."' 4 The
majority stated that the phrase was broad enough "to
include a finding that the state-court 'decision' [wa]s
simply 'erroneous' or wrong. ' 42 Furthermore, the majority
noted that "there is nothing in the phrase ...

that implies

anything less than independent review by the federal
courts." 43

In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor faulted
the majority's failure "to give independent meaning to both
the 'contrary to' and 'unreasonable application' clauses of
[28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)]."4 4 Justice O'Connor reasoned
that Section 2254(d)(1) provides two distinct types of cases
where a state prisoner can obtain federal habeas relief,
assuming the state court claim is adjudicated on the
merits. 4 5 Justice O'Conner emphasized that "[u]nder the

statute, a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus if
the relevant state-court decision was either (1) 'contrary
39 Williams, 529 U.S. at 380.

40 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (mandating that court only grant writ if

petitioner's state court conviction resulted in decision that was

"contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law").
41 Williams, 529 U.S. at 388.
42 Id. at 389.
431id.

44 Id. at 404 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (referring to the "contrary to"
and "unreasonable application" clauses of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).
41 Id. at 404-05.
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to...clearly established Federal law'...or (2) 'involved an
unreasonable application of...clearly established Federal
law." 46 The concurring opinion illustrated two scenarios in
which a state court decision is "contrary to" Supreme Court
precedent.
Similarly, the concurring opinion also
identified two scenarios in which a state court decision
involves an "unreasonable application" of Supreme Court
precedent. '8
3. The Court Remains True to the Purpose of
Habeas Corpus Reliefas Envisioned in 1867
Although the AEDPA modified the scope of habeas
relief, the purpose of the writ remains intact. Today, the
writ of habeas corpus continues to ensure that criminal
sentences are properly imposed. More specifically, in
analyzing a state prisoner's sentence, federal courts often
must examine both the constitutionality of the sentencing
guidelines as well as the jury's interpretation of these
guidelines.

id.
47 Id. at 405-06:
46

First, a state-court decision is contrary to this Court's
precedent if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite
to that reached by this Court on a question of law.
Second, a state-court decision is also contrary to this
Court's precedent if the state court confronts facts that are
materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme
Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to ours.
48 Id. The first scenario arises when a "state court identifies the correct
legal rule... but unreasonably applies it to the facts." The second
scenario, on the other hand, occurs when a "state court either
unreasonably extends a legal principle.., to a new context where it
should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a
new context where it should apply."
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C. Vague AggravatingCircumstancesand Eighth
Amendment Rights
The Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
forbids the infliction of "cruel and unusual" punishment. 49
For more than thirty years, the Supreme Court has been
committed "to guiding sentencers' discretion so as to
'minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious
action,' and to achieve principled distinctions between
those who receive the death penalty and those who do not."
50 In accordance with the Supreme Court's commitment,
many state legislatures have enacted statutory aggravating

circumstances to limit the factfinder's discretion in
imposing the death penalty. 51
To avoid being labeled unconstitutionally vague,
"an aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow the
class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must
reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence
on the defendant compared to others found guilty of
murder.,

52

Therefore, the proper analysis of a vagueness

claim focuses on whether the challenged aggravating

49 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see also TENN. CONST. art. I, § 16.
50 Tuilaepa v. Proctor, 512 U.S. 967,995 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); see also Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980)
(concluding that "if a State wishes to authorize capital punishment it
has a constitutional responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a
manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death
p enalty").
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 872 (1983); see, e.g., TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-13-204(i).
52 Zant, 462 U.S. at 877;

see also Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 258
(1976) (noting that because "the sentencing authority's discretion is
guided and channeled by requiring examination of specific factors that
argue in favor of or against imposition of the death penalty,"
arbitrariness and capriciousness in imposing the death penalty are
eliminated).
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circumstance adequately informs the jury as to what it must
find in order to impose the death penalty. 53
The constitutionality of a death sentence hinges on
two primary issues: (1) whether the defendant is eligible
for the death penalty and (2) whether the defendant should
For example, a defendant
receive a death sentence.- 4
convicted of murder is eligible for the death penalty if the
factfinder determines that at least one aggravating
circumstance is present. 55 Additionally, the aggravating
circumstance must not apply to every defendant convicted
of murder5 6 and must not be unconstitutionally vague.57
Assuming the defendant is eligible for the death penalty,
the sentencer must then decide whether the defendant
should be sentenced to death. 58 In this part of the analysis,
"[w]hat is important... is an individualized determination

of the individual and the
on the basis of the character
59
circumstances of the crime.",
While the eligibility determination "fits the crime
within

a

defined

classification, "6

the

selection

determination "requires individualized sentencing and must
be expansive enough to accommodate relevant mitigating
evidence so as to assure an assessment of the defendant's
53 Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356,361-62 (1988).

Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 971-72.
id.at 971-72; see, e.g., Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244-46
Q1988); Zant, 462 U.S. at 878.
6 Id. at 972; see Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 474 ("If the sentencer
fairly could conclude that an aggravating circumstance applies to every
defendant eligible for the death penalty, the circumstance is
constitutionally infirm.").
57 Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 972; Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428 ("If a State
wishes to authorize capital punishment it has a constitutional
responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids the
arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty.").
58 Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 972.
59
Zant, 462 U.S. at 879.
60 Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 879.
14

55
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culpability.", 61 Ultimately, "[w]hen only a narrow subclass
of murderers can be subjected to the death penalty, 6the risk
1
of cruel and unusual punishment... is diminished.
To overcome a vagueness challenge, the statutory
HAC aggravator used to impose the death penalty must
contain a limiting construction.63 In other words, the plain
language of the statutory HAC aggravator must inherently
limit the application of the death penalty. 64 In general,
however, the aggravator is inherently vague because it is
hard to imagine a person who would not believe that
murder itself is "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. 65
Therefore, in order to uphold the integrity of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment, a decision to impose the death sentence must
be "based on reason rather than caprice or emotion. ' 66
The Tennessee Supreme Court first addressed the
HAC aggravator in State v. Dicks.67 In Dicks, the jury
found Jeffrey Stuart Dicks guilty of first degree murder for
killing a store owner during the commission of a crime.68
During sentencing, the jury found that three aggravating
circumstances and zero mitigating circumstances were
present and, therefore, recommended that Dicks receive the
death penalty. 69 In particular, the jury deemed the murder
"especially heinous, atrocious or cruel in that it involved
70
depravity of mind.",

id.
Id. at 982 (Stevens, J., concurring).
63 Maynard,486 U.S. at 363.
61
62

64 Id.

Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977).
State v. Dicks, 615 S.W.2d 126 (Tenn. 1981).
68
/d. at 127.
69 Id. at 128.
70 Id.
66
67
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Upon review, the Tennessee Supreme Court applied
a narrow interpretation of Tennessee's HAC aggravator,71
defining "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" as a
"'conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily
tortuous to the victim.'

' 72

Adhering to the United States

Supreme Court decision in Proffitt v. Florida, s which
interpreted a similar Florida statutory aggravator, the
Tennessee Supreme Court rejected Dicks's argument that
the
Tennessee
statutory
unconstitutionally vague.. ' 74

HAC

aggravator

was

D. Cone's Crime Spree and the Ensuing Criminal
Proceedings
On August 9, 1980, Cone's crime spree began when
he robbed a jewelry store in Memphis, Tennessee.75 While
attempting to drive away, Cone was spotted by police and a
high speed chase ensued. 76 Cone abandoned his car in a
residential neighborhood, shot both a police officer and a
citizen, and attempted to shoot a third person who refused
to give Cone his car.77 The following day, Cone again
appeared in the same residential area and pulled a gun on a
woman after she refused to let him use her phone.78 The
two-day crime spree concluded after Cone broke into an
elderly couple's home and brutally murdered the couple
after they refused his demands for help. 79 Cone was later
71 TENN. CODE ANN.§ 39-13 -204(i)(5).
72 See Dicks, 615 S.W.2d at 132 (quoting State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1,9
lfla. 1973)).
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 255-56.
74 Dicks, 615 S.W.2d at 132.
75 Cone, 243 F.3d at 965.
76
77
78
79

id.
id.
id.
id.
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arrested and charged with two 80
counts of first degree murder
for the elderly couple's deaths.
After the jury convicted Cone of first degree murder
as well as several other offenses committed during the twoday crime spree, Cone appealed directly to the Tennessee
Supreme Court, challenging both his conviction and death
sentence.8s Pursuant to TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-205, the
Tennessee Supreme Court conducted a mandatory review
of Cone's death sentence, which was consolidated with
Cone's direct appeal.8 2
After reviewing the four
aggravating factors the jury relied upon during Cone's
sentencing, the court concluded:
(1) that the evidence supported the finding
that Cone had been convicted previously of
one or more felonies involving violence; (2)
that the evidence supported the finding that
the murders were "especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel in that they involved
torture or depravity of mind"; (3) that the
evidence supported the finding that the
murders were committed for the purpose of
preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution;
and (4) that the evidence was insufficient to
support the jury's affirmative finding that
the petitioner "knowingly created a great
risk of death to two (2) or more persons,
other than the victim murdered, during [the]
act of murder."8 3
Accordingly, the Tennessee Supreme Court
affirmed both the first degree murder convictions and
80 Id.
81Id.; see TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-206(a)(1) (2003).
82 TENN. CODE ANN. §39-2-205 (1982) (current version at TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-13-206).

83 Cone, 359 F.3d at 788 (citing State v. Cone, 665 S.W.2d 87, 94-95
(1984) (emphasis in original)).
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Cone's death sentence. 84 In doing so, the court also
"considered the validity of the aggravating circumstances
85
relied on by the jury in imposing the death penalty.,
On June 22, 1984, Cone filed his first state postconviction petition alleging that his constitutional rights
were violated due to prosecutorial misconduct and
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. 86 The trial court
denied the petition, and the Tennessee Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed the denial of habeas relief. 87 The
Tennessee Supreme Court denied Cone's request for an
appeal. 88
Five years later, in his second state post-conviction
petition, Cone again alleged numerous violations of his
constitutional rights, including "an Eighth Amendment
claim that the language of the HAC aggravator considered
by the jury in the sentencing phase was unconstitutionally
vague." 89 The trial court determined that Cone's second
state post-conviction petition asserted claims that were
barred under Tennessee's post-conviction statute because
84

85

d.

Id. At the time of Cone's conviction, the death penalty could only be

imposed if the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that at
least one of twelve aggravating factors existed. See TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-2404(i) (1981) (current version atTENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-

204(i)). After finding Cone guilty of two counts of first degree murder,
in addition to other crimes, the jury found four of the aggravating
factors listed in Section 2404(i), including (1)the defendant's previous
conviction of one or more felonies involving the use or threat of
violence; (2) the defendant "knowingly created a great risk of death to
two or more persons, other than the victim murdered, during his act of
murder;" (3) the murder was committed to avoid or prevent the
defendant's arrest; and (4) the murder was "especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or depravity of mind."
Cone, 359 F.3d at 788.
86 Id. at 788-89.
87 Id. at 789.

88 Id.
89 Id. (emphasis

added).
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they had either been waived or previously determined. 90
The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial
court's holding. The Tennessee Supreme Court denied
Cone's application for permission to appeal, and the United
States Supreme Court denied Cone's petition for writ of
certiorari. 91

Still unsatisfied with the courts' determinations
regarding the constitutionality of his death sentence, Cone
filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in federal district
court. 92 Cone again argued that the HAC aggravator relied
upon by the jury in imposing the death penalty was
unconstitutionally vague and, therefore, violated his Eighth
Amendment rights. 93 The district court denied Cone's
petition. On appeal, however, the Sixth Circuit granted the
writ of habeas corpus, holding that Cone had been
"unconstitutionally denied the effective assistance of
counsel at sentencing. ' 94
In reaching its initial decision to grant habeas relief,
the Sixth Circuit found it unnecessary to address Cone's
cruel and unusual punishment argument. 95 The U.S.
Supreme Court, however, later reversed the Sixth Circuit's
grant of the writ and remanded the case for further
proceedings. 96 On remand, the Sixth Circuit noted that the
"Tennessee Supreme Court's 'implicit decision,' upon
mandatory review of Cone's death sentence, was that the
HAC aggravator relied upon by Cone's jury in imposing
the death sentence was not arbitrary, and consequently, not
unconstitutionally vague.
The court held that this
90

See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-111 (1990) (repealed by Post-

Conviction Procedure Act, ch. 207 § 1) (1995).
9' Cone, 359 F.3d at 789.
92 Cone, 243 F.3d 961. Thus, Cone had exhausted Tennessee's appeal
and post-conviction procedures.
93 Cone, 359 F.3d at 789.
94 Cone, 359 F.3d at 789; Cone, 243 F.3d at 965.
95 Cone, 359 F.3d at 789; Cone, 243 F.3d at 975.
96 Cone, 359 F.3d at 795.
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"implicit" Tennessee Supreme Court decision "was
contrary to clearly established U.S. Supreme Court
precedent as announced in Maynard 97 and Shell 98 and
made applicable to Cone's case via the rule of retroactivity
explained in Stringer.' 99
Having determined that the HAC aggravator was
unconstitutional, the final issue hinged on whether the
jury's reliance on the invalid aggravating factor constituted
harmless error. 1°°
The Sixth Circuit concluded that the
invalid aggravators "had [a] substantial and injurious effect
or influence"' 0 ' on the jury's imposition of the death
sentence. 102 As a result, the Sixth Circuit reversed the
district court's decision and remanded the case instructing
the district court to "issue a writ of habeas corpus vacating
the petitioner's death sentence due to the jury's weighing
of an unconstitutionally vague aggravating factor at
sentencing."103
E. Determiningthe Constitutionalityof the HAC
Aggravator
The fundamental issue in Cone involves the
"constitutionality of the jury's finding that the murders
97 Maynard, 486

U.S. at 356.
98 Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1 (1990) (per curiam).
99 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the U.S. Supreme Court remanded
the case for the court to consider the constitutional challenge to the
HAC aggravator raised by Cone in his petition for habeas corpus relief

Cone, 359 F.3d at 797.
100 Id. The harmless error standard is "whether the error had substantial
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Coe v.
Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 334 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that Sixth Circuit
could perform a harmless-error analysis to determine whether a jury's
reliance on the unconstitutional HAC aggravator required habeas relief)
(quotations omitted).
10'

Coe, 161 F.3d at 334.

102 Cone, 359 F.3d at 799.
103 Id.
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were 'especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel."" '
Before
Cone's conviction was finalized, "[n]o Supreme Court case
ha[d] addressed the precise language at issue." However,
after Cone's conviction, numerous decisions examining the
constitutionality of similar statutory language "indicate
clearly that the language of the HAC aggravator the jurors
used to 10sentence
Cone to death . . . is unconstitutionally
' 5

vague."

The importance of the HAC aggravator's
constitutionality is grounded in the belief that punishment
should not be arbitrary or capricious, but should be
proportionate to the criminal act. In the advent of the
AEDPA amendments to federal habeas corpus relief, Cone
argued that his death sentence was "contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States." 1 6 Consequently, Cone's habeas corpus petition is
of the utmost importance, and the judicial system was
required to carefully examine any and all constitutional
challenges raised. Furthermore, if Cone were "restrained of
his . . . liberty in violation of the constitution,"10 7 the

purpose of habeas relief, as envisioned by our forefathers,
would be seriously undermined.
IH.What Does Cone v. Bell Add to the Evolution of
Habeas Corpus Relief?
Since the AEDPA amendments to the writ of habeas
corpus took effect in 1996, courts hearing habeas petitions
have been given a kind of "instruction manual." Courts
only grant habeas corpus relief to state prisoners if the state
104 Id. at 788.
105 Id.at 795.
106

110 Stat. 1214 (codified in scattered sections of title 28 of the U.S.

Code).
107 14 Stat. 385.
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court adjudication of the claim "resulted in a decision that
was contrary to, or involved an unreasonableapplication
of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court."' 08 Therefore, in light of the Supreme
Court's holdings in Maynard, Shell and Stringer, the jury's
reliance on the HAC aggravator in imposing the death
penalty upon Cone clearly violated his constitutional rights,
a fact that was evident when the Sixth Circuit first heard
Cone's habeas petition in 2001. According to the Sixth
Circuit:
Normally, post-Cone decisions would be
immaterial, but . . .the Supreme Court's fairly
recent application . . . of the 'non-retroactivity'
of new constitutional rules, in the context of an
Eighth Amendment vagueness challenge to a
death penalty instruction, makes several postCone Supreme Court decisions not only
material, but controlling. 109
After Cone's conviction, the Court addressed whether the
language "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" was
unconstitutional in Maynard v. Cartwright."0 In short, the
Supreme Court determined that the vagueness ruling of

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)(emphasis added).
109 Cone, 359 F.3d at 795; see Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992)
108

(addressing the "new rule" non-retroactivity doctrine in regard to

Godfrey and Maynard); see, e.g., Maynard, 486 U.S. at 363-64
(holding Oklahoma's HAC aggravator unconstitutionally vague); Shell

v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1 (1990) (per curiam) (holding aggravating
factor containing language "heinous, atrocious, or cruel"

unconstitutional). But see Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 654
(1990) (holding "Arizona's 'especially heinous, cruel or depraved'
aggravating factor not facially vague") (emphasis added).

1 Maynard, 486 U.S. at 356.
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Godfrey, decided before Cone's conviction, was not limited
to the precise language at issue in that case."'
Therefore, "[i]n applying the language before [the
Court] in Maynard, [the] Court did not 'break new
ground."'''

2

Because the Maynard case did not "break new

ground," Godfrey clearly established the unconstitutionality
of the HAC aggravator in the early 1980's. n 3 Although
there are no "Supreme Court decisions that [are] 'on all
fours' with the instruction in Cone's case . . . Stringer's

statement that Maynard's invalidation of Oklahoma's HAC
aggravator was an 'old rule' dictated by Godfrey, points
ineluctably to the conclusion that Godfrey represents a
'clearly established' Supreme Court precedent dictating
that Tennessee's HAC aggravator is unconstitutionally
vague." 114 Therefore, Cone was entitled to habeas corpus
relief because the jury's reliance on the HAC aggravator
was "contrary to clearly established" Supreme Court
precedent existing at the time of Cone's sentencing. 115
IV. Habeas Corpus - A Procedural Safeguard for
Imposing the Death Penalty?
While some might argue that affording prisoners
sentenced to death numerous procedural means to
challenge their sentences does little to deter future crime,
"the utter finality of the death penalty may [also] cruelly
frustrate the cause of justice."
Therefore, the writ of
habeas corpus acts as a procedural safeguard to ensure that
the sentencer does not apply the death penalty in an
arbitrary or capricious manner. For, "[o]nce the prisoner
111 Stringer, 503 U.S. at 228-29.
112 Id. (citing Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407,412 (1989)).
113 Cone, 359 F.3d at 796.
4
11 Id. at 796-97.
115 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
116 Dicks, 615 S.W.2d at 136 (Brock, C.J., dissenting).

173

174 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY [VOL. I, 1]
has been put to death by the state there can be no relief
granted although later developments in the evidence of the
case or of the controlling law may show, conclusively, that
the penalty was mistakenly inflicted."' 7 Consequently, it
is crucial that prisoners sentenced to death are afforded an
opportunity to seek habeas relief to ensure that death is a
proper and proportionate punishment.
When the Sixth Circuit first addressed Cone's
petition for habeas corpus, it did not determine whether the
HAC aggravator was unconstitutional." 8
After the
Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's grant of habeas
relief, however, the Sixth Circuit had to confront this
constitutional challenge." 9 In failing to dispose of the
issue the first time around, the Sixth Circuit wasted
valuable time and resources. There is no doubt that this
was all in an effort to ensure that Cone was not put to death
unless his trial and sentence had been properly adjudicated.
Yet the question remains - was Cone really entitled to
habeas corpus relief? The answer is yes. Cone was entitled
to habeas corpus relief from the moment the jury
recommended the death penalty.
Although the jury recommended that Cone be
sentenced to death in 1984, the Sixth Circuit did not grant
habeas corpus relief until 2004. Why did the court not get
it right the first time? Cone challenged the constitutionally
of the HAC aggravator in his initial habeas proceedings in
2001, but the Sixth Circuit never addressed this
constitutional challenge once it determined that Cone was
entitled to habeas relief on his ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. Had the court ruled on both issues in 2001,
the habeas proceeding may not have reached the Supreme
Court only to be remanded again to the Sixth Circuit.
117 id.
118 Cone, 243 F.3d at 961.
119 Cone, 359 F.3d at 789.
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The Supreme Court requires that "a jury be given
guidance . . . when the death penalty is a possible
punishment."'' 20 This requirement stems from the idea that
"death remains as the only punishment that may involve the
conscious infliction of physical pain. . ., [and] mental pain
is an inseparable part . . . of punishing criminals by death,
for the prospect of ending execution exacts a frightful toll
during the inevitable long wait between the imposition of
sentence and the actual infliction of death."121
Additionally, the time between the sentence and the actual
execution is compounded by a prisoner's right to habeas
corpus relief. Given this option, few prisoners idley await
Instead, they file numerous post-trial
execution.
The
proceedings, including a habeas corpus petition.
question then becomes - is this all merely an effort to
postpone impending death or to prove that the death
sentence is improper under the circumstances of a given
case?
It has been almost twenty years since Cone was
sentenced to death for the brutal murders of an elderly
Unfortunately, the importance of the jury's
couple.
determination that the murders committed by Cone fit into
the category of "especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel"
and that the death penalty was the proper punishment has
diminished. Cone's case is so far removed from the actual
events of August 9, 1980, that it has become lost in a mess
of legal minutia that now focuses on Cone's life instead of
the elderly couples' deaths.
If nothing else, Cone's case should illustrate the
diligence with which federal courts should analyze habeas
corpus petitions in the future. If the Sixth Circuit analyzed
the constitutionally of the HAC aggravator in 2001, or
better yet, if the Tennessee Supreme Court properly
120 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 192 (1976).
121 Furman, 408 U.S. at 288 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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analyzed the HAC factor in 1984, Cone might be serving a
life sentence without parole. 22
The Tennessee Supreme Court arrived at a
conclusion that was opposite to existing Supreme Court
precedent when it "implicitly reviewed" Cone's death
sentence and
found that the HAC aggravator was
2
3
constitutional.'
In short, the HAC aggravator does not
"achieve principled distinction between those who receive
the death penalty and those who do not."1 24 The
Tennessee's HAC aggravator does not narrow the class of
people eligible for the death penalty because any murder
may be deemed "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel"
and, therefore, a finding of the same is totally arbitrary.
Furthermore, the HAC aggravator relied upon in Cone is
unconstitutional
because neither the aggravating
circumstance's plain language nor the court's attempt to
limit the construction thereof adequately informed the jury
of what it needed to find in order to punish Cone by death.
Even assuming that Tennessee's HAC aggravator
was constitutional and did not apply to every first degree
murder committed and that, therefore, Cone was "eligible"
for the death penalty, he should not have received the death
penalty. In the end, as the Sixth Circuit seemed to
conclude, the jury relied on emotion in deciding to
recommend a death sentence. For that reason, the sentence
was capricious. 125 As a result, the Sixth Circuit correctly
determined that the unconstitutionality of the HAC
aggravator had an injurious effect on the jury's sentence

122 See Cone, 243 F.3d at 961; Cone, 665 S.W.2d at 87.
123 See n.46 supra.
124 See Tuilaepa,512 U.S. at 995.

125 The narrow construction articulated in Dicks is also arbitrary
because it does not define what is meant by "unnecessarily tortuous" in
the same way that the HAC aggravator does not define what is
"especially heinous, atrocious or cruel."
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and properly instructed the district court to grant Cone's
habeas corpus petition, reversing his death sentence.
V. Conclusion
The death penalty is an unnecessary punishment
because "[s]ociety would be adequately protected from the
condemned murderer by his permanent irrprisonment." 126
Since the Tennessee and federal courts should have
rectified this constitutional issue at least three years ago,
Cone properly illustrates what can happen when a court
does not get it right the first time. In the aftermath of the
Sixth Circuit's decision, federal courts analyzing habeas
corpus petitions should always examine all of a petitioner's
arguments. After all, when a state prisoner petitions the
federal courts for a habeas corpus petition, a life hangs in
the balance.

NICOLE M. GRIDA

126

Dicks, 615 S.W.2d at 138 (Brock, C.J., dissenting).
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